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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL: ... I'm sure most of you know, Senator Newt Russell on 
my left, and on his left is Senator Barry Keene. My staff -- Paul Fadelli and Ann 
Gressani on my right. Mr. Shapiro at the end of the table and our secretary over here 
Patti Stearns. 
I want to welcome everyone to an important hearing by the Senate Committee on Energy 
and Public Utilities. I say right up front that it's an important one, because the issue 
of utility diversification is hot. And it's hot because it involves money. 
Across the board, every utility under the jurisdiction of this committee, and regu-
lated by the PUC in this state, is planning and strategizing and promoting new ventures 
into competitive markets to make money. 
Both the telecommunications utilities, which found last year that they could explore 
new competitive territories, and the energy utilities, who have found that their logical 
investment domain in areas of energy development may have topped out in the state, seem 
to be rushing to invest before the mysterious "window of availability" closes. 
As a small businessman myself, I say bravo to capitalism and the entrepreneurial 
spirit. Making money is fine. But as Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Public 
Utilities, what I must primarily be concerned with is the amount of money that every 
Californian pays in utility bills, and whether or not that amount is fair. 
This really is a hearing on fairness. Fairness to ratepayers who need guarantees 
that their hard-earned money, possibly earmarked for research and development to lower 
utility costs, is not instead used to purchase a fast-food chain. This is also a hearing 
on fairness to competitors who fear competition from challengers who have been provided 
with tremendous resources, experience and expertise by ratepayers. 
The word we will hear a lot about today is "cross-subsidization" and it is what this 
committee must work to prohibit. 
I have made no one-sided judgment yet on the merits of utility diversification. I've 
heard the fears, but there may be real advantages for ratepayers in wise investment that 
cnn be returned to the rate base. 
So we will hear diverse testimony. The PUC public staff has made some definitive 
recorr~endations to the commissioners who must make some difficult decisions in this area. 
And I'm sure we will hear some of the positive aspects from those in the business and 
utility communities. 
But there appears there is no middle ground with cross-subsidization as far as I'm 
concerned. If the line is fuzzy between a utility and subsidiary, if there is a question 
about influence and resources being used outside ratepayers' interest, then we are here 
today to begin to make that fuzziness go away. 
Helping to clarify the separation, we have as our first witness PUC Commissioner Vic 
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Calvo, who has just overseen a two-day proceeding on utility diversification at the 
Commission. Mr. Calvo. 
MR. VICTOR CALVO: Thank you, Senator Rosenthal. I appreciate the invitation to 
appear before you on behalf of the commissioners. 
The item, as you've indicated, is "hot". It's one that is attracting considerable 
press. As I understand, the Wall Street Journal yesterday had a rather extensive article 
on this subject matter. I was interviewed last week by a reporter for the Chicago 
Tribune. They're going to do a series on utility diversification. So it extends beyond 
the California borders. However, I think the focal point on diversification is here in 
California. 
We did have two days of hearings because this Commission has before it an applica-
tion by San Diego Gas and Electric Company to diversify. They're seeking the "holding 
company" format, and they want to get into primarily related services to that which 
they've been performing. 
We also have other pending applications and we have just come through the Pacific 
Telesis formulation. 
So the subject is before us and the Commission must decide what course it should 
take. 
As of now, I can tell you that our schedule is that on December 4, at our next 
regularly scheduled Commission meeting, we will have the generic subject presented. I 
will be presenting it to the Commission. We will make our decision on San Diego Gas and 
Electric probably in January based on the information that is presented and on the merits 
of that particular case, and the testimony that has been presented. 
Though I am not going to give you a Commission position today, what I intend to do, 
if it's agreeable with the committee members, is present an overview of the diversifica-
tion issue. Some of the benefits that accrue to diversification of utility interests, I 
will try to highlight what some of the drawbacks are and then give you the possible op-
tions that we are considering, which include, by the way, some legislative help. But I 
wanted to say right up front that we do not have a position other than that which is the 
Commission's position of the past, and that is working within the Public Utilities Code 
and taking every case on a case-by-case basis. 
I suspect that I should also, at this point, indicate when I say that we've taken 
these on a case-by-case basis that diversification is not a new subject. We can go back 
to 1935 when I believe Pacific Lighting was first formed. So it goes back that far. 
50 years. And they have functioned under the holding company format, and we've been able 
to regulate successfully and they have flourished. 
CP National more recently has gone into the holding company format. They have 
diversified. We've not had any great difficulty tracking them. And as I mentioned a 
moment ago, AT&T, following their break-up, spun off 22 operating companies. We now have 
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Pacific Telesis operating in California and Nevada with many, many fuctions that they are 
performing and more that they wish to perform under the Pacific Telesis label. 
Well, why is it that we are faced, however, with this increase in interest and why is 
this now a national subject? 
Well, I think that there's several reasons. The federal government has gotten into 
the act, so we have a national level approach. We certainly know what the courts did and 
Justice Greene with AT&T. Less noticeable but just as important was the congressional 
action that created PURPA for instance. There was an effort made to the energy utilities 
to diversify, to start buying energy from outside of the central generating units that 
they were creating. 
We have state action. The California Legislature over the last decade has passed 
considerable legislation which has encouraged small businesses getting into the energy 
field in particular. And there are, of course, many worldwide technical changes that are 
occurring, political conditions that exist, and economic climates that drive the interest 
into diversification. 
As far as the economic conditions that are changing, you will hear testimony by the 
energy utilities in particular that they must diversify because it appears that in the 
future their base, upon which they return their return, will decrease. They have come to 
a fork in the road. They have completed their large generating facilities. They're being 
depreciated. They have old plant which is worth lesseveryday. So they see their base 
being worth less and less everyday, and they see themselves as one of the utilities 
described in a possible death spiral with decreasing base and nowhere to go to increase 
their earning capacity. So the economic trends of the day do impact. 
There are technical changes. I mentioned PURPA and the burgeoning third party 
power producing industry which impacts the utilities. 
Politically -- "deregulation" has become the byword in the last 8 or 10 years. That 
also spawns interest in open competition and easier entry into what was once the private 
domain of the utilities. 
There are social conditions that also are important. Conservation has become a 
byword. Everybody uses less energy and is more conscious of their energy consumption. 
The world's oil crisis that hit upon us a decade ago also has had a strong impact 
on the position of the energy utilities. 
The California Public Utilities Commission can take some of the credit, or blame as 
.Lt might be, for the increased energy into diversification. What we have done over the 
last 5 or 6 years is create, I think, a very healthy climate for the.utilities by bringing 
.Lnnovation to the regulatory art. We have at least --well, we may not have that many 
now, but at one time we had 11 unique procedures for making sure that the utilities got a 
fair break on their investment. I can mention ECAC which took care of the power purchases 
between the generalratecases. We had the attrition hearings which crank in inflation. 
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And otl1er factors, we have CAN and GAC and all these other acronyms which stand for 
various adjustment mechanisms. 
So the utilities in the last two years in particular, since we've hit a stable eco-
nomic climate, inflation no longer is what it was, the utilities have been doing well for 
themselves. They have beenearning, by and large, the attributed return on equity. For 
the first time in many years they find themselves then with a lot of cash, and they don't 
like to be referred to as "fat cows." They want to be able to employ that revenue in 
some gainful purpose to bring back a return to the shareholder which is their management 
responsibility. So I think the fact that we improve the regulatory climate has impact on 
the need, or at least the desire for diversification. 
Regardless of the reasons, and as I've told you there are many for this emphasis and 
focus on diversification of utility interests, it is here before us now, and as you've 
indicated, Mr. Chairman, it's a hot subject matter and it must be dealt with. 
1 don't believe that the Commission can sit back as we have in the past when an 
occasional request came through and take that on a case-by-case basis and evaluate it. We 
still have major utilities out there in the straight utility format -- PG&E and Edison in 
particular who are looking at the possible different situations that might benefit them. 
So we have to look at this much more closely. 
I've given you the reasons for the situation. Now I want to discuss some possible 
danger signals and drawbacks that might exist if we proceed in an incautious manner. 
There are possible financial problems that can arise from diversification. Capital 
needs of an affiliate's activities may restrict the capital made available to the utility. 
You will hear that testimony today. The losses of affiliates may lower the credit rating 
of the diversified entity, thus raising the cost of capital. That's a possibility. 
Impending losses in the unregulated area may cause a holding company to exhaust the 
utility's working cash to secure debt with utility assets and to leverage the conglomerate 
into a financially untenable position. 
There are other financial implications, and I'm not going to get into them into any 
great detail at this moment. There is the potential for dilution of management. That 
concerns me that the existing boards may be so interested with the challenge of these new 
businesses where they don't have a lot of expertise that they will be focusing the major 
part of their attention and energy in that direction. 
Now, during the hearings that we held, a Professor Hayes of Harvard indicated that 
that was one of the strong points for diversification. He indicated that management 
having new challenges would benefit from it. I hope they don't need that to have an 
interest in the conduct of these businesses, but he did make, I think, one valid point 
and that is that it may draw people from the business schools to the utility business; 
whereas in the past they've not attracted a lot of that type students because the utility 
business has been viewed by many young people as being a business that doesn't offer the 
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challenges that, say, the electronics business or some of the others. 
But I worry about dilusion of management, and I'm sure that you're going to hear that 
that isn't the problem, and it may not be, but it's a caution flag that I would raise. 
1he difficulty of auditing a holding company or a diversified utility that diversi-
fies horizontally is not an easy matter. Mr. Ahern will tell you that even if you 
authorize this Commission more auditors and accountants, that they're still going to have 
difficulty tracking. 
I'm not sure that that's the case. I think that you can get to most of the problems, 
as we have in the past, by attention through skilled personnel looking at these applica-
tions. But nevertheless, it does present a problem. There are certainly some possible 
cross-suosidies that occur in the form of, say, information and data that can be passed 
along, or, say, the reassignment of key personnel that do not track in an audit trail at 
all, and these are, in effect, cross-subsidizations. We may have difficulty tracking as 
well as we would like, but that is a problem also, and I think one that requires some 
attention by the Legislature and certainly by the Commission being charged with the whole 
matter of whether or not there has been cross-subsidy in specific cases. 
You will probably get into the types of diversification, that is the structure, that 
can occur. I mentioned in passing that there is this horizontal diversification. That 
usually occurs where a utility staying in the utility form expands into a related func-
tion but still doesn't change in the structure that it originally had. The vertical type 
of diversification is more typically attributed to a holding company where you have a big 
umbrella holding company with the separate entities operating in various fields -- some 
that may or may not be related, 
And within the horizontal and the vertical type of diversification, you can find 
tight regulation as far as the commissions are concerned -- the public services commis-
sions -- or sort of a hands-off approach. In the questionnaires that we sent out during 
our hearings, we asked the various witnesses as to what kind of structure they preferred. 
Most of them responded that they liked the vertical holding company's form and the hands-
off. They wanted to have just regulatory review by the big commission. That was the 
most popular option of those that were presented. 
Now, where does that leave the California Public Utilities Commission? I mentioned 
to you that we're right in the middle of deciding a case and that we will have a presenta-
tion and a paper, which I'm working on right now, presented on December 4 which will give 
the Commission some options. I suspect that what will happen is that we will put off a 
decision until later on in the month while the other commissioners have an opportunity to 
acquaint themselves with the presentation and that we'll have some sort of a decision 
coming out in mid-December. 
1here are, of course, a variety of courses that we might take. We can continue as we 
ltave in the past and take everything on a case-by-case basis. We can ask for support from 
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the lature in getting us additional , 'such as the New Mexico legislation 
which allows the public service cornnrission there to ate hold companies to look at 
the various activities so long as the main function of that holding company is the utility 
business. That would take additional 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Hr. Calvo? Senator Russell has a question. 
MR. CALVO: All right. I only have about two more lines. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTI:IAL: Oh~ okay. 
MR. CALVO: May I just finish that? 
SENATOR NEWTON RUSSELL: Please do. 
MR. CALVO: Or we might just ask for some modest changes in present legislation --
the Sections 816 - 818 of the Public Utilities Code directs the utilities to spend money 
only in---capital only in related activities. That was amended somewhat this year and I 
suspect that there'll be some other efforts made to amend the Code; or we could go some-
wherein between, and that is to take the State of Oregon's path, and that would be estab-
lishing some very strict rules and regulations and guidelines for any utility that wishes 
to diversify -- a lot of hoops to jump through. 
That basically gets me to the end of my presentation. I'm not going to go into more 
speculation than that. 
Keady for your question, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. The PUC has had for some time, and the Legislature 
specifically put into statute that the PUC now has a Public Staff designed to look only 
at the issues from the ratepayers' perspective. My had always been that the PUC 
was established primarily to protect the ratepayer. So you have the PUC, who is designed 
to protect the ratepayer and look at everything in a fair manner; you have then the Public 
Staff that's supposed to do something that only relates to the ratepayer. 
On this issue, for example-- I note from the staff paper that's been given to us that 
the Public Staff is opposed to diversification -- how do you as a member of the PUC get an 
overall balanced view from your staff if one staff is saying, for example, no it's 
terrible and awful, and the other staff is to sort of be fair, which means that 
the scales are weighted to the side? How do you, in a practical way, how do you 
deal with that as a ioner in terms of making sure that you're getting the overall 
p ture from your staff? Is it difficult? 
MR. CALVO: It's difficult but we do it fairly. (Laughter.) I don't want to be 
facetious. Let me see if I can be more to the question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you get the information, the balanced information that you need 
from your s ? 
MR. CALVO: It's only been a 
c~un!unnLng leglslatlon as well as desire 
these cases and these broad generic 
now that we have established, through 
the Commission, a Public Staff which looks at 
issues from the ratepayers' side. That 
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has been a national trend. I think we were about the last of the populace states to have 
that kind of a situation. Most states have the attorney general, for instance, or a public 
advocate in those cases. We really never had anything until this came along. And they are 
good people. 
I look at my charge from reading the Code and from the experience that I've had there 
as not representing the public necessarily as a separate entity but representing the pub-
lic and making sure that that public is served by a utility in a very fair, reasonable 
fashion for the least amount of money possible in the conformity with that utility earning 
a rate of return on its investment -- the shareholders coming out. So it's a balancing 
act and that's the way I look at my decisionmaking looking at the ratepayer, looking at 
the shareholders, and then viewing the record that is established in the cases and trying 
to come up with a fair answer. 
Now, as to how do I evaluate the Public Staff's testimony -- I look at it as impor-
tant evidence presented by experts but not necessarily the only evidencenordo I always 
come down on the side of the Public Staff. It's just another part of the evidence that's 
introduced. It's valuable evidence, but so is the evidence introduced by a utility or a 
public intervener valuable information. So what we try to is just weigh these all out in 
conformance with our charge then of providing that service in a least possible cost and 
making sure that it's being performed properly. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, nobody that knows you would ever say anything other than that 
you are a fair person. We can disagree philosophically on issues, but the integrity is 
never impugned. But it would seem to me, if I were there, what I would need is a staff 
for the public, a staff for the utilities, and then a staff to referee. And you get all 
those and maybe you get then the information which will allow you to make a fair decision. 
It seems to me, from my philosophical viewpoint, that the scales are kind of weighted 
against your being as fair as you'd like to be based upon the information that you get 
only on that basis. 
MR. CALVO: Well, it may appear that way but I don't think it comes out that way. If 
you look at what the utilities have done in the last couple of years -- I mentioned at the 
very beginning of my presentation that they are earning their rate of return and that they 
are now cash cows and that's one reason, one impetus for their searching for diversifica-
tion. 
So with the advent of John Bryson as chairperson, we began to look at the balance 
much more closely, and I think that we've come up with fair decisions. The cost of ser-
vices in this state are not excessive when you compare them to other states, other urban 
states. We're higher in some areas, lower in others. Our telephone service is, I think, 
probably the least expensive and yet the utility is earning its rate of return. So I 
tl1ink we've done a fairly good balancing act over the last half a decade. By the way, 
thnt half n decade fits my term by coincidence. (Laughter.) 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, I don't want to blame you then. If, in fact, as you indi-
cate, the utilities are accumulating cash isn't this evidence that maybe you were too 
generous in giving the utilities the increases that have applied for? 
MR. CALVO: You might look at it that way. I think the reverse. For many years 
idn' t, didn't earn their return. There was of 6 or 7 years when stock was 
below-book and they were just struggling to make their dividend commitments. What we've 
done is to try to balance the scales a little bit in giving them that opportunity. The 
reason they have cash, and they'll respond to this --well, there are many rea~ons --but 
one is that they're no longer invest in major plant, and that's a big, big difference. 
They don't have retained earnings to sink into a Diablo or a San Onofre. Expansion, or 
the consumption of energy has leveled off, and we have also gotten into a period of eco-
nomic prosperity, so to speak, where interest rates have fallen. The money is maybe two-
thirds of what it was 4 or 5 years ago. That has a big impact and the inflation rate 
having scaled down. 
So all of these factors come together to allow the utilities to earn their rate, and 
to not have a ready investment for their earnings. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, but how do you predict the future in terms, for example, 
supposing there is a reversal? Supposing 3 or 4 years from now we go back into what hap-
pened during those 5 or 6 years, and we have now permitted these funds to be siphoned off. 
At what point then is the ratepayer at risk in terms of now they're asking for higher in-
creases perhaps than would have been necessary had they had the cash to either reduce rates 
to the ratepayer or not ask for increases? 
MR. CALVO: They could do several 
just ask for reduced rates, which .•. 
with the cash have. One would be to 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL Give money back to the ratepayer. 
MR. CALVO: Give money back. Another is they could just put it in the bank and in-
vest it and hold it for rainy day and get more cash as a result. What they are doing is 
to invest it in what they see as related ventures to be able to continue to attract 
investors in this market 're in. 
I don't know what's going to happen 5 years down the line, Senator. If I were to 
guess, I would say that we're going to enter an 
is going to be worth a lot more than it is 
period again and that energy 
And what that means as far as regula-
tion is concerned might impact diversification one way or another, but I don't think it 
makes our decision any easier today trying to 
down the line. 
what we be doing 5 years 
CHAI~~ ROSENTHAL: One other question I have, and then I think Senator Keene has 
one. Do the utilities carry the burden of an affirmative showing that diversifica-
tion is actually going to benefit the ratepayer? 
MR. CALVO: That is an item that will be discussed at our December 4 meeting. And 
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there is a difference of opinion as far as I can tell amongst the commissioners. I feel 
that the utility has the burden. I feel that the ratepayer must at least be neutral and 
not hurt by any diversification. I might even go one step beyond that, although I'm not 
sure at this point, and say that the ratepayer must benefit directly from diversification. 
Those are the three possible positions. We've not established policy yet, except that our 
past performance by decisions indicate that the Commission has always respected the posi-
tion of neutrality to the ratepayer, that the burden is with the utility and that the rate-
payer must not be burdened in any way. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene? 
SENATOR BARRY KEENE: I can't yet tell which of the questions that are in my mind 
make practical sense or not, but let me ask them anyway. One is whether your concerns 
where the utility diversifies into other activities that are also within the regulatory 
purview of the PUC, does that diminish or cause your concerns to vanish or do you still 
have some of them, and if so, which ones? The utility, again, is A, B, C, all of which 
are also regulated activities. 
MR. CALVO: If the utility diversifies, and now I think we're talking primarily of 
what is known as horizontal diversification, it still maintains the form that it now has, 
and if it goes into a related service, we would still continue to regulate it. 
SENATOR KEENE: What if it's unrelated -- if it's an energy company that goes into 
communications, for example? 
MR. CALVO: They might make a case for related but I don't think that they would---
that they would have a strong case. I would say an unrelated venture would be PG&E's 
interest a year ago in the Sera 1 company 
how I really started looking into this. 
Nutrasweet. That got my interest and that's 
Seven or eight years ago, or maybe it's 10 or 12 years ago, PSA, when they were still 
regulated by the Public Utilities Commission, diversified to the extent that they bought 
some hotels and tuna boats and one thing and another and they were going under, and that 
to me is diversification that is harmful to the ratepayer in an area that is unregulated. 
SENKfOR KEENE: I understand that. Let's say, for example, Southern Pacific once 
owned GTE Sprint I think, or something. Is that correct? 
MR. CALVO: Yes they did. 
SENATOR KEENE: Since both the railroad is regulated by the PUC and the communication, 
then-::;ubsidiary I guess, was regulated by the PUC, would you have concerns about that kind 
of situation? 
MR. CALVO: I think I would have less concerns as far as a closely related service or 
function than one that is totally unrelated. Now, if they go into the holding company 
format, and we accept that as being a course that will be allowed, then they will be going 
into some unrelated functions and I don't know if we can ever have control over that. 
Tl1at would worry me, but you'll hear people here testifying today that that's what we ought 
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to do is allow them to---let management make management decisions in any venture that 
seems promising, whether they have 
SENATOR KEENE: Maybe I'm missing 
in it or not. 
I don't see railroad and telephone as 
c related. 
MR. CALVO: Well~ the reason ••• 
SENATOR KEENE: I see them both as regulated. 
MR. CALVO: I'll tell you why they started that. It was their own communication 
system, you see. It was to tie in the transportation system and they used it solely for 
themselves when it was first formed, and then after several years they began to branch 
out a little bit and decided it wasn't really what they wanted to do so they sold it. They 
started looking for a buyer once they grew to the point where it was very competitive and 
got out of their immediate usage. They had their own system primarily as a railroad 
communication system. 
SENATOR KEENE: Has the PUC ever attempted to assert jurisdiction over a nonregulated 
activity that is controlled by a regulated entity? Say, you know, whoever it was that 
got Nutrisweet --who'd you say it was? 
MR. CALVO: The S eral company. No, that never went through and they withdrew their 
offer and fortunate for everybody, but that didn't occur. But that's what got me inter-
ested in looking into this whole matter of such an unrelated venture. It seemed to me to 
be somewhat risky, particularly in that field where sweeteners have gone on the market and 
then off the market with great losses to investors. 
SENATOR KEENE: And the PUC has never attempted to assert jurisdiction over the un-
regulated venture ••• 
MR. CALVO: No. 
SENATOR KEENE: venture of a regulated entity. 
l1R. CALVO: Except I mention, and this was way before my time, the famous case I've 
heard mentioned several times in the halls, there was a PSA case of the tuna fleet and 
the hotels and so forth. They came to the PUC for an increase and it was denied and they 
were directed towards divesting themselves of these other ventures which seemed to be 
them under. 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you. 
CHAIR}UU~ ROSENTP~L: One more question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Tell me, Vic, to what extent does the PUC control the fact that 
hese companies may or may not ? Is it strictly as it relates to the rates? 
You can't say we're not going to allow you to diversify, but you can say if you diversify 
we're going to do thus and so with your rates, or whatever. Is that basically what the 
hammer is? 
MR. CN,VO: No, the Code section that I made mention to, Public Utilities Code 
Section 816, 817 and 818, prescribed the way a may invest its money, and that's 
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the handle that we use, and that's why San Diego Gas & Electric is before us, because they 
cannot invest any money that's generated from the service that they perform for anything 
unle8 s a related venture is involved. And then they must come before us and we make the 
decision. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is that applied to the capital also? 
MR. CALVO: The capital? Money? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Capital, income, anything. 
MR. CALVO: Yes, any money. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So you really have, so to speak, a life and death hold over what 
they do with their money. 
MR. CALVO: At this point we do, but in that Code section, and that's why San Diego 
Gas & Electric is before us, for instance, and that section of the Code was amended to 
indicate, as I recall this year, and I didn't follow that too closely, but an amendment 
was inserted which required us to stay within the area of directly related functions. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman, are these companies, these holding companies then 
that you've given us lists of all been approved and are existing or are they pending? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: They're existing. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So they've been given approval by the PUC? Is that correct? 
MR. CALVO: Yes. The Public Utilities Commission has been taking these cases as 
they come before us one-on-one. Since 1935 we've been approving diversification and .•. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It's not a new phenomenon, it's just kind of blossomed lately. 
MR. CALVO: Yes. The impact is now, as I indicated in my opening statements, for 
various reasons -- economic, political, social, technological and so forth. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Mr. Calvo. Mr. John Hardy, Vice 
President of Standard and Poor. 
MR. JOHN HARDY: Thank you very much, Senator, for asking me to come today. I'd 
like to refer the committee to written statement that I filed with the California PUC at 
the time of their hearings on diversification. I understand the committee has it. 
It's particularly useful in that the second part contains a fairly comprehensive of 
the effect of diversification on bond ratings throughout the United States to this point 
in time. 
My comments are offered neither for nor against utility diversification, or organi-
zation. We will certainly evaluate any action taken here in California for its effect on 
California utilities. 
Before I really get into my remarks, I'd like to define briefly for you what an S&P 
credit rating is. A credit rating is an assessment of credit risks. It represents our 
opinion on the likelihood of timely payment of interest and principal on debt or preferred 
stock security. It's neither an audit nor a recommendation to buy or sell. We don't 
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manage investment funds, offer consulting services or provide rate case testimony for 
either party. But we do however, express our on matters that we in fact feel 
will affect the credit Hence why appearance before the California PUC. 
We do not advocate either high or low 
of our rates. 
Our interest is in the accuracy 
Strong bond ratings have traditionally been to all utilities, reflected as 
they are in the utilities' cost of borrowed funds. Those costs ultimately affect rates. 
Strong bond ratings derive from profitable operations, adequate cashflow, conservative 
capital structures, and the qualitative factors of management, regulation and operating 
efficiency that makes such financial performance possible. 
California utilities in general have been able to maintain strong bond ratings. At 
the same time potential tax actions. such as the elimination of the investment tax credit, 
may reduce cashflows sufficiently to require utilities who do not need external capital 
today to need it again at a future time. 
At the same time, as Commis.sioner Calvo mentioned, utilities in many parts of the 
country are finding themselves interested in utilizing equity funds, deriving from their 
profitable operations, but presently not required in those operations. 
There are questions about whether or not this additional equity should be accumulated, 
as was raised earlier. or some other disposition of it. There are questions about the 
possibility of rate reduction. That could amount to a formofconfiscation, which could 
credit quality. Other solutions • such as purchase securities purchases, 
repurchases, or higher would lead to tax for the investors and the 
disaggregation of useful capital. 
Other utilities have sought diversification as a better way of earning equal or 
returns for their investment. And, of course, this is diversification. We don't 
advocate diversification. We've stated in the past many times that the most direct route 
to improved credit quality would be to reduce debt and earn a full equity return on a 
level of stockholder equity. 
What other characteristics of diversification investment? I think you've heard some 
remarks to the effect that they're generally much riskier than any present utility 
, as they operate without a franchise, with different products, services and 
customers in a marketplace, and also different kinds of manage-
ment skills. Each kind of diversification, whether it's a start-up or a purchase of a 
concern, will bring its own special set of risks. 
Perhaps most important, and I think the focus of this hearing, is that diversifica-
tion carries the risk of uncertain long-term regulatory treatment. S&P does not regard 
the actions or promises of a current commission as binding on any subsequent commission. 
Therefore attainment of consistency of treatment can be critical for the future. 
Use of revenues, royalties, assets or from successful diversification unfor-
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tunate to subsidize utility rates is a real possibility. Such subsidization, we would 
feel, would be a meaningful risk to long-term credit quality because it masks the inability 
of the utility to operate in a manner consistent with our current credit rating criteria. 
Assessing the impact of diversification on utility .•. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Could you say that in other words, please? 
MR. HARDY: Okay. You mean that question. 
SENATI)R RUSSELL: Yes. Masks its ability ... 
MR. HARDY: All right. The situation would be very definitely where some income 
stream was assigned or imputed to the regulated utility, thereby reducing its revenue 
requirements. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: For that other .•• 
MR. HARDY: For their normal regulatory rate of •.. I'm sorry. The normal regulated 
utility activities. This would create a situation where for regulatory purposes the 
returns were far higher than they were for any financial calculation and that in turn 
would create pressure on the company's bond rating. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. I understand. 
MR. HARDY: In the assessing the impact of diversification and utility credit quality, 
we would be concerned with whether the utility bondholders are effectively insulated from 
the different risks associated with diversified activities. Such elements of effective 
insulation might include establishment of separate corporate entities; separate manage-
ments to ensure dedication to the utility business; a minimum of arms-length transactions 
at market price equivalent between the utility and non-utility; effective assurances that 
regulation permit investors to keep the benefits of successful diversification, as well as 
the loss of unsuccessful investments; and effective assurances that management can manage 
without undue interference. 
Is there a structure that would ensure effective insulation? Well, any structure 
that allows free transfer of assets back and forth between the utility and non-utility 
segments would be viewed by ourselves as being just one entity for credit quality pur-
poses. Risks and strengths would be consolidated since management would be regarded as 
managing the overall organization of common goals and objectives. Thus the risks of 
diversified activities could partly offset the utility's credit strengths and overall 
credit risks would rise. 
Rating would then reflect the consolidated credit risks directly, and any less in 
credit quality could partly affect the ratepayer through a higher cost of utility capital. 
On tl1e other hand, with perfect insulation, such diversified activities would be 
ignored in looking at the utility, and the credit quality and ratings would affect the 
credit quality of the utility by itself. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How would that be any different than it is today, though? 
MR. HARDY: In any structure today that Wl' have, where you have a separate holding 
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company and you have diversified activities here and like---excuse me, regulated utility 
here, we would be able to. because we see the two , to look at the regulated 
utility from a total perspective credit---utility credit perspective. If you asked us to 
look at the holding company, we would look at it as a sum of the non---the risks, the 
of each separate entity. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Don't you -- I guess I'm a "Johnny-come-lately 11 on this -- I wasn't 
as aware that utilities were involved in this diversification since 1935 --but don't you 
tend today to look at utilities---aren't most utilities a single entity now, and don't you 
look at them that way? 
MR. HARDY: Within---because of the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, many of the 
electric and gas distribution companies are separate companies. Whereas in the area of 
telecommunications and pipelines we see a great many holding companies and operating sub-
sidiary situations. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: They're hybrids. 
MR. HARDY: They are not hybrids. They are something that have arisen since that 
point in time. When they wrote the Public Utility Holding Act in 1935 they did not en-
vision the growth of these other , nor was telecommunications or the pipeline dis-
tance sufficiently large and significant within the economy for the~ to have included it 
in the Act. That's why you see electrics and big gas distribution companies as primarily 
separate -- telecommunication companies generally as members of holding companies. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: In assessing the quality of a regulated entity, the rate of return 
is something that's obviously a key factor -- one of the key factors. Where a utility 
has the ability to invest in other activities which are not regulated, is that taken into 
consideration? Maybe that should also be addressed to Mr. Calvo. Is that taken into 
consideration in whether the rate of return is reasonable or more than is reasonable? 
MR. HARDY: The fact that they can invest and do invest in nonregulated diversified 
activities would tend to dictate the need for a rate of return, believe it or not, 
as there has to be some offset for an overall corporate rate of return. There has to be 
an offset of the higher risks involved in these diversified activities. The utility por-
tion of it could continue to have the same rate of return, but the nonregulated diversi-
fied activity would have to show a higher rate of return to offset its particular activ-
ities and then .•• 
SENATOR KEENE: Because of the higher risks in the unregulated activities. 
MR. HARDY: Yes. And then the entire The calculated overall return for it 
would then have to show the sum of those two returns. 
MR. CALVO: Let me respond to that because he's responding to it as a rating agency. 
And when we look at a request for rate increase, we don't look at the nonregulated ven-
tures. For instance, the perfect example of that is Southern California Gas. We look at 
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only that which is a proper expense, a proper rate base, that which is part of the rate 
case. And what happens out there, and I don't know just how many unregulated entities 
they have, but it's into the dozens. We're not concerned with that, and I think we've 
been able to just keep our sights focused on that entity that is the utility itself and 
we don't care about the holding company-- Pacific Lighting and what their rate of return 
is. We're just concerned about what the gas company should be getting. 
SENATOR KEENE: So the holding company which may hold A) a regulated entity where 
the rate of return, let's suppose, is not very good, just hypothetically; and B) which 
is an unregulated activity where the rate of return may be enormous because they made a 
very, very good investment, you don't look at that at all and you say that the rate of 
return may be, should be increased because it's unreasonable over on the regulated side. 
It's unreasonably low on the regulated side. 
MR. CALVO: That cuts both ways. It could be that they're losing or gaining, so we 
don't try to speculate on what the holding company is doing. We have a very narrowly-
focused general rate case before us, and I can say this, that in my experience, the 
utility itself is by far the biggest venture of that holding company. It could be 90%. 
They might have 20 or 30 other ventures, but that's the big function and that's where 
their main board of directors resides and where the decisions are made for the utility. 
SENATOR KEENE: Why then doesn't it become something of a shell game where increasing 
percentages of the revenues go into the unregulated area in order to keep the rate of 
return within the range of what the PUC would regard as reasonable and never in excess of 
that, because if it were tn excess of that, rates to ratepayers would have to be lowered 
under your formulas. Why doesn't it become that sort of shell game which would really 
Jrive these revenues under the ••. 
MR. CALVO: That can happen and that was one of the detractions that I mentioned to 
the formulation of a holding company and it's difficult to track. We think we have in 
place sufficient safeguards to prevent that from occurring, but it certainly is a pos-
sibility that they can siphon off energy and talent and also, not necessarily money because 
that's easy to keep track of, but for instance, patents, information, trade secrets and 
so forth to the unregulated and ..• 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, if I were a utility manager, just a prudent utility manager 
not trying to get away with something, I would certainly not want to get stuck with an 
unreasonably high rate of return coming before the PUC. And if it appeared that for that 
year I was going to have one, I would certainly, as a prudent manager, transfer that over 
to tl1e unregulated entity where you wouldn't look at it, 
MR. CALVO: There are countervailing forces at play because we don't have just one 
utility in this state, we have several -- 4 or 5 major utilities and we weigh one 
against the other in the total economic scene and that gives us an opportunity then to 
compare, and if there's something totally amiss, we're going to be able to spot it I think 
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in the complex rate case which goes on for months at a time and testimony unending. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Hardy, are you just about concluded with yours? 
MR. HARDY: I've got a few more remarks here. Two things I'd like to say is that the 
model of the utility, the model of diversification where the subsidiary, the nonregulated 
subsidiary is an asset of the utility, we think would be somewhat less---have less capa-
bility of insulation, which is the very thing that Commissioner Calvo was talking about, 
being able to separate the regulated utility from the diversified activities and assess 
its credit quality on its own is for really the key thing from our perspective here. 
I would refer you to, in the interest of time, I would refer you to the paper I'd 
already filed with the California Commission. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman? I know you have an agenda to keep, but I think Mr. 
Hardy's comments are pretty important in my trying to get a grasp of this. If you want 
to come back to him later if we have more time or if you want him to continue, I'd like 
him to finish. But time will not permit, maybe Mr. Hardy, if you have to leave •.• 
MR. HARDY: Yes, I do, unfortunately. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh, all right. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, if you haven't completed the point that you wanted to 
make, why don't you take a couple of more minutes? 
MR. HARDY: No, the important thing I---let me reiterate two points. We're neither 
for nor against diversification. All we do is assess what happens. We think that the 
holding company structure is probably one where it is most possible to isolate, insulate 
the regulated utility from the rest of the activities within the corporation and make it 
cleaner and clearer to see the credit quality there by itself and the regulators to assess 
proper rates of return on it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: If utilities then, from what I think you've said, if they 
diversify into unrelated ventures as to the area---opposed to the areas in which they have 
expertise in which you have rated them, Standard and Poor's will consider that utility 
to be a greater risk? 
MR. HARDY: If the utility is in the form of---if it's where the diversification is 
merely an asset, a subsidiary of the utility itself. If it's involved in a holding com-
pany, then we think that it is probably possible to separate the credit risks. 
SENATOR KEENE: Where you have regulated and unregulated activities, is there some 
ratio of assets of regulated activities to unregulated activities where you're not par-
ticularly troubled? If, for example, 20% of the assets of a holding company are in an 
unregulated activity, does that trouble ••• 
MR. HARDY: At the point where 20% -- most companies today, that is not the case. 
But where assets are 80% regulated and 20% nonregulated, then we would evaluate -- unless 
it's in a holding company format-- we would very much evaluate the risks and returns of 
the nonregulated portion in assessing the overall credit risk. 
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SENATOR KEENE: Okay, but is 20% troubling? 
MR. HARDY: It's hard to say. In each case we've got to look at it individually, just 
as the California PUC looks at each case individually. It's almost impossible to make a 
blanket statement. 
SENATOR KEENE: I'm just wondering whether it's worth the regulatory effort or really 
assessable to go into each case and try to figure out whether this is a good idea or a 
bad idea and to kind of look over the.shoulder constantly at the utility manager, or 
whether it might just not be easier to say if you're a regulated entity, a certain per-
centage cf your assets can be invested in nonregulated ventures and you do it anyway you 
want to, but beyond that point you can't go. 
MR. HARDY: That's the kind of question I would defer to Commissioner Calvo. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, I'll just throw it on the table for now. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You have no opinion on that? 
MR. HARDY: We'd have to see how it came out. How it worked out. 
MR. CALVO: We haven't kicked that around, setting a percentage. My own feeling 
would be that an arbitrary limit is not necessarily the way to go. It's better to view 
each case separately. 
Just for the record, you got into a very interesting subject there as to structure 
ltnd the distance from the main service that a utility might enter into. We had three 
individuals -- professors from Academia -- testify, and I'll leave the record here, by the 
way, before I go for the committee-- it's all in here-- but they all testified basically 
along this line that if you diversify away from the main service, even though it's in 
holding company form and easy to track, that the chances for success are diminished. The 
greatest chances for success, the ratio of success, is in closely related subject matter 
whether it's in the horizontal utility, corporate form or the holding company structure. 
That seems to be a general rule that they all agreed to. The farther away you get from 
home, the greater the chances of failure. 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes, but you can imagine a perfectly dreadful investment that's 
right in the area of what the utility •.• 
MR. CALVO: Sure. Yes, that isn't to say that they can't fail at home. Some of them 
do. 
SENATOR KEENE: And yet the PUC would approve it under that criteria. 
MR. CALVO: Well, hopefully, we would be able to evaluate whatever application was 
better than that, but of course it could happen that, you know---I'm sure that if I 
research the record, I could come up with failures within the utility structure. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay? All right, Mr. Conlon, the partner in Arthur Andersen 
and Company. 
MR. P. GREGORY CONLON: Thank you. I do have a written statement that I've prepared 
and brought with me today and there are copies available. 
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As indicated, I'm a partner with Arthur Andersen and Company in our San Francisco 
office and I'm responsible for our regulated industry practice in northern California and 
in the northwest United States. I've been in the regulated industry practice for over 27 
years so that's my specialty with the firm. 
We at Arthur Andersen are pleased to present our comments here today on utility 
diversification. 
In serving over one-third of the electric and gas distribution companies in the 
United States, as well as a majority of the independent telephone holding companies and 
the gas pipeline companies who have had extensive experience in diversification activities, 
our audit clients in California are PG&E, Southern California Edison ••• You have that? 
All right. 
I think our experience does give us a perspective because of the other clients that 
have gotten into this arena of diversification, particularly in other jurisdictions. And 
just very quickly, there are 5 areas that I tried to summarize in my statement as to why 
these companies are diversifying. I think competition, regulatory mandate, substitute 
services, falling demand for the basic core service, and finally the threat of corporate 
takeover. 
And just briefly, I think competition has been mentioned here quite a bit and their 
basic business has forced them to go into nonregulated businesses, or they're going to run 
the risk of declining revenues and declining net income. And I think that the telecom-
munications, it's obvious with the restructuring and the limitation on intralata calls; 
and the gas distribution business, the lack of losing large customers to oil; and now with 
the new gas regulation you went into yesterday, the risk of gas producers selling directly 
to large industrial customers. 
So I think competition is rearing its head in all three basic services. And electric, 
I think the risk of losing large industrial customers to cogeneration is upon us, as 
indicated by certain major utilities. 
Regulatory mandate -- the Commissioner indicated the FCC is restructuring some of the 
basic services of the telephone industry. Judge Greene in the MFJ, PURPA and then the new 
gas transportation order that came out just recently. 
Substitute services we've talked about. In areas outside of California, I think the 
declining revenues and demand for basic utility service, particularly plant construction, 
has created these large cash balances and the construction and the equity balances that 
were mentioned earlier. 
I think in these situations of the high cash balances, that has left some utilities, 
particularly the medium-sized and small utilities, vulnerable to corporate takeovers. I've 
just gone through that with one of my clients in another state. So I think as you get 
these high cash balances and high equity balances, there is another risk-- it's probably 
not too likely in California -- but it is a risk. 
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So I think in California and other states that you're going through a situation where 
tl1ese companies are going into diversification because of the need to recognize the state 
of change that's happening and restructure themselves. 
We believe that ratemaking objectives of a diversification program should be struc-
ture to, first, protect the ratepayer from cross-subsidization of diversified activ-
ities; and second, to provide the environment, to allow the shareholders the opportunity 
to earn a competitive market return on their investment in unregulated diversified 
activities commensurate with the business risks taken. 
Now, the ability to protect the ratepayer and provide the environment to the share-
holders to earn this return is premised upon a clearly defined ratemaking policy for 
diversified activities and separate accountability for those activities. Now, the 
establishment of clearly defined ratemaking policies and a clear separation of diversified 
activities should be achieved regardless of the regulatory strategy adopted by the 
California Commission -- the horizontal, vertical or unrelated, which Commissioner Calvo 
touched on this morning. 
Now, a ratemaking plan for diversification activities which meets these two objec-
tives must address three areas: first, organizational structure; second, asset transfers, 
including personnel; and third, transfer pricing, including joint services. And to touch 
on each of these briefly: 
Organization structure. We believe that structural separation is the ideal method of 
separation, assuming that it's feasible, because it ensures a greater level of account-
ability than other alternatives. Diversified activities perferrably should be placed in 
a separate subsidiary but at a minimum in a separate division or separate set of accounts 
with unregulated accounting. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point, Mr. Chairman? Not to get into an argument, but I 
think I heard Mr. Calvo say that professorial types, from their testimony, would disagree 
with this approach, if I understand what he said and what you said. You're saying it 
should be clearly delineated and defined as separate entities. I think Mr. Calvo said 
that the professors indicated that the further away they got, the more defined they got, 
the more difficult it became to turn a proper profit. Is that basically what the pro-
fessors were indicating? 
HR. CALVO: However, most of them feel, and they grudgingly come to the conclusion, 
that if you're going to have diversification, it should be through holding company form. 
But the comment I made was only to the type of activity regardless of the form. If it's 
removed considerably from what they are doing, the chances of success for that activity 
diminish. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In terms of product? 
MR. CALVO: Products. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. I missed that. I thought you were talking about in terms 
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of structure. 
MR. CALVO: No. No. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay, thank you. 
MR. CALVO: It has no relationship to structure but what they were doing. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
MR. CONLON: All right, a holding company organizational structure is preferrable but 
not required. With a holding. company structure, the basic utility business and the diver-
sified business would be in separate and distinct subsidiaries of the holding company. 
Which structure is selected will depend upon the ability to clearly separate the par-
ticular assets, personnel and other services. If there is a clear separation of resources, 
a separate subsidiary would be preferrable. Without a clear separation of resources, 
separate accounting within the regulated utility would be more practical. 
A holding company structure facilitates separation of management effort. A holding 
company structure also provides an efficient vehicle for obtaining financing and it can 
employ economies of scale in the provision of joint services to both the diversified and 
the regulated operation. This can result in lower revenue requirements for the utility 
operating company, as well as lower costs for the unregulated subsidiaries. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is that structure also the easiest for the PUC to determine whether 
or not there's any skullduggery going along with transfer of assets and skimming profits 
off, or whatever they might do? 
l1R. CONLON: Well, I think the intent on this separateness is to allow third parties, 
including the Commission, and ourselves, to better identify these transactions as they 
occur and better account for the activities in each of these entities. I mean, the comment 
about separating the revenues between the regulated and unregulated, I think if you have 
separate subsidiaries with separate audited statements, or without separate audited state-
ments, you still have a better ability to identify the revenue streams, expenses and so 
on. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Therefore the holding company approach is the best way. 
MR. CONLON: From the separateness standpoint. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yes. 
MR. CONLON: All right, as far as asset transfers, asset transfers to be priced to 
ensure that their utility is compensated for the fair value of the asset, market base 
transfer prices achieve these objectives. They are difficult to determine because they 
presume perfect or near perfect markets for the assets. 
Because of the difficulties inherent in trying to apply market base pricing, full 
cost pricing is generally recommended. With regard to asset transfers, full cost normally 
remains----relates to book value with some adjustments. 
Transfer pricing. Again, intercompany transfer pricing, these transactions that go 
on between the subsidiaries, we believe should follow the same guidelines, market base 
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practical, full cost, otherwise which would include indirect overheads and return on 
investment. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Assume this structure that you're describing, and assume that one 
or more of these diversified companies is really---becomes an albatross, and to say the 
company, what can the holding---is there any way in which the holding company could 
or would or should take some assets or loan them or transfer them from, say, the utility 
if they had a surplus of cash to bail out for a temporary period this other company in 
that structure? Is that possible? 
MR. CONLGN: Well, I think that the transactions between the utility and the holding 
company are certainly under the jurisdiction of the California Commission, so that they'd 
have the right to review anJ generally give some approval to those transactions. So what 
happens at the holding company, when the assets get to the holding company, you know, 
management can decide whether they want to invest more money into a losing cause or to 
cut it loose. Whichever they decide would be up to them. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Can the holding company, if you have five companies, can they pick 
and choose l1ow they want to transfer assets and put cash in among the five? 
MR. CONLON: Yes. I mean, my understanding is that generally in a holding company 
~c>tructure that the holding company management has the prerogative to make its judgments as 
lo where they invest money. 
SENATOR RUSS~LL: But the holding company structure clearly would show that, and the 
PUC would be able to see that before the fact and say ..• 
MR. CONLON: Absolutely. You have the right to review the transactions as it goes 
between the utility and the holding company. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay, thank you. 
SENATOR KEENE: And under what circumstances could the PUC block a transfer of assets? 
MR. CONLON: Well, I think the Commissioner could best answer that, but I think they 
have general powers to control the utilities' rates. Now, as far as payment of dividends, 
I think that those are stockholder funds, and I think the Commissioner probably would be 
in a better position to answer that. 
Senator Keene: And the correlating question is: 
of the nonregulated entity? 
Couldn't that impair the security 
MR. CALVO: It could. 
and entering the utility. 
We do have complete control of revenues leaving the utility 
That's---done that right along and I don't see that as being a 
problem. But as far as unwise investments impacting the utility, that is a possibility, 
because, say, if every venture that Pacific Telesis enters into is a failure, certainly 
that's going to make that stock worth less and then financing or capital costs higher, if 
you make a worse out of it. It can impact adversely. That's one of the conerns that we 
have. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point, briefly. Do you foresee then, in effect, the 
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Commission, present and future, entering into management decisions and saying we don't 
think this is a good investment or we think this a good one, we'll prove that, type of 
thing? For example, PSA management thought it was a neat idea to buy tuna boats and go 
into the hotel business. Hindsight says, well, it wasn't very good. But maybe at that 
particular time it might have been a super investment. Wouldn't the Commission at that 
point get involved? Do they have the authority to say, well, we don't think that's a good 
idea, don't do it, or we think it's a good idea, okay? 
MR. CALVO: As long as the utility structure remains in the simple utility form, we 
have control of the investments for any subsidiary function. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How about the holding company? 
MR. CALVO: No. Once we've---now, that's without a holding company. Once we've 
formed a holding company and allowed that company to be formed, then we have no control 
over the board of directors. Our control is in the initial incidence, whether or not we 
should allow them to form the holding company. But once that's formed, it's up to manage-
ment to decide what to do with that money. We control monies coming in and leaving the 
corporation, the utility structure itself. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Your concern is whether---if the parent company is bleeding off 
money from a utility, your concern is not why they're doing it but they're doing it and 
what effect would it have on rates and that only? 
MR. CALVO: Yes. And I mention that there are some states -- five, I think -- in this 
country that recently have allowed the public utility commissions to review holding com-
panies in all of their functions. That would be the most extreme possibility of control. 
MR. CONLON: All right. In the last area here, just the transfer pricing on inter-
company transactions, we're saying, again, should follow the market base concept if 
practical, but it probably won't be and the full cost would be the right approach, which 
would include overheads and a return on investment. 
Now, a holding company arrangement, or a simple parent subsidiary arrangement is 
employed joint costs which require allocation to both the unregulated and the regulated 
will result. Where possible, services provided should be directly identified and attri-
buted to a particular operation. Costs which cannot be directly attributed, should be 
based on so-called "cost-causitive" factors. If no distinct cost-causitive factors can 
be identified, then joint services should be allocated using California approved metho-
dology which considers the type of service provided and the entities benefitted. 
The California PUC precedent has approved certain approaches to be fair and objec-
tive. 
In summary, forces in the utility industry will continue to lead utility management 
to diversification. A ratemaking plan to protect the ratepayer from subsidizing diversi-
fied unregulated activities, yet protect the shareholders' opportunity to earn a commen-
surate return, must address organizational structure, asset transfers and service transfer 
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pricing. Ratemaking policy should remain unchanged regardless of the form of diversifi-
cation entered into by the utility. 
Properly diversified utilities operating under a well established ratemaking plan 
should be able to protect the ratepayers from cross-subsidization and allow the share-
holders to earn a reasonable return commensurate with their risk. 
Periodic monitoring and review of the regulated activities by the CPUC staff should 
provide further assurance that ratepayer cross-subsidization does not exist. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Conlon, how can we monitor and quantify the effect of di-
verting management attention away from utility businesses to other activities? How do we 
deal with brain drain? 
MR. CONLON: Well, I think the point that the two commissioners developed at the 
workshop was the problem of management separation between the utility and the holding 
company. I know they spent a lot of time questioning some of the witnesses. So I think 
the separation of the utility from the non-utility provides outside parties to have some 
assurances that managements are going to be tending to their own store and not to the 
other guys. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But how do you quantify it in your business? 
MR. CONLON: Quantify the management drain. I think that it's difficult for us to 
quantify factors that are not quantifiable, I guess. It's just difficult to measure some-
thing like that. 
MR. HARDY: I would like to comment that many companies that have diversified -- you 
see this within the regional Bell operating companies. What they have done is they 
realize that these other activities, these nonregulated activities, require totally dif-
ferent management skills and kinds of skills. And many have taken some of their own 
people -- where there are common skills, such as accounting -- but many have gone outside 
and developed whole separate staffing to bring in these additional skills that there is 
some transfer. But I think that there's a difference, a sufficient difference in skill to 
tend to minimize that. 
MR. CALVO: My comment on that question is that you can hire skills, you can hire 
people, to do any function and if you pay enough you get good personnel. However, I think 
a question that goes beyond who you can hire is who are those who serve on the board of 
directors. That's where the decisions are made. You don't hire people for that. And 
you will find that in many instances you have the same board of directors for the utility 
that you do for the holding company, and that's the brain drain that I worry about. And 
there are differences of opinion. There are those who say if they're good and they're 
worth their salt, this is stimulating for them and they can make those business decisions 
as they've been making them, and you can bring in younger individuals who are looking for 
challenges much more readily than if you just had a utility. On the other hand, there is 
that concern that you can get people so involved in ventures that they know little or 
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nothing about that the utility begins to suffer, and that's the caution that I would raise 
at this point. 
MR. CONLON: Well, one additional point. You know, when the unregulated gets very 
significant, it just has to have sufficient management of its own to run its unregulated 
activities and the regulated managers are going to have their own company to run, and I 
think, you know, once they become significant on both sides, you will have separate 
managements out of necessity. 
MR. CALVO: Just one more point on that. Our experience has been that, for instance, 
Pacific Lighting, which has been a holding company all these years, has, I think, and 
Mr. John is here, has the same exact board of directors for Southern California Gas 
as it does for the holding company, or nearly the same. And yet they've been able to do 
both things quite well and they've run their gas company successfully. So it can be done. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Just a quick summation in my mind. Should I take what you have 
been saying -- all of you -- that the holding company is probably the best mechanism, 
business mechanism for which---to allow the Public Utilities Commission to evaluate these 
things as separate entities? Do you gentlemen recommend that there be legislation that 
says something to the effect that if the utilities are going to do this, they must form 
a holding company? I think most of them have, but is that kind of legislation---does that 
give them the longer term -- of course, a piece of legislation is only good for one 
legislative year -- but does that---is that a good way to go, to say something of that 
nature? Any opinions on that? 
MR. CONLON: Well, if the California Commission takes a position on its own, I'm not 
sure the legislation would be needed. But that's a view that we have to wait and see. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. Is that your feeling, Mr. Hardy? 
MR. HARDY: I think so too. Yes, I think so too. And I can also conceive that the 
California Commission may ask for some legislation to cement the position as it were. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you have any thoughts on that yet at this point, Victor? 
MR. CALVO: I have some personal thoughts but they would only be mine at this point. 
The matter has not been presented to the full body. 
It may be that -- or at least one possible position that the Commission can take is 
that they would like to keep a tight rein on diversification and holding company format, 
and that they would like to control the remaining major utilities and how they diversify 
and stay close at home with the ventures that they get into and not go into the holding 
company format, and therefore not want additional empowering legislation. But I think we 
can do it now anyway. 
What I mention by way of additional legislation would be if you wanted to go to that 
extreme of the New Mexico commission and some of those others, or if you wanted to go 
somewhere in between where the utility could expend revenues dire~tly into other functions 
that are associated or not without review -- right now we do have complete review of how 
-24-
they spend monies -- that would be sort of an in between position but would be more 
favorable to the utilities than where they find themselves now, and I personally would 
not want to recommend that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much for this panel discussion which went beyond 
our time but I think it was well worth it for our understanding, and the committee's under-
standing of the subject matter. I'm going to suggest that when we get into the next panel, 
"Utility Structures: Current and Proposed" that we not read statements but kind of give 
us what you would like to say in as few words as possible. 
I want to thank Mr. Calvo, Mr. Hardy and Mr. Conlon for their presentation. 
Now, at this point, Steve Edwards, Manager of Special Projects, San Diego Gas & 
Electric Company; William Cole, Vice President for Pacific Lighting Corporation; Fred John, 
Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Southern California Gas Company; John Danielson, 
Manager of Corporate Planning, Pacific Gas & Electric Company; and E. A. Myers, Vice 
President of System Development, Southern California Edison Company. So if those indi-
viduals will come forward. Tell us, I guess, what you're currently involved in and what 
you're proposing and, if possible, trynot to duplicate what somebody else before you has 
said. So the first ones get an advantage of a little more input perhaps. The others can 
say, "Me, too." 
MR. WILLIAM COLE: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: My name is William Cole. 
I've Vice President of Pacific Lighting Corporation. With me, in addition to the other 
members of the panel, is Mr. Fred John, who's Vice President of Southern California Gas 
Company, the gas company, and he would like to make some comments on this subject from the 
standpoint of the utility gas company. 
But I would like to do, very briefly, recognizing that we are running a little late, 
is tu very briefly describe Pacific Lighting Corporation -- its organization, its present 
diversification program, its future plans, and how Pacific Lighting Corporation insulates 
the gas company and its ratepayers from diversification risk. 
Starting first with a brief description of Pacific Lighting Corporation. It will be 
100 years old next year. It is solely a holding company. It does not engage in any 
operations other than its function as a holding company. It is not now, and it never has 
been, a public entity subject to the Public Utilities Commission. 
The Gas Company, Southern California Gas Company, is its largest subsidiary. The 
Gas Company, by far, is the largest source of revenue and profits. Now, the Gas Company 
is an independent corporate entity. It has its own independent board of directors. With 
all due respect to Commissioner Calvo, there are no common members of the parent company's 
board of directors and the Gas Company, the utility's board of directors. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: No duplication? 
MR. COLE: There's no duplication at all. There is no duplication in corporate 
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officers. The Cas Company has its own separate set of corporate officers, chairman, CEO, 
right on down, that is completely different and independent from Pacific Lighting Corpora-
tion's corporate officers. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point. Can Southern California Gas make what Pacific 
Lighting considers a dumb acquisition, or a dumb business move with Pacific Lighting saying 
hey, don't do that, that's going to cost us money? 
MR. COLE: Senator Russell, as we get into this, both from the standpoint of Mr. 
John and myself, we will point out to you that the utility is not engaged in any diversi-
fication activities at all. The diversification activities are engaged in by the parent 
company solely. The Southern California Gas Company is engaged in its utility operations 
and only its utility operations. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Suppose they have a surplus of cash because of the reasons we were 
talking about that they want to do something with. What do they do, give it to the hold-
ing company? 
MR. COLE: The way this is handled, and again, Mr. John can speak to this because it 
is the Gas Company we are now talking about, but as we get into this, we will point out to 
you that the Gas Company has its own financing operation. Its financing comes through 
the issuance of its own bonds and through the issuance of its own preferred stock. And it 
has its own retained earnings. It's kept as a separate entity completely. 
Now, when it makes its decision as to what capital it needs for its utility opera-
tions, then it either issues new bonds or it increases its retained earnings. The excess 
of what it does not need, it sends up to its shareholder, the parent company, in the form 
of dividends, and the dividend policy over the past years, the Gas Company has dividended 
to the parent company in about the same ratio as the other utilities in the state have 
dividended out to their shareholders. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So a large surplus of cash, under this scenario, could go back to 
the parent company in larger dividends? 
MR. COLE: It certainly could, but what I'm suggesting to you, Senator Russell, is 
that the policy that has been followed has been one that is very comparable to what the 
other utilities, the "stand-alone" utilities if you will, have done with respect to their 
dividend policies to their shareholders. 
Speaking about our diversification program, and now I'm speaking of Pacific Lighting 
Corporation, the parent company -- and, again, Mr. John will speak to you about looking at 
it from the vantage point of the Gas Company -- as Commissioner Calvo mentioned, we, at 
Pacific Lighting, have been involved in a diversification program since 1963, for over 20 
years. This is not something new to us. And all of our diversification efforts have been 
through the form of separate corporations -- mostly California corporations -- which have 
been subsidiaries of the parent company. Again, Senator Russell, the diversification 
efforts have had nothing to do with the utility itself. They have not been subsidiaries 
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of the utility operation. It is the parent company that has been engaged in the diversi-
fication endeavor. 
With respect to the types of areas of diversification by Pacific Lighting Corporation, 
what we call the "unrelated non-utility diversification efforts" fall into a number of 
categories. One is oil and gas, explorationand production. We have a number of subsid-
iaries that are engaged in oil and gas production and exploration throughout about 16 states 
here in the country and abroad. 
The point I want to make is that none of the gas that is produced through those sub-
sidiaries is sold directly to the Gas Company. We do not want to have any transaction 
involving our non-utility subsidiaries with the Gas Company, such as selling gas directly 
from those diversified subsidiaries to the Gas Company. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you sell it indirect? 
MR. COLE: A very small amount of gas, we found out after we made a recent acquisi-
tion, is sold to El Paso Natural Gas Company, and of course, they're one of our large---
they're our largest supplier. This is a very small amount of gas-- I don't recall what 
it is but it's diminutive and that, of course, is handled on an arms-length transaction 
with El Paso. So there's no way through any sale of gas that there can be any cross-
subsidization at all. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Uhm •.. I'm sorry, are you concluded? 
MR. COLE: No, I was •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Let me ask a question. Itcame up yesterday in the 
hearing, and I don't know whether you were here or not, and it had to do with the Mojave 
Project and bypass. We were told that all three partners would have to approve the Mojave 
service to the non-EOR industrial customers. 
t-:lR. COLE: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. If non-EOR industrial customers tell Mojave that they 
want interstate service and that they'll go to another interstate pipeline if Mojave re-
fuses, what would Pacific Lighting do? 
MR. COLE: I'm sure this is a matter we would have to take a look at, Mr. Chairman. 
I don't think I can give you a specific answer about that. Obviously, it's going to be a 
function of what the situation is, what the conditions are, and it would have to be a 
matter that we would look at at the time. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There might be some anti-trust implications there and that's 
the reason. 
MR. COLE: I understand. It is my understanding that there is no anti-trust---our 
counsel has indicated to me that there is no anti-trust implications in the fact that the 
form of agreement is as it is. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
Ml{. COLE: Mr. John indicated, also, that the chances that there will be two inter-
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state pipeline companies serving the EOR market are, I think, very slim. I think it's 
going to be a single interstate pipeline, or it will be the gas distribution companies 
that will serve that line. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 10 years .ago we didn't think there was going to be one. 
MR. COLE: That's true, and it may be that we're here now, but at least that's our 
feeling at the moment. 
Very quickly, let me just quickly go through this because I know we are running 
short. Other areas of diversification that the parent company is involved in is land 
development, commercial, residential and industrial real estate development. We also are 
involved in some smaller activities, such as financial services and alternative energy 
operations. 
Now, we do have some operations that we call related operations to the Gas Company, 
and since this is a matter that has co~e up, let me very quickly tell you what that is. We 
do have some interstate, small interstate pipeline companies -- three -- that service the 
Gas Company. In other words, sell gas to the Gas Company. We don't really consider this 
as part of our diversification effort. These are really companies that were formed during 
the decade of the '70s when we were in our supply crisis and were formed for the purpose 
of getting gas to the Gas Company, and they, of course, have continued on. 
I might point out that prior to the time of the supply crisis, we did not have such 
verticle integration, and we do not consider those operations as really part of our un-
related diversification operation. 
With respect to future plans of diversification, I would simply say that we are 
looking for additional acquisitions. We are looking for additional acquisitions in the 
service area, and, again, it is our plan that any additional acquisitions that we might 
make would be unrelated to the Gas Company. And we stress that point because it is true, 
unrelated diversification that we feel, it's one of the areas that we can insulate the 
utility because through the unrelated diversification, we minimize any transactions be-
tween the utility and the diversified operations, and that reduces, if not eliminates, 
cross-subsidization and competitive aspects and what have you. So we are focusing on the 
unrelated rather than the related. 
With respect to ratepayer protection, let me simply say that we have been at this 
for 20 years. In our view, there's no evidence at all that indicates there's been any 
adverse impact on the Gas Company or our ratepayers through our diversification efforts. 
We have done this deliberately by keeping the organizations and entities separate, by 
ensuring the creditors of the unregulated, the non-utilities, have no access to the 
utility. We have, as I indicated, attempted to stay in the unrelated fields so that there 
will be no transactions between the utility and the nonregulated entities. 
We have tried to keep the utility separate and on a stand-alone basis. Its financial 
statements are audited independently, it files its own reports with the FCC. As I 
-28-
indicated, we've attempted to keep all transactions to a minimum or completely eliminated. 
There are some services that the Gas Company performs for the parent and the parent per-
forms for the Gas Company. In those cases, we maintain extensive records. We attempt to 
be sure that any charges will be on a full-cost basis that you heard about earlier, and 
the Commission has audited those transactions routinely and regularly in our rate cases. 
Let me just say this: We feel that we've been at this for some period of time. As 
I indicated to you, we feel that there has been no adverse impact on the utility or the 
ratepayers. We feel that the Commission at the present time has adequate authority and 
has not been hesitant to use it in looking at the utility in the rate cases to be sure 
that there is no cross-subsidization or in a competitive behavior. 
We don't feel that there's a need for any additional legislation at this time. 
Thank you. 
CHAIR11AN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Hr. John. 
MR. FRED E. JOHN: Hr. Chairman, Senator Russell: My name is Fred John. I'm with 
Southern California Gas Company. I'm Vice President of Regulatory Affairs. I'd just like 
to make a couple of points just to reemphasize some of the points that Mr. Cole made. 
Southern California Gas Company is somewhat unique from the people on this panel. We 
are a "gas only" utility. We're not an electric, we're not a combo. We are a "gas only" 
utility, and we also happen to be a part of a holding company structure. 
As Mr. Cole indicated, we are, and I think we'll always be, the major business of 
Pacific Lighting Corporation. But we are a stand-alone operation. We have a separate 
accounting system, and the PUC regularly audits the books of Southern California Gas 
Company. 
CHAIR}Uill ROSENTHAL: May I suggest that you don't repeat what's already been said, 
please, so that we have an opportunity to hear from everyone? 
MR. JOHN: Fine. The only other point I'd like to make -- two points -- one is that 
we have no plans as a gas company to ehter into any new lines of business in the future. 
We're a gas transmission distribution company. 
And on the point of brain drain, which has been raised many times, I think it's 
important to note that for Southern California Gas Company we have our own replacement 
planning program, and part of that replacement planning program is to plan for retirements 
of key managers and officers of the company. And to do that in recent past, a lot of 
talent has been brought into the utility from the outside, and also from within Southern 
California Gas Company. And I think it's---obviously the Commission has to look at that 
on a case-by-case basis, but if they look at Southern California Gas Company, I think 
they'll find that there's no such thing as brain drain as far as the management of the Gas 
Company is concerned, and that's primarily because it is such a major portion of Pacific 
LLghting Corporation's overall earnings and revenue base. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The PUC has expressed some concerns about Southern California 
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Gas's transactions with your affiliate, Pacific Offshore Pipelines. Would you like to 
comment about that? 
MR. JOHN: Sure. I think what's important to note is that any of the transactions 
that occur between Southern California Gas Company. as the purchaser, and the Pacific 
interstate companies, as the seller, are regulated in two ways. They're regulated by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission who regulates the sales of those---that are made by 
the Pacific interstate companies, which are interstate pipelines. The California Public 
Utilities Commission not only has the right to intervene and actively participate in 
those FERC proceedings, but once those sales are made to the Gas Company, the Commission 
has, what they call, an "annual reasonableness review." And in those reviews they look 
at all the purchases that we've made, both from our affiliates and from our nonaffiliates, 
and for whatever reason they think we've been imprudent, despite the fact we may disagree 
with them, they have the power, the authority, and they've used it in the past, to dis-
allow recovery of costs, which obviously hurt the shareholders of Southern California Gas 
Company and in this case Pacific Lighting Corporation. 
~o the PUC has existing authority which they've used. So I think it's a red herring 
that's being thrown up by the Public Staff. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: Let's take a hypothetical where a utility owns a natural gas field 
or a portion of it or an interest in it. It owns a pipeline, or the holding company owns 
the interest in the energy, the pipeline, and the distribution system. And there is a 
contract which, if it were a long-term contract, would benefit the customers of the dis-
tribution system, the ultimate distribution system, but would disadvantage the ownership 
of the natural gas field. A very short-term contract would be to their benefit, a long-
term contract would be to the advantage of the customers, the ultimate customers. Does 
the PUC have the authority to regulate that, the length of that contract? 
MR. JOHN: Let me see if I understand your question. If it's a sale by the producer 
to an interstate pipeline company, and then in turn the interstate pipeline company sells 
the gas to the distribution company ••• 
SENATOR KEENE: Yeah, I may have made it too complicated. It doesn't necessarily 
have to be that complicated. Let's just say that there is the contract between the 
utility which ultimately distributes to customers and the people who own the source of 
the energy, and a contract of a certain length would benefit one and be a detriment to the 
other. Does the PUC have the power to regulate? 
MR. JOHN: If it's a direct sale from the producer to the distribution company-- that 
goes back to the point I made earlier with Chairman Rosenthal -- what the Commission does 
in an annual reasonableness review of utility operations, it will make a determination at 
that point as to whether it thinks the purchase of the distribution company made was 
prudent. And if it finds that it was prudent, everything's okay. If they find it was 
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imprudent, then they can assess whatever disallowance they determine to be appropriate. 
And, of course, the only review of the PUC decision is to the California Supreme Court. 
SENATOR KEENE: But how do you translate that sort of advantage that may accrue to 
one or the other of the two entities into something quantitative that the PUC can deal 
with? 
MR. JOHN: Well, I think from quantitative, if they disallow recovery of certain 
costs, that's a hit on the earnings of the corporation and that has a pretty large impact 
at the board of directors' level and the shareholders' level. I think they only have to 
do it once. 
But getting back to the point -- I think you were out of the room -- that Mr. Cole 
made earlier is right now Pacific Lighting Corporation has an oil and gas expiration 
company. We do not make direct purchases, we at the Gas Company do not make direct pur-
chases from that oil and gas producer for exactly the reason you just said. We think it's 
safer for all concerned to avoid those kind of direct transactions. 
SENATOR KEENE: So should they be prohibited? 
MR. JOHN: I wouldn't go as far as saying that. When you say "prohibited", I think 
the Commission itself has whatever jurisdiction it needs. And my philosophy generally is, 
and I know some legislators disagree, but if an agency has existing authority, I don't 
know why you have to impose additional authority. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, because presumably-- we don't have to --but presumably we 
ought to at least enunciate standards by which that authority ought to be exercised. The 
fact that they have the authority is fine, but under what criteria should that authority 
be exercised, and should a transaction such as that be prohibited where you have that kind 
of integration where the utility owns the power source as well. 
MR. JOHN: I think as you go into a period, especially in the natural gas industry 
that we're going into, where things are in such a state of transition, if you prohibit 
anything for all time, what you may do is over the longer term disadvantage the ratepayer 
for exactly the reason you just said. What might not be a good deal today might ultimately 
turn out to be a great deal 10 years from now or vice versa. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, presumably we're learning about this area so that we can give 
some policy guidance to somebody, and for us to understand all of the problems and the 
perils and the pitfalls and then to say to the Public Utility Commission, hey, you've got 
authority to go out and do your thing, I mean, that's not---doesn't sound like very 
responsible leadership to me. Because what is their thing? What should they be doing? 
MR. JOHN: My feeling right now is they're doing probably as good a job as they can 
in regulatlng this kind of situation. It seems to me that the Legislature has the over-
sight authority which obviously you have to use if you see abuses of the process, either 
by the Legislature or the PUC. At that point, I think you do jump in and intervene. You 
come down with a hammer. But until you've seen abuses of the process, I think what your 
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function should be is an oversight. 
SENATOR KEENE: But you tell us something like we're staying clear of transactions 
of this type ... 
MR. JOHN: Not because they're wrong. It's because of the perception. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, we haven't defined wrong yet in this area. People are doing 
lots of things that may be bad public policy, maybe okay, maybe bad public policy, but 
that's what we're really doing is that we're •.• 
MR. JOHN: But I think the point I'm trying to make is any time you go in and make 
an absolute prohibition, that might have made sense in today's time-frame, but 5 years 
from then you may have made the determination it wasn't necessarily in the public interest. 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you, 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, you use the word "perception", and one of the reasons 
that legislation is proposed is to deal with perceptions. The average person out 
there thinks that you have taken them to the cleaners. Okay? And the average person 
thinks that the utility prices are too high, and most of them don't even understand why, 
and that may be part of your fault because maybe you didn't do the proper educational 
job along the way. But we're called upon by those constituent concerns in terms of 
their perceptions. And while it's true that the PUC can do a lot of the things 
that---and they are doing, we sometimes get involved in a piece of legislation because 
there is a perception that perhaps they're not. And that's the place where legislators 
are. 
The important thing is some assurance of the safeguards, and that's really what 
it 1 s all about. 
MR. JOHN: And I think a lot of the safeguards were set forth by some of the prior 
witnesses -- Commissioner Calvo, Mr. Hardy, and Mr. Conlon -- and I think those are 
reasonable safeguards. I think Pacific Lighting Corporation and the Gas Company follow 
them. I think the only point I'm trying to make is unless you see something going wrong, 
why put it into law if that law itself becomes somewhat inflexible at a later time. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand that. Okay. Mr. Edwards. 
MR. STEVEN EDWARDS: Good morning, Chairman Rosenthal, Senators: My name is Steve 
Edwards with San Diego Gas & Electric Company. I am Manager of Special Projects. Over 
the past three years I have been deeply involved in strategic planning for our company 
and most recently in our application before the Public Utilities Commission to form a 
holding company. That has been my primary responsibility at the company. 
I will briefly touch this morning on the need to diversify, which Commissioner Calvo 
addressed, and he said someone would take the podium and tell you why. I agree with him 
that there are many changes facing our industry. Our strategic assessment of those changes 
tell us that we are at a crossroads and that responsible management must take action. 
Our base utility business is faced with competition, changes in the way that services 
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are rendered, social attitudes, the conservation epic if you will, housing standards, 
technology improvements that have cut down the usage of our basic products, photovoltaics, 
solar installation on houses and so forth. This has been aided by regulatory change, such 
as PURPA, as Comissioner Calvo referred to, encouraging competition very directly through 
the small power producers and the tax incentives that they are given, and the compulsory 
obligation to purchase their output by utilities. 
So without going through a complete list, there are significant changes which I know 
as a conmli ttee you're quite aware of. They do cause us some concern about the growth 
potential of our basic business. The need to maintain earnings growth is well recognized. 
We have two choices one is to ignore these changes and let our markets erode, let the 
competition get the stronghold and act to our disadvantage, particularly our customers' 
disadvantage, by weakening the financial base of the utility; or to respond -- choose to 
participate. And we have made the strategic decision to diversify, as a management 
decision-- one that we feel is in not only our shareholders' best interest but also our 
customers. A very critical point to be kept in mind. 
The utility will, however, always remain our primary business. There's no question 
about it. We are a 97% utility today, and I expect that we will remain significantly 
a utility in the future. 
SENATOR KEENE: Aren't you going to make the case as to why it's in the shareholders' 
interest and in the customers' interest? 
MR. EDWARDS: Let me address---I think the shareholders' interest if fairly straight-
forward, and it derives from the fact that our investment opportunities in the base busi-
ness are not what they were. We have completed a construction program as an industry, not 
just our company, which has sufficient supply available. The forecasted deployment of 
equity capital in the utility business has declined, and therefore, the earnings base, 
which we traditionally have as a utility, is eroding. Depreciation has accelerated, the 
plant is getting older, and those opportunities for growth in earnings are not what they 
were. We're expecting growth at less than rate of inflation, for example. 
By deploying equity capital in nontraditional unregulated ventures, we, at least, 
have the opportunity and the potential. I won't sit here today and tell you it's not 
risky to enhance the prospects for investors, and that is the basic theory, obviously, of 
any diversification effort. 
SENATOR KEENE: Aren't the investors really interested in the rate of return, and 
does the fact that your industry is not growing as fast as it once did have anything to 
do with the rate of return really? Because if your rate of return in the growth period 
was excessive, the PUC would knock it down; and if your rate of return in a low growth 
period is too small, can't the PUC kick it up and give you a rate increase? 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes. I think we have to distinguish a reasonable rate of return for 
utility services ••• 
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SENATOR KEENE: So how really does it help the investors then for you to take some 
portion of the earnings and put it into a higher risk activity? 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, the alternatives that we're faced with as to the additional 
equity that has become available is to put it back into the base business, the base utility 
business, which, in our assessment of the situation, is not required. There are plenty of 
facilities. It would not be to our customers' advantage to gold plate or to build power 
plants that are not necessary, so the investor has only a f~w options available to him. 
We can return funds to him through dividend payments, which are above the norm. We can 
buy our stock back, which, in our case, is contrary to our objectives of increasing equity 
ratio in our company. Or we can deploy his capital in alter~ative ways, which, hopefully, 
will enhance that overall return. 
SENATOR KEENE: Or you can lower the rates to ratepayers. 
MR. EDWARDS: I think that's a good point. It was brought up earlier. I think it 
reflects a misconception that we're talking here about funds that were overearned or some-
how are ratepayers' fund. And I think we owe it to our customers to be sure they under-
stand the situation. These are shareholder dollars that we're talking about. The cash is 
simply a reflection of the equity that is available for investment after having serviced 
the traditional level of dividends and paying the debt structure and so forth. 
These funds would customarily be reinvested in the utility if it were so warranted, 
or paid out to our shareholders as additional dividend payments, or reinvested in the base 
business. But they're not ratepayer funds as such. They are not reflective of over-
earnings. We have been earning our authorized rates of return but not excessively. 
SENATOR KEENE: Why wouldn't the PUC be perfectly justified in saying that these 
funds, you can do one of three things with these funds: You can return them to share-
holders, reinvest them if it's warranted, if you believe it's warranted, in the activities 
that you're already engaged in, or return it to ratepayers. Those are the three places it 
can go and forget about anything else. 
MR. EDWARDS: Right. I could understand the desirability of the third option of 
returning it to ratepayers, but I do think it's crucial that in attaining the balance of 
regulation that Commissioner Calvo alluded to earlier this morning that we fully recognize 
that these are earnings of shareholders who put their capital at risk in the utility and 
have been fairly and properly compensated for that risk. So they are not in any stretch 
of thinking ••. I think any of the former financial folks would have given you the same 
answer. They are not funds that the ratepayer truly has a claim on. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, but why can't the PUC say you can do A, B or C -- you decide 
which of the three it is --but you can't get into other businesses --what social pur-
poses there in allowing you as a utility to get into all sorts of other businesses. 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, I think that one is fairly straightfoward, Senator. There are a 
number of social purposes that could well be served -- increasing the tax base for the 
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state, increasing the jobs that are available throughout the economy of California and 
so forth. I would think that as a matter of public policy that diversification should be 
encouraged. 
SENATOR KEENE: Why aren't you in the same position as the State of California was 
when it was accused of having obscene surpluses prior to Proposition 13? 
MR. EDWARDS: We are operating in a regulatory setting where the rules of the game 
are well established. The funds that we're talking about have been earned by shareholders 
as a proper recompense, if you will, for their investment to serve customers. 
So I think our real job, Senator Keene, is to communicate effectively to our custo-
mers, and we have been doing that. They understand what is happening to our business and 
the need to change. And I can tell you in the San Diego service area that the issue of 
returning these funds to customers has not become a large one because we have effectively 
communicated to them what is going on here. I don't believe that legislation that creates 
a third option of returning funds to ratepayers would serve that interest at all. It 
would simply create more controversy that is unwarranted. 
SENATOR KEENE: I think it's getting a little platitudinous. I think the real ques-
tion is why shouldn't you be restricted to A, B or C, and you keep going back to the one 
option, the ratepayers' option, and I'm saying how do you know that these investors would 
not rather---would rather not have these funds in their pockets to invest as they see fit 
and not as the utility specialized management sees fit? 
MR. EDWARDS: That's a fair question and we recently did a shareholders' survey over 
the past year where we asked precisely that question of our shareholders. Their responses 
indicated that they are interested not only in current dividends but the long-term earnings 
growth potential of their investment in San Diego Gas & Electric Company. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, I would certainly, if I were a shareholder, not want utility 
management to invest in the food business or the hotel business or the tuna boat business. 
I would rather have that money in my pocket to invest as I see fit. 
L'1R. EDWARDS: I would agree with you, Senator. 
SENATOR KEENE: Maybe you have a special breed of shareholder. 
~ffi. EDWARDS: No, I didn't mean to imply that they would want us to invest in areas 
that we have no expertise or any reasonable prospect of succeeding in. Surely our 
management, which has been a successful management, would assess those circumstances 
appropriately. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You mentioned that as time goes on, plant and equipment wears 
out. Why isn't that money now being used, instead of diversifying, to bring your plant 
up to producing the product in a more reasonable fashion, thereby bringing more profits? 
I'm reminded of some of the major industries in the United States that diversified 
on the basis that they were going to do well for their stockholders and the public, and 
they've ended up by practically going out of business. Instead of modernizing the steel 
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plants, and the auto plants, and the various other manufacturing entities in the country, 
they diversified. 
MR. EDWARDS: I think that's a very good point. We do not want to leave you with 
the impression that we're going to take our eye off the base utility business. In our 
strategic planning work, we identified eight key areas for involvement in the future. 
Seven of those eight deal with the utility business. The eighth one being is growth po-
tential or diversification. 
We are concentrating and giving first priority to the capital needs, the service 
level requirements, the image perspective of our community on the utility and so forth. 
We have one of the best operating records in the industry with respect to power plant ef-
ficiency. We are continually doing research and development work and redeploying capital 
and will continue to do so in a way that will run the utility as effectively as possible 
for our customers. 
A couple of very quick points to wrap this up. We were talking about safeguards and 
the need for clear thinking about who's responsible for what and where the risks are. We 
have advanced a number .of proposals in our holding company application which we feel will 
give the kinds of assurances that I know you're looking for. And they are for maximum 
separation. We've heard that referred to this morning. Minimum sharing of resources be-
tween the utility and the non-utility operations, and limited intercompany transactions, 
so that the problems of auditing and following through are not created. We think it's a 
lot better if you simply don't have those kinds of transactions. 
We talked about the "brain drain" was referred to. We will recruit, and already have 
begun the processing of recruiting, new outside management to run our non-utility operation. 
Utility management is not traditionally equipped to do so in an entrepreneurial setting. 
We will restrict the transfer of utility personnel to our non-utility operations; 
again, for basically the same reasons-~they are needed to run the utility well, and they 
will stay there. 
Our first priority, as I indicated, is to the capital needs of the utility and 
achieving the equity level of investment which the PUC determines is reasonable. We have 
not reached that level yet, and therefore, pulling cash out of the operation of the util-
ity is not a feasible alternative. We will not be doing that in the foreseeable future. 
We still have room for growth in our equity investment in the utility to meet the objec-
tives of the Commission. 
Foremost is that utility decisions have to be left with utility management and the 
utility boarrl, with respect to dividend policy, the levels of services to be offered our 
customers and so forth. Our full intention is that that be the case. 
From a regulatory point of view, I think complete and full access to the books and 
records of the utility and the·non-utility operation to the extent needed by the Commission 
to discharge its responsibilities is something that must be ensured, and we certainly 
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would agree with that. 
Equal access to information has been a point that was made in our case. The trans-
fer, as I think you mentioned, of patents or utility developed products out of the 
utility should always be at fair market value so that customers are fully compensated for 
the value of what is transferred. As a general proposition, we would think that those 
should be limited also. 
It goes without saying that we feel the holding company structure best accomplishes 
these objectives. We have applied for one before the Commission. And I'd like to note 
parenthetically that there are well over 100 utility holding companies in this country. 
So this is not a particularly new or novel concept. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask you -- can you elaborate, for example, for the com-
mittee on the degree to which the utility will receive royalties as a result of the 
affiliate assets or services originated in the utility? -- which is a little different 
approach. 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes, and it's one that we currently have under consideration. The 
utility has developed a software program having to do with computerized mapping of 
facilities, for example. We have started a subsidiary company which will market this 
software and the program related to it and do some service work for the customer, who 
might be another utility or a municipality, or in the case of this subsidiary, it has just 
recently signed contracts in Malaysia and Australia, which I suggest to you is not utility 
service area related. 
The value of what is being transferred from the utility to the subsidiary has been 
established by an independent computer software appraisal firm -- A.D. Little, as the 
firm. And the proposal is that ratepayers would receive a percentage of the revenues 
which are received by the subsidiary in the form of a royalty payment extending out over 
the life of the contract that is entered into between the utility and the subsidiary. So 
we do think that royalties have a role in certain relationships between the utility and 
its affiliates when something of value is transferred. 
Lastly, I'd like to make the point that we feel the PUC does have full and complete 
authority to effectively regulate utility diversification under any structure. It has 
indicated that in many prior decisions. There was a comment this morning about the trans-
fer of assets, and I think Senator Keene was concerned about the transfer. There is a 
statutory provision that requires PUC approval prior to the transfer of utility assets 
out of the utility. So that takes essentially care of itself, and applications are pro-
cessed with the Commission to do that. 
With respect to capital costs and dividends, the Commission, again, has indicated a 
complete ability to insulate the customers from any potential adverse effects through the 
ratesetting process. 
And I will leave my comments at that. I thank you for the opportunity to share them 
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with you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Mr. Danielson? 
MR. JOHN DANIELSON: Thank you. Good afternoon. My name is John Danielson. I'm 
Manager of the Corporate Planning Department of the PG&E. And I'll just take about two 
minutes to go over---to provide a summary of our position. 
PG&E has not had significant involvement with diversification. Our subsidiaries, 
both regulated and nonregulated, account for less than 1% of our earnings, or about 2¢ 
per share out of a total earnings of about $3 a share. 
Our primary business is now and will remain in the future providing electric and gas 
services to our customers. We've not formulated any specific plans about creating a 
holding company. However, we'd like to keep that option open. We would like to see as 
much flexibility as possible in terms of both legislative approaches and the approaches 
of the Public Utilities Commission. 
Our specific areas -- you had a number of specific questions about what we intend to 
do -- our specific areas that we are looking at are investment in cogeneration and energy 
services, principally in terms of the shared savings. We also have a decision before us 
now with regard to the phase-out of the gas exploration and development program -- the 
GEDA program -- a recent PUC decision. We have an offer outstanding on September 9 to 
purchase the remaining shares of Pacific Gas Transmission Company. We own right now 50% 
of that. 
I agree with the comments made by Mssrs. Hardy and Conlon with regard to the subsi-
dization---cross-subsidization questions. And I think the transfer pricing problem that 
has been discussed here this morning too has been adequately reviewed. 
To summarize, I think our position is that in evaluating and developing new business 
opportunities, we feel that it's our obligation as a utility to ensure, first of all, that 
there's no cross-subsidization that takes place. There's no subsidy from the utility 
business to the non-utility business. 
SENATOR RUSShLL: On that point -- would you be able to demonstrate that non-cross-
subsidy to the PUC and the Legislature clearly? 
MR. DANIELSON: I believe that's what we would have to work on and is to work with 
the PUC to ensure to mutual satisfaction that the cross-subsidies do not occur. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you think it's doable? 
MR. DANIELSON: I believe so. I think if you look at the experience in terms of 
diversification Pacific Lighting's case, others that's certainly been set up. I 
think also that we should not place utility customers at risk.for non-utility investments. 
And that's a question that basically has to be handled by nonrecourse financing of---doing 
it with stockholder funds, not ratepayer funds. 
I think the third point is that we must ensure that from the point of view of the 
regulated utility that we segregate for accounting purposes and funding and all other 
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activLties the regulated from the nonregulated activities. And that if the utility has 
transactions with non-utility affiliates, that they must be at arms-length. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: These are, you know, these are fine statements. I think basically 
we all would tend to agree with them. But I wouldn't expect you to come in and say much 
of anything else. What I think I would find helpful as we progress through this legisla-
tive year forthcoming that the utilities develop some sort of a strategy which is more 
than just words. Some concepts of management -- how management could do the things that 
you're saying that we could look at and say if that policy is adopted, this will generally 
protect this and this will be good over here, so that if we want to develop some kind of 
a policy, a legislative policy, we could do that in keeping with what you're proposing. 
Of course recognizing that anytime we enact legislation it reduces flexibility, and I don't 
think that's very good. 
But it would seem to me that to the extent that the utilities can very clearly 
delineate the kinds of things that this committee is talking about and concerned about, 
and I'm sure the PUC is, that it would be to their benefit, because to the extent that 
they don't do it, surely you're going to have the Legislature moving in, the PUC coming 
down harder perhaps, because, you know, we have a responsibility to the ratepayers and 
talk is cheap. And I don't mean to impugn anything you're saying, but we need some tan-
gible evidence of the kinds of things that you're going to do, put into motion, the 
structures and so forth, that will bring a relieved concern on our part. That's not a 
good way to put it, but will reassure us that these things won't happen down the road. 
MR. DANIELSON: Well, I agree with you, Senator Russell, and I think the position 
that we've taken-- first of all, we have not been active in the diversification area; and 
secondly, we would proceed to do this on a case-by-case basis reviewing with the PUC as we 
go down the road to make these investments, to make sure that there is appropriate record 
that would indicate with the PUC what specific things would satisfy each of these. And I 
think from the management's point of view it's to put itself on record that we believe 
that these things should be ensured as part of a diversification or new business oppor-
tunities. And you would have to do that, I believe, on a. case-by-case and, frankly put, 
we have not had a great deal of activity in this area. 
SENATOR KEENE: On a case-by-case basis, what should be the standard that the 
Commission uses or the Legislature down the road adopts to regulate or condition diversi-
fication? 
MR. D&~IELSON: Well, I believe that's the two days of hearings that we had in 
October or whereabout, the process that the PUC is currently going through. 
SENATOR KEENE: And it's a process we're going through today. So really the plati-
tudes don't help very much, and I apologize for using that word, but that's the way it's 
occurring to me. We're saying, well, we're going to monitor these transactions and the 
PUC has authority to monitor them and we're going to try to keep them on paper so that you 
-39-
can see what's going on, but then the issue becomes one ot public policy-- when are they 
okay and when are they not okay. 
Let me ask you, for example, if there is a contract with a non-utiliy subsidiary, or 
between two entities that are held by the same holding company, one of which is a regulated 
utility, the other of which is a unregulated activity, and it provides favored treatment 
to the nonregulated activity. Is that something that the PUC should be empowered to pre-
vent? Does the PUC have jurisdiction over that kind of situation? And let's say it 
doesn't impair the operation of the utility but it simply reduces the prospect of a bene-
fit to the utility. 
MR. DANIELSON: Well, let's deal with that in a specific case of qualifying facili-
ties. I think that's an area that a number of utilities are looking at. Under PURPA, as 
you know, we purchase power from third parties, qualifying facilities, and we had four 
standard offers out. PUC is going through a process instituting some regulations regard-
ing the availability of these standard offers, and our position is that in terms of the 
affiliate transactions that to avoid problems of self-dealing, that the utility would 
sign essentially the same contract with an affiliate as it would with a third party. In 
other words, that there would be no favored treatment in there. 
Where that is not the case, for example, we are requested to negotiate and come up 
with offers better than the current standard offer four, which is in abeyance. We would 
take those contracts back to the Public Utilities Commission to review, to see that they 
are in the public interest. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, does the Public Utilities Commission have the authority to 
review and retract a contract that it finds ... 
MR. DANIELSON: Absolutely. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, what is the standard for rejection of that contract? 
MR. DANIELSON: I believe that's what the Public Utilities Commission now is doing in 
terms of the OIR2 proceedings ••• 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, but what should it be in your judgment? 
MR. DANIELSON: Well, I think it's very complex, because ••• 
SENATOR KEENE: I know it's complex. 
MR. DANIELSON: For example, in terms of the ratepayer and stockholder benefits on 
contracts for third parties, right now PG&E essentially has a system that is very dynamic, 
and that is there are tremendous fluctuations in our least cost resources. In a year 
that we have plentiful hydro, we want to be in a position to use that hydro to satisfy our 
ratepayers in getting least cost energy sources. Under the PURPA, when we have contracts 
with third parties, those basically are treated as baseload facilities that do not have 
any dispensability. We have 7,000 megawatt signed contracts now under the standard offer. 
Those provide far more baseload facilities than we need. 
And in terms of negotiating contracts with third parties, I believe you want to be in 
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a position where in looking at the nonstandard offers, you begin to discuss things like 
dispatchability of the resource. In those cases you could very easily have nonstandard 
offers, contracts that you negotiate, that are eminently in your ratepayers best interest. 
And those are the kinds of things where if we signed a nonstandard offer, let's say, with 
an affiliate, we would certainly want to go back and should go back in to get approval of 
these nonstandard offers. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, it's not a question of can and should. Are you required to? 
MR. DANIELSON: I don't believe that we're required to unless there's an element of 
risk in the contract, and the risk is defined by the Public Utilities Commission. And if 
there's an element of risk in the contract, I believe we are required to, but I would have 
to defer to an attorney in the area of this contract. 
SENATOR KEENE: And your understanding, at least at this level, is that the risk 
would be risk to the utility investor? 
MR. DANIELSON: Absolutely. 
SENATOR KEENE: And if there were, you believe you would be required to go back before 
the PUC? 
MR. DANIELSON: On a nonstandard offer, yes. But, you see, that's the ..• 
SENATOR KEENE: Should that be the standard then -- potential impairment of the 
utility investors' position? 
MR. DANIELSON: I don't know if that's a general statement. I think in terms of 
specific contracts. That's why when you develop these •.. 
SENATOR KEENE: We can't make policy with respect to all of this that might arise. 
We can't make case-by-case policy. 
MR. DANIELSON: That's why we're only looking at a few basic areas for investment in 
the diversification. 
SENATOR KEENE: Let me just ask you quickly about another situation. If a utility 
diversifies and invests in some non-utility related activity, and it turns out, although 
the judgment at the time seemed okay, the PUC approved it, it turns out that the utility 
has been hurt, the utility investors have been hurt by that particular judgment in the 
direction of diversification and investment in that nonregulated activity, should the 
utility be required to desubsidize, or reinvest in the utility assets that have gone into 
this unregulated area in order to protect the utility investors? And should the PUC have 
the power to require that? 
~m. DANIELSON: The basis of that would be the transaction in the first place, 
should and sure that the utility itself is •.• 
SENATOR KEENE: My hypothetical presumes beyond that, that the judgment was okay at 
the Lime but turned out to be a bad one. Now the utility investor is impaired as a re-
sult of that judgment but it was nobody's fault. 
MR. DANIELSON: By a non-utility investment? 
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SENATOR KEENE: Right. 
MR. DANIELSON: Some non-utility investment? 
SENATOR KEENE: Right. Nobody's fault but there it is, there you have it. It turned 
out that it should not have been allowed but it was allowed because nobody had the perfect 
foresight. 
MR. DANIELSON: And somehow the appropriate safeguards on the front end of the 
investment, and that is segregating stockholder and ratepayer investments, did not take 
place? See, our position is that the investment would not have been made, such that the 
utility---the ratepayer would have been put at risk. That's one of the principles that 
you don't put the ratepayer at risk for a non-utility investment. 
SENATOR KEENE: The risk was not appreciated at the time of the transaction but it 
turned out afterwards that, in fact, the ability of the utility to function on behalf of 
ratepayers and its own investors was impaired by the transaction. Should the PUC retain 
jurisdiction and be able to require a desubsidization of the utility? 
MR. DANIELSON: I would imagine in something like a force majeure or some catas-
trophe that it would have to go back into the Public Utilities Commission, but we would 
do everything imaginable to ensure that the investment itself could in no way impair 
ratepayers. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, I know you would try. Let's assume everybody's in good faith 
and that you had tried, but it did happen as a result of the transaction hypothetically. 
MR. DANIELSON: I don't know what the answer would be in that case. I simply don't. 
SENATOR KEENE: Shouldn't the -- as a matter of public policy -- shouldn't the rate-
payer and the utility investor be held harmless at least to the extent of the assets of 
the unregulated diversified activities? 
MR. DANIELSON: Certainly. 
SENATOR KEENE: It would seem to me that that ought to be so. 
MR. DANIELSON: That's what we started out. That's the supposition here. And I 
think you're saying that let's assume that we didn't make that supposition? Well, a 
supposition is made that you would not do an investment where there were any recourse 
back to the utility operations. That's the principal. 
SENATOR KEENE: But you don't have perfect judgment in that respect. So are the 
assets of the unregulated ••• 
MR. DANIELSON: There's no recourse back to those assets. 
SENATOR KEENE: But shouldn't there be? In the public interest. The ratepayers and 
the utility investors, shouldn't they be able to be held harmless to the extent of the 
assets of the unregulated activity into which investment has been made, which turned out 
to be improper after the fact? 
MR. DANIELSON: The ratepayer should not be held accountable for the investment of 
!:ltockbolder money in a diversified activity that failed. And the way to set up the 
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transaction is that that transaction must be set up such that it will not affect the 
utility operation. 
SENATOR KEENE: You've reversed my hypothetical. My hypothetical is not that the 
transaction that is unregulated fails. My hypothetical is that the utility's assets have 
been transferred to the unregulated activity, invested in this diversified activity in a 
way that is a detriment to the operation of the public utility. It can no longer serve 
its ratepayers adequately or protect its investors adequately because of the transfer of 
assets or investment in an unregulated venture. 
MR. DANIELSON: You can't transfer the asset. You have to obtain ••• 
SENATOR KEENE: We're talking about an investment of utility capital. I mean, that's 
what this hearing is all about. Aren't we? 
MR. DANIELSON: Ratepayer capital or stockholder? 
SENATOR KEENE: Whatever you choose to call it, it's capital. 
MR. DANIELSON: It's very different. They're very different. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, let's say it's investor capital. 
MR. DANIELSON: Certainly~ And the way you do the investment is that you make the 
investment, stockholder capital, and if the business fails, the stockholders suffer. It 
does not impair the utility operations. If you are buying or selling from the utility to 
a nonaffiliate assets 1 transfer them, you must get PUC approval. PUC approval exists on 
the transfer of assets. 
Ct~IRMAN ROSENT~L: I just want to pick up on one thing. If, in fact, the investors' 
capital---the other entity fails, are you telling me that that would not affect the rate-
payers? 
MR. DANIELSON: Absolutely. 
C~IRMAN ROSENT~L: You would not be before the PUC asking for something? 
MR. DANIELSON: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENT~L: You would then have to close up? 
MR. DANIELSON: The failed enterprise, not the utility. 
C~IRMAN ROSENT~L: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. The cost of capital would go up? 
Your rate by Standard and Poor would be affected? And the cost of money to operate 
the utility would be adversely affected? 
MR. DANIELSON: I think the discussion that we had before with Mr. Hardy and Mr. 
Conlon was the point precisely that -- that you would not have utility impairment due to 
non-utility investment. And that is that looking at the cost of capital, rates of return, 
etc., and with the PUC that they would continue to regulate and monitor the utility 
operations, find a rate of return on the utility operations, and the non-utility opera-
tions are items that were funded by stockholders. Whether they fail or succeed enorm-
ously has no impact on the utility operations. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, if instead of investing in a power plant or a pipeline or a 
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transmission line you invest in some unrelated activity, and then you find that you need 
that transmission line or that power plant or that pipeline and that you can't serve your 
customers without it, what happens? 
MR. DANIELSON: Well, that's the point of utility planning, that as you evaluate the 
utility operations, and you have your own strategic planning with regard to utility opera-. 
tions -- say the load forecast changes -- and the utility operations provides cash out of 
operations and a financing capability out of operations, off to the side you have a 
non-utility investment, there is no subsidization either direction. 
SENATOR KEENE: The judgment to build the power plant turned out to be wrong because 
of market forces. 
MR. DANIELSON: Right. Okay. 
SENATOR KEENE: Can the utility go and recover some of the assets of this unregulated 
activity in order to build that power plant? 
MR. DANIELSON: That investment is stockholder investment, it's an organization that's 
going on, providing non-utility services. And, again, you would be asking for a subsidi-
zation the other direction, and that is should stockholders go back in to subsidize the 
utility operations? And the question there is in the same direction -- no. You have no 
subsidization that goes either direction. That's the point that Mr. Calvo, Commissioner 
Calvo, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Conlon. 
SENATOR KEENE: I don't understand all of this. 
MR. DANIELSON: Well, maybe Ed can ••• 
MR. CALVO: Could I make a comment? I think the confusion lies in understanding the 
type of structure that we're talking about. We're talking about holding companies. What 
Mr. Danielson says is true. But you also have to bear in mind that that board of directors 
of the holding company has utilized retained earnings made by the utility, and if it's 
the dominate business of the holding company, there was a flow of money from the business, 
the utility business. 
But if you have, say, an enterprise that is within the horizontal or lateral diversi-
fication within, say, PG&E for instance that doesn't have the holding company structure, 
and they came before us and said we want to spend $50 million for a time-of-use device 
that we're going to install in every single home to be able to shave the peak and lower 
the rates, and we thought it was a good idea and we allowed that and it was a total flop 
because it didn't go over and the ratepayer didn't want to utilize it, or it was mechan-
ically unworthy of the venture, then that money would be part of loss and would be con-
sumed and spread out among the rates and the ratepayer would pay that. 
So it just depends on the type of structure that we're talking about. If you have a 
holding company and an investment and a loss, money can't go either way. Except I did 
caution you that there is money that has gone into that investment that was in retained 
earnings, but once it got into retained earnings, that money is no longer under control of 
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the regulatory agency. 
SENATOR KEENE: Should it be? Because if you starve the utility operation, if the 
utility has to incur debt in order to serve its customers because of a misplaced invest-
ment of investor assets in this diversified operation, whether it's through a holding 
company or horizontal type .•. 
MR. CALVO: I don't know whether it should be or not. I think that's sort of a 
legislative decision. It is part of the utility regulatory commission's concern in five 
states, but it isn't in California. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point. If they're retained earnings, traditionally, don't 
they belong to the stockholders if the company so choses to use it that way? They can 
either give it back to the stockholders as an extra dividend, or they can use that capital 
for building plant in this case apparantly they don't want to because we don't need any 
more new plants so they want to use those retained earnings to invest in some diversi-
fication? 
MR. CALVO: Traditionally they do belong to the shareholders, and if there is a 
holding company, then that money is utilized as the board of directors and the officers of 
that company so see fit. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Would it not be the case that if these retained earnings were by 
some legislative fiat held in some part for the ratepayers, that would tend to dry up 
investment potential because the investor might think, well, if I make an investment here 
and we get a profit, and part of that profit over and above what is appropriate is siphoned 
off to the ratepayers, or held for the ratepayers, that's going to reduce my return, 
therefore I'll invest in something else? Is that---isn't that part of the equation too? 
MR. CALVO: Well, I'm not sure that that's hypothetically possible, I'm sure, but it 
doesn't exist under the standard holding company structure and under California law as it 
now exists. We can't do that. 
MR. DANIELSON: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right, Mr. Myers. 
MR. E. A. MYERS: Senators, good afternoon. In deference to our tummies, I'll make 
it awfully quick. 
I'm Edward A. Myers, Jr. I'm Vice President of System Planning of Southern California 
Edison Company. I know you encourage us all to say "me too." Edison has never said "me 
too" in its life, although much of what has been said here applies to us. 
We are a regulated utility dedicated to fulfilling our obligations to the public. 
We're better than ivory soap. We're 99.44% plus in the utility business. 
We have a number of non-utility subsidiaries, some of which date back to 1927, which 
are mentioned on that punch list that you have in your handout there. Most, if not all of 
tltose, were set up either at the behest of the Public Utilities Commission, or to meet a 
specific need of an electric utility customer. 
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We presently have not been looking at any holding company or broad diversification, 
but we do believe that prudent development of non-utility opportunities does allow us to 
capture benefits for customers, employees and investors. 
I think we've been through this investor thing pretty much, but let me just make one 
point there, if I may, Senators. The Public Utilities Commission determines our debt 
equity ratio for the utility business. That means that there has to be a certain amount 
of shareholders' equity in order for us to function. That's a practical limit as to what 
can be put at risk outside. Where we have gone into non-utility ventures, it has really 
been for the ratepayers as well as the shareholders. For the shareholders it's an oppor-
tunity to earn on generation resources, which are no longer in our portfolio of possible 
investments. We are fully resourced for this century. We didn't ask to be. PURPA and 
policies allowed us to become that way. It's baseload, nondispatchable. You've heard 
all of that. By our investing in some of these PURPA facilities, at the invitation of the 
customers, and in one case at the behest of the PUC to break this market open a long time 
ago, we have gotten lower than avoided costs, lower than standard offers. We've gotten 
dispatchability and this has been to the benefit of our ratepayers. It also has given an 
investment opportunity to our shareholders. 
Another thing we are doing is we have done a joint venture out of state selling pro-
duct to Sierra Pacific Power, if you will, in Nevada nothing to do with the California 
ratepayer -- but it did allow us to do some research and development in brine technology 
and geothermal, which we are not allowed to do in California under the avoided cost rules. 
We just can't do it. We need to be a joint venture, qualifying facility to get those 
special incentives to get in to stay in the research and development business. 
We are, as you, concerned with bypass, as far as the impact on the residential rate-
payer. We think that getting close to some of the cogeneration and PURPA power allows us 
to understand the psychology of an industrial potentiai bypass customer and enables us to 
go to the PUC with structured rates, off-peak purchases, that enable us to hold that busi-
ness and not lose that potential impact, detrimental impact on the residential customer 
should we lose it. 
In other words, we recommended that the Commission, and certainly that the Legislature 
establish the right rules to play by. We're willing to play by any rules. The rules 
change, we change with them. If a holding company makes more sense, although it is not 
in our future at the present time, we certainly would consider going along with it. 
We are in a dynamic energy market. For some reason, the utilities, who are responsi-
ble ultimately for delivering the goods, have been disadvantaged by PURPA, giving subsi-
dies, by transmission access deliberations going on, trying to take ratepayer jeopardy 
really, ratepayer service in jeopardy, and we like to be able to maintain our flexibility 
under reasonable rules as you and the Commission set forth. 
We think that we have an alert and aggressive management. We would like to preserve 
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our utility management prerogatives. We certainly, in no way, would wish to have any 
cross-subsidization or any negative impact on our ratepayers. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Myers, Edison subsidiaries, in the cloak of small power 
producers, are selling power to Edison at avoided cost. 
MR. MYERS: The Edison subsidiaries as 50% partners or less, as allowed under PURPA, 
in three---four four joint ventures have power purchase contracts with Southern 
California Edison. In another one they have power purchase contract with Sierra Pacific. 
They are being sold below avoided cost, except in one instance where it's at avoided cost. 
CHAIR}~N ROSENTHAL: Now, Edison is no longer signing new contracts, then, with small 
power producers as a result of this. 
MR. MYERS: No sir, that is not correct. We are signing power purchase contracts 
for Standard Offers I, II and III. Standard Offer IV has been suspended by the Commission 
as of April 17, and as soon as it's reinstated, we will again consider signing contracts. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Because it's my understanding that Edison is benefiting from 
policies designed to promote third party owned power to the disadvantage of the third 
power producers. 
MR. MYERS: Sir, I categorically deny that. At no time have we disadvantaged any 
third party power producer. We are in joint ventures at the invitation of the host 
company on whose grounds we are operating in joint venture with him. We have never com-
peted with any small power producer for that business, and I categorically deny that we 
have disadvantaged them in any way. 
CHAI~N ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
SENATOR KEENE: Question. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
SENATOR KEENE: If the utility chooses to invest in, let's say, a new power plant, 
the Public Utilities Commission evaluates that with reference to ratepayers and investors 
to determine whether it's a sensible, generally sensible kind of an investment. 
MR. MYERS: Yes. We are required to get a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity from the Commission in order to begin construction. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. Let's say that same utility wishes to invest in the amusement 
park business. How in the world -- or the insurance business, which I understand a Florida 
utility is doing. It's in the process of purchasing a large insurance company. How in 
the world can the Public Utilities Commission -- I'm not saying this pertains to your 
situation ... 
MR. MYERS: Please don't. 
SENATOR KEENE: No, I'm not. I'm not implying that. I'm looking for your expertise 
ill the fLeld, nnd saying llow in the wurld can the Public Utilities Cmnmission renlly 
evaluate the amusement park business or the insurance business or some other business? 
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MR. MYERS: The only answer I can give you to that, Senator Keene, is this. In the 
Public Staff's testimony in this ongoing PUC Commission, they said that if the utility is 
allowed to diversify, they would prefer that it be something outside of the utility busi-
ness because it would be sure easier to keep track of, you know, and that's probably true, 
because it's a separate entity, a separate set of books, a separate bunch of rules and 
regulations and it probably would be easier. But I think anybody in the utility business 
who wants to do that kind of diversification certainly ... 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, but my question is if one of the jobs of the Public Utilities 
Commission is to protect the investment of ratepayers, how in the world can the Public 
Utilities Commission do that when the investment is outside of the normal activities of 
utilities and therefore beyond the expertise and scope of the Public Utilities Commission 
and its staff? 
MR. MYERS: Well, I think that the one handle they have on there, and they have taken 
us out of subsidiaries, and somebody said no, they never exercise that jurisdiction. We 
had a subsidiary that they voted out of business for us. They can do that. But the main 
control they have is the debt equity ratio of the utility business per se, you know. If 
we've got $10 billion invested in the business and $20 billion worth of debt, or something 
like that, they can maintain that 42% debt equity and they can prohibit you from moving 
that equity out. That's the quickest way to stop you. 
SENATOR KEENE: Right. Well, they may have the power to stop, but how can they make 
an intelligent judgment over whether that's a good business risk or a bad business risk 
when they're, in effect, in the utility evaluation business and not in the amusement or 
insurance or recreational vehicle or food or hotel or tuna boat business? Isn't that one 
of the tough issues here? 
MR. MYERS: Well, I don't know that they really should. Provided, the equity, the 
shareholders' equity investment in the utility is deemed adequate by the Public Utilities 
Commission, and some holding company management wants to take capital and put it someplace 
else, I don't imagine it's any of the PUC's business. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, but how then does the PUC discharge its responsibility, or does 
it not have the responsibility for protecting ..• 
MR. MYERS: They protect the ratepayer by maintaining adequate amounts of equity in 
the base utility business. 
SENATOR KEENE: Do they have a duty to, in your judgment, protect the investor, the 
utility investor as well? 
MR. MYERS: They certainly have the responsibility under all of the federal laws to 
protect the abiiity to earn of the investor in the utility business. But I imagine a 
sophisticated investor who was notified that his company was diversifying into the 
amu<>ement company would be down there selling his stock awful darn quick. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. Let's approach it from a slightly different direction. I'm an 
-48-
elderly person who wishes to invest in some secure investment, I go to Public Utilities 
and I say I'm going to invest in PG&E, a nice safe investment, and I know that there'll be 
a guaranteed rate of return, there won't be a great deal of risk associated with it, and 
I suddenly find that my stake in that company, my stake in the assets of that company are 
being invested in the amusement park business. I bring a stockholder suit to prevent 
them from doing that. My contract with you was that you would give me a reasonable rate 
of return and everything would be secure I checked it out in Standard and Poor's -- and 
suddenly you guys are investing in some, you know, in the ice cream business. 
MR. MYERS: Well, I assume you'd have to have shareholder approval to do that, sir. 
If it was an investment of any magnitude, if you were going to form a holding company, for 
example, for that purpose, you'd have to have shareholder support to do that. 
So I think your---maybe your little old lady might not be aware of that, but her 
broker or advisor should be in order to do that. You're talking about a major diversifi-
cation here and that's really not possible in the practical world without adequate notice 
to the body of shareholders. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, why does it have to be a major diversification? Why can't it 
just be an investment of substantial assets into some other business? 
MR. MYERS: Well, you used the word "substantial." I used the word "major." I mean 
the same thing. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. And that would require, or should require shareholder approval? 
MR. MYERS: I believe it certainly should require shareholder notification an oppor-
tunity to comment. 
SENATOR KEENE: As a matter of, what, good taste or law? 
MR. MYERS: I don't know. I'm not a lawyer, sir. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: One final question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: One quick one. PG&E said that your total investment for diversi-
fication might not---is not more than 1%. Is that what you said? What about Southern 
Cal Edison? The same? 
MR. MYERS: Far less than 1%, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And I imagine SDG&E? 
MR. EDWARDS: In the 2 to 3 percent range. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And Southern California Gas? 
MR. JOHN: We're not into diversification. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh, that's •.. (Laughter.) We're back to that again. Okay. It 
would seem to me that we're talking about a small amount, and I'm wondering if there's 
any value in just saying that under a certain percent we are more flexible; if you go 
above that, then different rules apply. Is there any merit to saying that kind of 
thinking, rather than getting us into such a straightjacket and require the PUC to add 
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more taff and more rules and more legislation and so forth on this? 
MR. CONLON: Senator Russell, if I might respond. In our view, and I think the 
financial community's view, diversification will be self-limiting. If it's successful at 
5%, 10, 15 20% of total assets, the market will encourage it. If it is unsuccessful, the 
market will respond. It will reflect that in the value of the stock. It will call for 
changes in boards of directors, which has happened at other utilities. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, we understand that, but our concern is that in the process 
of moving out into diversification some failures might impinge unfairly and unhappily 
upon the ratepayers. That's our concern. And so---but if you have a 1% or 2%, even if 
you do have some bad choices and disasters, maybe in simplified terms, even the worst 
case, that really wouldn't impact much at all. Is that a fair statement or is that not 
the case? (No answer) Well, Victor, I'd like to talk to you about your opinions on that 
sometime. We don't have time now. But whether the size of the diversification has any 
bearing on what we should or shouldn't do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. We will break now for lunch. We will take one hour 
for lunch. We're not, as a matter of fact, the staff and the Senators are not going to 
be leaving the building. We have sandwiches being provided for us so that it doesn't go 
beyond the one hour so that we can make up for the time that we didn't get all in this 
morning. And so we'll be back here at a quarter to two. 
- LUNCH BREAK -
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. The hour of 1:45 having arrived, telephone utilities are 
going to tell us what their particular problems are, and they're going to do it briefly. 
Mr. Thompson. 
MR. JAMES THO~WSON: Good afternoon, Chairman Rosenthal, Senators: My name is James 
Thompson. I am the Market/Planning Manager for Network Services for General Telephone 
of California. And will be brief. 
There are two key areas that I want to address this afternoon, one of which is that 
deregulation has caused us to make some internal changes in the way in which we provide 
goods and services to our customers. And we formed, under Commission direction, in 
January of 1985 a wholly-owned subsidiary that deals with primarily customer premise or 
deregulated equipment, and it's called "G-TEL." It is for the purpose of providing some 
continuity to our customers as they go through the deregulation environment. 
We believe that that will be as far as General Telephone of California will go in 
the diversification arena for the near term period as we see it. We think that more 
importantly we should concentrate our energies and efforts on our core business, the 
11ct work bus Lnc~sH. and movc toward enhnnc it nH WC' go thnHtp;h the t•volutlnn 11\ t~>chnn-· 
logy that we're seeing upon us. We think that our interests are in the network, and that's 
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where our primary revenues are going tQ be generated from. 
The other area that I had some concern with relative to diversification is General 
Telephone of California has no real positive or negative position.relative to diversifi-
cation, as far as format, whether it's a holding company format or holding subsidiary 
format. Our concern for diversification, in particular, amongst other utilities in the 
State of California is that any operations that are in a nonregulated format not be with-
in the telecommunications arena or other regulated areas in which the ratepayer or the 
net effect on the ratepayer may have a negative impact. 
What I mean by that is that if other utilities were to diversify and enter into the 
telecommunications arena, they probably would not look to providing service in desolate 
areas or in low density populated areas. They would look to provide service in high 
density, profitable network serving arenas. This would have an impact on the telephone 
industry in a negative fashion, or that it might impact the other utility in a positive 
way. We've heard this morning several ways in which those revenue strains would be kept 
separate -- that the ratepayer would be held harmless and would not see a positive flow 
of cash from those diversified activities. While the ultimate result is that you have a 
ratepayer in the State of California that uses all the utilities, and therefore, there 
would be, if the telecOITh!lunications industry were "cream skinned" as a result of others, 
enter into telecommunications provisioning if •.. 
SENATOR KEENE: If it were what? 
MR. THOMPSON: Cream skinned. You would have ultimately a negative impact to the 
ratepayer. That's our primary concern is wherever there would be diversification and 
entrance into nonregulated opportunities by whomever, we just think that they ought to 
be preempted from telecommunications because of the already at the brink of chaos that we 
find ourselves in the telecommunications arena. 
We're already facing so many deregulated impacts, and the bypass threat for pro-
viding these services. Our ratepayers are already at risk we think with the siphoning 
off of those revenues. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, why wouldn't you want to leave the related industries 
within their regulated utility to reduce consumer telephone bills? 
MR. THOMPSON: Well, in effect we have, if I understand your question. 
CHAIRl~~ ROSENTHAL: Well, in other words, what's the line your corporation crosses 
to make it diversity? 
MR. THOMPSON: The only diversification that we have at this point in time is our 
G-TEL organization, which is a horizontally distributed of customer premise equipment or 
deregulated equipment. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, but supposing you decided next week that you're going to 
do some other kind of diversification. Why wouldn't you leave it---what is your objec-
tion, if any, to leaving it within the regulated arena? 
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1U{. THOMPSON: I don't have a rejection of that thought at all. As far as ... 
Clilllfu~~ ROSENTHAL: A company has a policy in terms of the future as to whether or 
not they are in favor of or opposed to leaving all of the related industries within .•. 
In other words, what we've been getting at earlier today was giving PUC a handle on 
everything that you do, even unrelated to telephones. 
MR. THOMPSON: I understand. I would say that our company's position would be that 
the Public Utilities Commission has already all the information that it needs provided to 
them in monitoring the regulated business, that if we were to diversify and have inter-
action between an unregulated subsidiary and the regulated business, they have enough 
tracking. I think we went through the exercise this morning of defining "retained 
earnings" and what are retained earnings and what can happen to retained earnings. Once 
those earnings are in fact retained, they're no longer, I don't believe, under the juris-
diction of a regulated body. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, let me---l live in an area where the telephone equipment, 
up until just recently, was outmoded, and yet that telephone company may have had an 
excess of money to reinvest someplace else. And I'm saying, hey, how come they didn't 
buy the new equipment instead of reinvesting someplace else? Do you have a response to 
that? 
MR. THOMPSON: Well, that fits perfectly with what I'm suggesting is our philosophy 
at General Telephone. We don't believe that we should be expanding and diversifying 
any more than we have to accommodate some kind of continuity for our customers in pro-
viding customer premise equipment that has now been deregulated. 
We believe that we should take the monies that we're accruing today and build for 
the future and enhance the core business, which is the network business. We're at a 
point in our investment cycle that differs somewhat from what the other folks that spoke 
this morning are. We're at a point where technical evolution in our industry is happening 
so quickly that we're at the---we're yet to reach the peak of investing in our and in our 
users' future. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So your company is not looking for investment in other places 
with excess profits. 
MR. THOJ'1PSON: Absolutely. We have, we think, all we can handle to build the net-
work of the future. 
CHA~~ ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Mr. Gaulding, Pacific Telesis. 
MR. J. R. GAULDING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators: My name is John Gaulding. 
I'm Vice President of Corporate Strategy and Development for Pacific Telesis Group. 
We're going to use some easels here, and I gave you, just before we started, hard 
copies of those. That is this document right here. 
Before I get started, I think I should make the point that there are rather funda-
mental differences between Mr. Thompson's company and my own-- General Telephone of 
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Cali fc,rnja being a wholly-owned subsidiary operating telephone company of GTE, which is 
a worldwide, fully diversified telecommunications corporation headquartered in Stanford, 
Connecticut. 
Pacific Telesis is a local corporation. We are incorporated in the State of Nevada 
and headquartered in San Francisco with telephone operations all over the state and a 
small and growing portfolio of businesses which are not in the network service business 
itself. 
I thought this morning Mr. Edwards from San Diego Gas & Electric suggested a couple 
of reasons why San Diego Gas & Electric was seeking to form a holding company and diversify 
from a strategic perspective. We were removed of the need to go through that process by 
the federal preemption of the telecommunications industry. 
We have a number of forces that have driven our particular industry, and the princi-
pal one is federal public policy, both regulatory and judicial. We operate under the 
strictures of Computer Inquiry II of the FCC and of the modified final judgment that 
was entered into between AT&T and the Department of Justice. As a result of that, a 
holding a company was formed, one of seven holdings that were part of the divested Bell 
operating company structure when AT&T divested the operating companies. 
I think it's important to acknowledge the fact that the federal actions of deregu-
lating parts of the telephone industry have fundamentally changed the structure of that 
industry. And that's where we start. We start from trying to understand how that 
structure has been altered and what it means. And for simplistic purposes, everything has 
been changed in the industry. The technologies have been changed, competitors are present 
where they didn't used to be, the economic flow of funds within the telecommunications 
industry has been changed, fundamentally unregulated companies are taking profits which 
used to flow into the national telecommunication structure, customers are changing their 
behavior -- some are getting more sophisticated, some are leaving our network as well as 
others -- and just recently I heard the chairman of IBM, John Opal, address the Inter-
national Industrial Conference, which is held every four years, in San Francisco, and 
during his keynote speech, he identified telecommunications as the new business that IBM 
was in. And for their purposes they see this as a 2 trillion dollar-a-year industry 
worldwide by the year 2000. 
So we're talking about an industry which is fundamentally different than it is today 
thought to be, is today regulated to be, and in many instances by the way it's incor-
porated is different than it ought to be. 
So with that, I will simply say that we have a number of changes which are funda-
mentally changing our industry, and they are forces which are largely outside the control 
of either ourselves or anybody within the State of California. 
In trying to make some sense out of this industry, we tried to look at various 
customer segments, and again, for the purposes of simplicity, we tried to segment our 
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markets in terms of volume, both low and high volume users, and complexity, whether those 
users are very sophisticated or simply require basic telephone service. 
Now, on this chart you'll see four quadrants, and each one of those quadrants 
generally characterizes an industry segment that we serve. In each of the outlying three 
quadrants, competition is present, and in many instances it's rather healthy. 
In the increased functionality quadrant, for example, where we included advanced 
PBX's, there was a point in time when AT&T and its Bell operating company subsidiaries 
had 100% of the PBX market. At deregulation AT&T held less than 50%, and they went from 
100 to 50 percent in less than 5 five years. So in that segment, composition is very 
robust indeed. 
ln the segment which is control over information resources, you tend to find the 
highest volume, most sophisticated users of communications and information technologies. 
l recently heard a gentleman by the name of Ed David, who is the vice president with 
Exxon, explain why Exxon had built its own worldwide voice and data network. And his 
basic rationale was that there wasn't anybody else to build it for them, and they wanted 
reliability, integrity and low cost. Now, we have through the virtue of public policy at 
the federal level created a situation where existing providers could not offer that to 
Exxon, and so Exxon has, for all intensive purposes, left all public switch networks. 
In the lower right-hand quadrant you see people who are... I'm sorry. Senator? 
CHAI&~ ROSENTHAL: Why couldn't you build it? 
MR. GAULDING: Well, as the local exchange company, Pacific Bell couldn't build it 
because its reach only extends as far as its franchise serving area. At the federal level 
AT&T today probably could build it. But prior to the time that AT&T was given the 
authority by the FCC to integrate its transport and equipment, sales, marketing efforts, 
they had to approach a customer through separate subsidiaries as well. That was the whole 
basis for Computer II. That left Exxon with no suppliers of record to build the kind of 
system that they felt was important to run their business. 
Now, that's changed somewhat because AT&T has been given relief under one of the 
dockets just completed before the FCC. I should point out, however, that the local 
operat companies like ourselves have not been given relief, and we still are required 
to approach customers through Pacific Bell for network services and through one of our 
subsidiaries -- PacTel Communication Systems -- for PBX's and other kinds of equipment. 
So we still have a separate subsidiary requirement that we're required to maintain. 
Now, the only place where we don't have robust competition in this quadrant is in the 
lower left-hand corner. Now, the reason for that is that we provide services which cost 
about $30 a month and we charge a little bit over $8 for them. So to an outsider looking 
at that particular market segment it's not particularly attractive. 
It is important, however, to note that in the other three quadrants -- Bill, will you 
change that? -- in the other three quadrants, our abil to be successful in markets 
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which ~ire both competitive and deregulated from the standpoint of our competitors, and 
yet we are regulated in our participation, our ability to be successful in those segments 
contributes to widely available, affordable service. And that is the principle upon which 
we're operating. And we wish to be as successful as possible in competitive markets so 
that we can continue to sustain widely available affordable service. 
Now, we also think that it's important where we do compete, and from the basis of 
competition in our PacTel companies, which are---I don't know whether you understand the 
structure of our corporation or not, but we have the core business -- Pacific Bell -- and 
we have the PacTel Company group which contains, at the present time, seven non-network 
related subsidiaries. Pacific Bell is regulated, rate of return regulated, by the 
California PUC and the FCC, and our PacTel companies are essentially unregulated, except 
in some instances such as mobile access which is to sell your business, which is priced, 
and it's regulated in certain facets of its operations. 
So our intent is to try to be as successful in the outlying quadrants so that we can 
continue to maintain widely available affordable service to the ratepayer of California. 
SENATOR KEENE: The colors in that are ... ? 
MR. GAULDING: The colors are •.. 
SENATOR KEENE: Profit? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: They're certainly warm colors. (Laughter.) 
SENATOR KEENE: No, I'm just trying to find out what they represent. 
MR. GAULDING: They represent---where the red is the deepest is where we face the 
greatest degree of competition, the greatest vulnerability in our ability to offer services 
to the customers. Those people are leaving the network -- they're leaving Pacific Bell. 
They're leaving it because it's economic to leave it; they're leaving it because tech-
nology has allowed them to have substitutes; and they're leaving it, in many instances, 
because their needs are so complex and sophisticated, and their need to control their own 
information is so proprietary that they simply don't want to do that over a public switch 
network. 
So those are where the Exxon's and the Bank of America and Crocker and Security 
Pacific and other data intensive users are located and they are leaving the network for 
most of their fundamental information needs -- building their own facilities. And AT&T 
now competes for those customers as well. 
SENATOR KEENE: It's certainly graphed very nicely and everything is nice and 
symmetrical. 
MR. GAULDING: Now, because the lower left-hand quadrant is so far under water 
economically, you'd think that it'd be green but it isn't. It's yellow because it re-
yuices something like $3.2 billion a year of subsidy flow from the other segments in order 
to keep the cost of basic service as low as it is. And it is lower in California than it 
is in any other jurisdiction in the United States. 
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SENATOR KEENE: It's the parched desert symbolism. Scorched earth. 
MR. GAULDING: Yes. So we're worried about it. We're worried about it, because we 
believe that we have two basic groups of businesses. One business is designed to try to 
capture for the corporation all of those people that are in the outlying quadrants. And 
the other concern is to try to provide for people in the widely available affordable 
quadrant, continued widely available affordable service. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question, Mr. Chairman. As ~ recall when Judge Greene handed out 
his edict, there was some concern at one time that the Yellow Pages were going to go 
either with AT&T or someplace else. Do I recall that correctly? 
MR. GAULDING: Yes, Senator, you do. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And Pacific Bell locally was able to keep them and make a profit 
to defer some of those costs that you're talking about. Now, in the kinds of things we're 
talking here about, suppose that's decided to diversify that and make that some other kind 
of a profit thing, which we were talking about, whether it's Yellow Pages or something 
else. Is that---to the extent that you do that, then you have less companies or products 
that are subsidizing those low costs, and isn't that a danger in terms of this diversifi-
cation aspect whereby companies, in this case telephone companies, may invest dollars in 
something over here that have no relationship to subsidy, whereas maybe if the money were 
required to be kept within the company there would be a subsidyL Or could invest in this 
but it would have to be part of the overall ratemaking structure. Are you in a little 
different bind than, say, the Gas Company and PG&E and Southern California Edison in terms 
of those kinds of things? 
MR. GAULDING: We have a different set of realities, I believe. And let me answer 
your question really in different ways. The first is that, yes, the Yellow Pages provide 
rather a significant contribution to subsidized basic services. And parenthetically they 
are probably the most competitive industry that we participate in. Ruben H. Donnelly, 
General Tel, GT Directory, and others are all competing for the markets that we serve. 
There are some 78 publishers presently active in California producing Yellow Pages. 
We agreed at a policy level in our corporation that the revenues from Yellow Pages 
would continue to be imputed in the rate of return for Pacific Bell. In other words, all 
the profit that is made in the Yellow Page operation is given over to Pacific Bell and 
included in the rate of return calculation. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Were you required to do that? 
MR. GAULDING: We were not. It is true, however, that it would have been one heck 
of a battle to try to do otherwise. And in some cases, in some other jurisdictions, 
regional companies have made deals, if you will, with their local regulator to say we will 
cont tnue to provide "X" number of dollars of profit contribution each year. but w<' 're 
going to take Yellow Pages and move those into a publishing line of business. We did not 
do that. 
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So our policy is that the Yellow Pages, as long as they are healthy and continue to 
sustain an adequate return, and the return today is more than adequate, we will consent 
to have those profits imputed by the California PUC as part of the rate of return regu-
lation. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: To the extent that these other companies make inroads into your 
marketing abilities, and therefore reduce that profitability, to that extent there'll be 
fewer dollars to subsidize. 
MR. GAULDING: That's correct. 
SEN~fOR RUSSELL: Now, what's the difference, though, between your, say, choosing to 
do that with the Yellow Pages and your choosing to do something else with your mobile 
companies, your car phones and so forth7 
MR. GAULDING: Well, we go through an annual cycle in the fall -- in fact, we just 
completed it-- that we call the "Resource Allocation Cycle." And at that time all of 
the business, including directory, come before our policy group, and that includes the 
chairman and the seven of us that report to the chairman. And they give their business 
plans to us. The CEO analyzes those and my staff analyzes those, and as a group we allo-
cate the funding that we believe is appropriate for each line of business. 
Now, there are two things that govern that. First of all, we won't fund any line of 
business unless it demonstrates that it can earn a rate of return on that investment that 
is commensurate with the risk that's involved. And secondly, we won't fund any business 
outside of the network if all the money we have is needed by the network. And so the net-
work comes first -- Pacific Bell comes first. Once we've satisfied ourselves that the 
capital demands of Pacific Bell can be met adequately, then we determine what level of 
earnings growth we think is appropriate to sustain us as an attractive investment in the 
financial community, and we sort of split the rest of the pie among the businesses 
according to their ability to compete successfully for those funds. 
So two answers: Yellow Pages stays in the regulated entity and stays as a contri-
butor to keep local rates down. And secondly, the network comes first. What's left over, 
if there is anything, is allocated in a rational way to the other businesses on a basis 
of competition. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, we're told that in the real world in "X" years -- I think 
it's five, maybe it's---around there that the telephone, the basic telephone rate was 
going to go up from $8 to either $21 or $27 -- I can't remember which --simply because 
the subsidy that was once in the AT&T long distance operation and so forth is no longer 
there. Therefore you are helping to subsidize those rates by the Yellow Pages, but that 
over a period of time, that's not going to be enough and so the rates are going to go up. 
We're talking about bypass and all that sort of thing. But even with bypass, and that 
Lw('omes a stLckler issue each yenr, 1 H<>e a potPntinl --1 1m not saytng tlwt's whnt I'm 
(or -- but 1 see a potential for those of us maybe in the PUC, maybe in the Legislature, 
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to say wow, we can't let that happen, our constituents are going to have our scalp, so 
therefore we're going to pass a bill that says all these different holding company sub-
sidiaries you can't spin them off until there's enough money into the pot to keep the rates 
down at the current level. And if we were to do that, what effect would that have on 
your ability to be an attractive investment and to compete in all that other thing? 
MR. GAULDING: That's an extremely insightful, very complicated question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I like the insightful part. 
MR. GAULDING: Well, maybe it's just the answer that's complicated, I don't know. 
First of all, the financial community looks at the quality of regulation in each one of 
the state jurisdictions and make a judgment whether it's right or wrong. And the judg-
ment then determines the amount of risk they feel is present in the stability of earnings 
of the regulated entity. 
The number one ingredient in that is the quality of regulation. If in California, 
either by legislative or by PUC action or a combination, we were to say to Pacific Telesis 
you cannot grow any more in the businesses that represent the outer three quadrants until 
there's enough money left to keep the prices of local service at one-fourth of what it 
costs you to provide it, I think you would see an economically unviable entity in very 
short order. 
I believe that our ability to be healthy and grow over time is a function of doing 
everything that is prudent managerially to do to capture every single customer that we can 
find in that industry. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, why wouldn't the investors say the same thing about the 
Yellow Pages? They're saying here is a perfect example of an investment, it's doing well, 
we get a good return, you've chosen to keep it in the kitty. How does that differ from 
our coming along and saying the same other things with 2 or 3 of your other spin-off 
proposals? Well, with the Yellow Pages, you kept it in; we'll just keep these other 
things in and we will guarantee then our constituents the same low rate. 
MR. GAULDING: Well, the money has to come from someplace. And in the case of Yellow 
Pages, I think at some point in time -- I can't predict when it is-- but at some point 
in time, we and the Commission are going to have to revisit whether the risks of that 
business are so great that the ratepayers should not bear it. 
To the extent that customers are choosing options other than Pacific Bell's network 
to meet their communications needs, the money simply goes away to provide that $3.2 bil-
lion subsidy. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So to the extent that we would prohibit this expansion, for the 
reasons that I suggested, we would be driving investment capital away from you and 
worsening the situation. 
MR. GAULDING: I believe you would. I believe you would. I don't know what the pace 
is, but it's clear that our viability is a function of participating rationally wherever 
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we can find a profitable market. Because the market that we used to serve is now highly 
fragmented. Much of it has left the regulated arena. And yet we continue to have the 
social objective in California of maintaining very low affordable rates. 
So if we're going to participate in that, which we wish to, we must be able to par-
ticipate everywhere where we believe we can stay healthy as a corporation. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Gaulding, a recent L.A. Times article described the 
recently established PacTel new business----PacTel "Spectrum" Services as a major cause of 
concern to the PUC. Can you explain to the committee how you intend to keep a service 
which provides voice and data network services completely separate from the mother 
company which helped to develop such expertise? 
MR. GAULDING: Yes, I sure can. I'm troubled by the last statement. I'm not sure 
that the mother company did, in fact, develop that expertise. But let me tell you how 
it's structured. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, there's an indication that it has, because the people who 
are in that new company came from your company. 
MR. GAULDING: Some did, yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, but so. That's the only thing we can go by and the fact 
that ... 
MR. GAULDING: No, you're absolutely right. Some people did come from Pacific Bell 
to Spectrum Services. Some people came from AT&T. Some people came from 
------
some people came from the business schools, some people came from the engineering schools. 
It's very much a hodgepodge of people skills that landed on the ground in a company that 
is organizationally and structurally separate from Pacific Bell. 
It was run for the first year and a half of its operations as a division of PacBell 
Communication Systems. And at the time we got our first customer, we formally announced 
the creation of a new subsidiary, which is now part of our PacTel Communications group. 
Other than the fact that there are some people in that company that came from Pacific 
Bell, there are no other interactions among those companies, except that Spectrum buys 
under tariff the same kinds of private line facilities that anybody else would buy in 
order to run its diagnostic equipment. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And if this subsidiary makes a profit, why shouldn't that adhere 
to the ratepayer? 
MR. GAULDING: Because it was capitalized with shareholders' equity for one thing. 
CI~Ifu~N ROSENTHAL: But could the PUC, looking at that company, come up with a 
concept which says, hey, PUC paid for those people in the beginning, those who are there, 
and that needs to be returned? 
MR. GAULDING: Oh, but they didn't, Mr. Chairman. The PUC, nor the ratepayer nor 
anybody else paid for those people. People are not for sale. The people had a set of 
skills that were created in a number of different prior work environments -- one of which 
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was Pacific Bell. And the people elected to change their place of employment from 
wherever they were before, including Pacific Bell, to start this new company. The company 
itself was funded by shareholders' equity. There are no funds that flow from Pacific 
Bell to PacTel's Spectrum Services. 
And perhaps the question really is should the diversified subsidiaries compensate 
former employers in some way, shape or form for the skills of the people that are present 
ln that subsidiary? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, I think what my constituent is asking when they raised the 
question, is why is it that the profit that your company is going to make as a result of 
this reorganization, why doesn't it keep my telephone bill down? Why are you now still 
appearing before the PUC and asking for increases when, in fact, an offshoot of that 
company is producing profits which could keep my telephone bill down? 
MR. GAULDING: I see. 
CHAIID1AN ROSEN1HAL: The average person, by the way, does not believe that the cost 
of providing that service is $27 or $28 or $29. They don't believe that. 
MR. GAULDING: I understand that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay? And so you're dealing with an historical relationship 
which said, hey, I paid $7 a month, I had unlimited kinds of services for that $7, we 
are now paying $15 a month and you're making a profit someplace, but why is my bill going 
up? 
MR. GAULDING: It's a difficult question to answer. The cost studies commissioned by 
the PUC and others over time have established for the record of whatever the costs are of 
providing these services. And the ratemaking process has determined the price of those, 
and I don't think anybody takes issue with the fact that the price is significantly below 
the cost. 
And the problem that all of us have, the PUC and ourselves and the FCC, and increas-
the Department of Justice, which has systematically ignored the pricing problems, 
the problem that we have is that the source of subsidy to keep prices low is eroding. We 
have never claimed, nor would we claim that diversification is an answer to that. An 
answer to it is getting the prices someplace close to cost. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, I understand what you're saying. What's the process by 
which a determination is made to spin something off which could then be profitable which 
is not going to transfer to the benefit of the ratepayer? I mean •.• 
MR. GAULDING: Well, I'm not sure I understand the "spin-off" terminology. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, okay. 
MR. GAULDING: I don't believe we've spun anything off. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No. The management decided that the Yellow Pages was something 
they would leave but Spectrum is something different. What was the •.. 
MR. GAULDING: Well, the determination there is the Yellow Pages have been by 
-60-
Califo~nia statute as well as PUC policy been imputed for some period of time now. And we 
had a choice to make. The choice was should we approach the Commission and say let's make 
some sort of accommodations so that you get some guarantee of profits and we move this out 
of regulation. Or do we simply say, listen, we're going to run it as competitively as we 
can and make as much money as we can and whatever we make we give you. And as a matter of 
our public policy we decided to do the latter. 
In the case of PacTel's Spectrum Services, we had a number of ways to get in a busi-
ness that market research told us there was a market for. Now, incidentally, that market 
research was paid for by shareholders' equity. None of that research was funded by Bell 
or any other regulated entity. 
That research said, and we commissioned for that particular research Arthur D. Little, 
that research said that there was a latent and strong market of business users who didn't 
have any idea in the world how they were going to keep the networks patched together. In 
many cases they had equipment they didn't know they had, and in some cases they didn't have 
equipment they thought they had. In many cases they had equipment hooked to a network 
that hadn't worked since the day it was installed. 
And so that research led to the creation of a business plan. That business plan com-
peted for the corporation's capital and won, and we established that as a startup sub-
sidiary. So it's not a spin-off. It had no existence prior to its creation at all. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'm trying to understand how a decision is made. PacBell' s Spectrum 
Services deals with the businesses as your users. They are the large users of services. 
They're also in the rate base, these large users. Why wouldn't it make as much sense, 
since they are a large portion of your rate base, keeping them in the rate base? 
MR. GAULDING: Oh, I'm sorry. I haven't communicated this very well. Spectrum 
Services provides a very specific network surveillance and maintenance service to these 
users. It does not take their voice and data needs away from Pacific Bell in any way, 
shape or form. Pacific Bell cannot offer the services that PacTel's Spectrum Services 
offers. 
Those companies, unless they have chosen to leave the network of their own volition, 
because like Exxon they may have built their own captive network, those customers are 
still on Pacific Bell's network and producing revenues for Pacific Bell buying services 
under tariff. 
~1at we are doing through PacTel's Spectrum Services is giving them a very finite 
diagnostic service for their own networks -- like a bank ATM network. 
CHAI~~ ROSENTHAL: Okay. Now, those users of that particular service were not on 
lhe PacBelJ system. 
~ill. GAULDING: Yes they are on the PacBell system. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Then I don't understand what you're saying. 
MR. GAULDING: And they continue to be on the PacBell system. See, PacTel's Spectrum 
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Services is just one service. It's a single service. 
CHAI&~ ROSENTHAL: No, I understand. I just picked that one out because of the 
L.A. Times article. I'm trying to figure out, in my own mind, since that'sauserofPacBell 
services why that wasn't left with PacBell as the Yellow Pages were, because Yellow Pages 
are the users---are used by ••• 
MR. GAULDING: Oh, because that service didn't exist until we formed the company. 
See, we formed that company because we researched the market and found a need for a ser-
vice. And then we went and designed the service and we designed the hardware and we 
developed the software in PacT,el Spectrum to provide that single service. They were 
never •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I guess what I'm---what was the decision which made it be 
another company? In other words, outside the concern of ••. 
MR. GAULDING: Oh. Why would you not develop that service within Pacific Bell? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
MR. GAULDING: A couple of reasons for that. The first reason is that most of these 
networks are national networks. They're networks that are connected, interconnected 
throughout the country or throughout the western region. Pacific Bell doesn't go through-
out the western region. It is confined to its local serving area. That's reason number 
one. 
Reason number two is that this is a brand new service. We believe through our own 
research that it will be successful, but we don't know. Right now we have quite a little 
bit of money invested in it that the shareholders are paying for, and it's our belief that 
if there is competitive risk and startup risk to be borne, that they ought to be borne by 
the shareholders and the profits or rewards from that ought to go to the shareholders. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I guess my bottom line is trying to determine on what basis you 
will decide to improve your operations, and then spin it off, where it doesn't benefit my 
homeowner. 
r1R. GAULDING: We won't. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, that's what I'm trying .•. 
~1R. GAULDING: All right. We won't. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So what are the safeguards which Pacific Telesis has implemented 
to keep its subsidiaries separate from resources inherent to Pacific Bell? 
MR. GAULDING: Let's go to the next one and I'll discuss with you the principles that 
we have at work. 
SENATOR KEENE: Could you bring the other one back for just a second? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: He likes those colors. 
SENATOR KEENE: I know that there is some explanation for what appears to be a funda-
mental contradiction in your testimony and ••. 
MR. GAULDING: I sure hope so, Senator. 
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SENATOR KEENE: Well, if corporate strategy can't explain it, no one can. First, 
your rationale, which is expressed up there and in your own testimony, is that you need to 
diversify and get into these other businesses in order to keep prices low in order to---we 
must pursue new business development to minimize vulnerability in all segments and enhance 
shareholder value. I certainly understand the enhanced shareholder value. It's the first 
part that I have trouble with -- minimizing vulnerability in all segments. And I listened 
very closely to your testimony and you used the phrase "that the sources of subsidy to 
keep prices low is eroding." And all of this appears to be the rationale for your moving 
into other areas. So I listened to that and I said, yes, that makes sense. You have 
responsibilities as a regulated utility to do certain things, and in order to do those 
things, you've got to earn some money and compete in certain areas and therefore move into 
those areas. I thought I understood that. Then I thought I heard you say several times 
that there really is no duty to, for want of a better term, "resubsidize" the utility 
activities, the ratepayer that the Chairman was talking about -- in fact, quite the oppo-
site becau::;e that would be a kind of cross-subsidization and after all, you went into 
these other areas with shareholder assets and they took the risk with those assets and 
the profits from those assets therefore ought not to be used to reduce the cost of services 
to the ratepayer. 
So on the o~e hand I hear you saying, hey, we need to diversify to keep prices low, 
to keep the ratepayer effectively happy and in the gain; and on the other hand, we're 
getting into these other areas with shareholder assets, therefore we have no duty to do 
that. 
MR. GAULDING: Let me try to address that because it's a very valid concern. 
SENATOR KEENE: Please. 
MR. GAULDING: We have two basic groups of businesses. One group is a network ser-
vices group and its principal occupant is Pacific Bell. Now, there are a number of ser-
vices, business development activities, within Pacific Bell that are currently underway. 
And, in fact, their planning has identified over time something close to $300 million 
worth of revenue contribution that can be made by continuing to develop the capabilities 
of Pacific Bell. 
We recently made a filing before the FCC in response to their Computer Inquiry III, 
which basically says on this chart, allow us to push into those other quadrants by pro-
viding increasingly intelligent information-age services, which we are currently prohibited 
from doing by public policy. Allow us to do that because it is in that capability that 
sophisticated services will be made available to all users in the State of California. 
If we're able to do that, that will open up all sort~ of new potential, product and 
service potential on the basic network. So that's point one. 
Point two is that there are certain things that are happening in our industry that 
no network service company can do anything about, because the network itself doesn't have 
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the capability to provide those services. PBX's, for example. Local area networks inside 
buildings, terminal equipment of all sorts, PC's, mini's and micro's --the kinds of 
things that are sort of driving the automation of the office. The network can't reach 
those people because the network can't provide the services. But they are still part of 
an overall set of needs that a customer has, and that's where we're pushing our diversifi-
cation program. 
SENATOR KEENE: I don't think you've addressed my question. You've kind of stated 
some positions around it. Why do you need to get into these other areas? Why should the 
PUC even allow you to get into these other areas? 
MR. GAULDING: In my view, Senator, because if we don't, others, including our former 
parent, will take our customers away from us -- all of our customers away from us. 
SENATOR KEENE: Because your customers what? 
MR. GAULDING: Because our customer has needs that go far beyond our ability to reach 
them with just the network. If we can modernize the network and get public policy to the 
point where it permits us to put available technology to work in that network, all of 
which is regulated and all of which benefits the consumer, then that will keep a certain 
number of customers with us. The customers that are going to leave us anyway, we would 
like to be on the other side of the street with other products and services to greet them, 
so that if they come to us for their PBX, they come to us for their micro's, their mini's, 
they come to us for the whole host of services that fill out their information needs. 
SENATOR KEENE: So you're diversifying because you don't want to lose customers. 
MR. GAULDING: We're diversifying because we don't want our customers to be taken 
away from us, that's correct. And we are continuing to grow a network for the same reason, 
and continuing to stretch the envelope on the ability of the network to provide very 
sophisticated services because we don't want people to leave the network. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. If in doing so you reach into areas that are more profitable, 
why shouldn't the returns on that be used to subsidize the areas that may be less profit-
able or that fall within the ambit of your responsibility to ratepayers? 
HR. GAULDING: I don't believe, Senator, that that's purely a function of how the ef-
fort is capitalized. If it is capitalized by the shareholder, then the shareholder ought 
to take the hit or the profit. If it's capitalized under rate of return regulation, then 
the ratepayer ought to take the hit or the profit. And I think it's the balance that the 
Commission is trying to seek to insulate the ratepayer from too many effects of competi-
tion. There are a lot of effects you can't insulate the ratepayer from to begin with. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, how does it help you to---how does it keep you from losing 
customers if these other areas of activity when profitable are not going to be used to 
support and sustain the areas in which you desire to keep customers? 
MR. GAULDING: Well, first of all, it's important to us that our customers see 
Pacific Telesis group in all of its companies as fullest-service provider as possible. 
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So they ought to go to Pacific Bell for their network services and they ought to go to 
Pacific of Pac'fel Mobile Access for their cellular radio, and they ought to go to PacTel 
Communications for the PBX's and micro's and mini's. They ought to come to one of our 
companies for their needs. 
To the extent to which they come to any one of those companies for their needs mini-
mizes their desire or need to leave our corporation as a source of meeting those needs. 
SENATOR KEENE: It seems to me that that is a very tenuous argument for justifying 
diversification by PacTel. 
MR. GAULDING: Well, it may be. It may be. 
SENATOR KEENE: It just sounds that way to me. 
t1R. GAULDING: But we look at an industry today that is in total size smaller than 
it was three years ago, because customers have left our system for other people's systems. 
Everytime one of those people leaves the network, the shortfall that's created by that 
causes pressure on local rates, and we don't want them to leave. 
SENATOR KEENE: But then you no longer want to do what you started out in this 
world doing. 
t1R. GAULDING: We want to have a full set of capabilities, information capabilities, 
for those customers to draw on. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point. If you're not allowed to do these other things, 
more and more customers will leave your network and get their services from other organi-
zations, shrinking the capital net, so to speak, with which you can build the regulated 
part, as well as the other, and with each departing customer there is a cost impact, ad-
verse cost impact, to the ratepayer? 
MR. GAULDING: It certainly is potentially. It's a bit of a zero sum game. As long 
as one segment of our customers are not paying the cost of serving those customers, as 
long as we are required to serve those customers on demand, somebody's going to make up 
the difference. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Let me back up and see if I understand your answer, which wasn't 
as direct as I'd like it to be. If you have a totality now, some of which paying for the 
ratepayer keeping prices down at this time, and if we don't allow you to diversify, or 
put roadblocks, and some of those customers then leave this universe, then the universe 
shrinks. You have the same number of people you are required to serve, but the profit-
ability becomes smaller and smaller. So there is less subsidization available, if you 
want to call it that way, to the ratepayer; thus we're sort of in a Catch-22. Your 
universe is smaller, the base stays the same, so the cost will go up. 
MR. GAULDING: That's correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On the same token, if you are allowed to compete for these com-
panies that are going to leave, you're setting up a separate entity to capture those 
people who want to leave who you can't now serve, but you will be serving them outside of 
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the regulated rate base, so what's the difference? 
MR. GAULDING: Well, the part of the puzzle that's missing there is the extensive 
amount of new product development that's taking place inside Pacific Bell. It's not as 
literal as all of our matrixes and models make it out to be. 
We want to expand the capabilities of Pacific Bell as much as we can to provide as 
much service to our existing customers and new customers as we can. Those people that 
can't get it from Pacific Bell because the network technologically doesn't have the capa-
bility, we would also like to serve. But that's a very intensely competitive marketplace. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Why doesn't the network have the capability? Because capitalwise 
you don't have or .•• ? 
MR. GAULDING: No. No. It doesn't have the capability because the basic capability 
has moved out of the network in many instances to the PBX. Electronics have made it 
possible to do many things right in a very small piece of equipment like this that used 
to be served out of the central office, and customers are electing to go that way. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, why couldn't ••• 
MR. GAULDING: They're not hooking their telephone to their computer. In many cases 
their telephone is their computer. Those kinds of things can't be provided by the central 
office in the network. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: All you do is provide the wire between .•• 
MR. GAULDING: We just provide the con activity, yes sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: My homeowner cannot leave the system. Okay? My homeowner says 
to me, "I don't care what they do. Whatever they do that makes a profit ought to keep 
the price down. Whatever they do! They have to compete with anybody else who's in that 
particular business, but in their competition in this separate company they've got to show 
a profit, otherwise I'm going to stay in business." What's wrong with saying that what-
ever they do, it keeps my homeowner price down? What's wrong with the concept? 
MR. GAULDING: The ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Do whatever you want to do. 
MR. GAULDING: The other side of the arithmetic is missing. What about losses? Who 
stands the burden of picking up the losses, because not everybody's business succeeds all 
the time. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, we'll let the PUC decide. You've come in, for example, 
and you've said it now costs me more to do such and such, I want an increase, so they give 
you an increase. That's the same as a loss. It's a loss leader. What's wrong with the 
basic concept which says whatever you do stays on the line to keep the costs of the indi-
vidual telephone down? 
MR. GAULDING: I think in a large measure for all the services that we can provide in 
tile network we have said that. 
Cl~IRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, I'm talking about everything. It's all telephone. It's all 
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communication. 
MR. GAULDING: It isn't all telephone. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, but you know someting? You have disagreements, for 
example, with cable, and yet in one city you're king, so that's okay in San Jose, but you 
don't want them to do someplace else what you're doing there. It just seems to me that---
I want you to compete, okay? But if, in fact, you make a profit or a loss, that's on the 
rate base and it's all at one company. Because I want to keep the rate down for my 
homeowner. 
MR. GAULDING: I don't think that there's anything wrong with wanting to keep the 
rate down for the basic ratepayer at all. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, but that's not what's happening. What's happening is that 
as all of these things begin to spin off, the only one left is the homeowner, and the 
homeowner can't afford to pay the cost of the total nut that you have to meet. And so 
we're looking for, you know, increases which could---I'm not suggesting that she's right 
but maybe $70-a-month bills, Sylvia Siegel is now proposing is what's going to happen. 
MR. GAULDING: She hasn't heard that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, in the literature that she's sending out that's what's 
happening-- $70 a month bills. Now, I don't think it's going to be $70 a month. If it 
is, none of us will be reelected. 
MR. GAULDING: I don't think we'll be in business either. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But if all of the other things that you're doing which are 
profitable are now taken away from the business that you're in the business to do, be-
cause you see it as the ability to attract investors who are looking for a return, and I 
have no problem with that, eventually the only ones on the telephone line are going to be 
my homeowners. Because as time goes on, the large users are going to bypass. I don't 
care that, you know, that we have a dollar more to get into a line. They're going to 
bypass. What's the future for my homeowner if, in fact, we permit you to spin-off every-
thing else that you're doing? 
MR. GAULDING: Well, I don't believe we've approached it on the basis of spinning off 
everything we're doing. We've got a set of circumstances that neither one of us created. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand. Right. 
MR. GAULDING: We've got federal public policymakers who want to see our industry 
complet.ely competitive and deregulated, and they are willing to say to the California 
PUC and other PUC's you guys made the pricing problem, you fix the pricing problem. 
We have a technological emergence that has given customers all kinds of capabilities 
to bypass us. We've got a social/public policy, admirable as it is, to keep service 
widely available and affordable. Somehow we've got to put the blend of things together 
to be able to do that. The only thing that we know is this: We've got to be expansive 
in both our core business and in our new businesses. We've got to turn loose both sides 
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of those business to go after the marketplaces competitively as they know how to. And to 
the extent that it's possible to do so, we've got to keep the ratepayer insulated from the 
forces of competition -- insulated. 
SENATOR KEENE: Including the benefit of that competition. 
MR. GAULDING: Including the benefits of that competition if there are benefits to be 
gained. I'm not sure ••. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Nobody's going to be competing for my telephone bill at home. 
l1R. GAULDING: Not at its current price, no sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTP~L: Okay. And so what you're saying then that if that gets high 
enough, if I'm now obliged to pay instead of $8 or $15, $50, that then competition will 
give me an opportunity to look someplace else. I think that is the worse kind of an 
approach. 
MR. GAULDING: I don't think we said that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I don't think he said that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, no. I'm not saying you said it. I'm just carrying your 
words to eventual conclusion. 
MR. GAULDING: I believe we do have a problem that we must fix. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay, on that point. We're talking about spinning off these profit-
able things and so forth. In my simplistic approach, a lot of them, if not all of them, 
are related to the telephone communication business, which is the telephone's business. 
What would be the effect if we said, all right-- as the Chairman said-- we don't care 
what you do, but you keep it all within the purview of a regulated industry, you somehow 
work out the profits so that the equity capital is paid back and so forth; but at the 
same token, the equity capital went and built the system in the first place and the stock-
holders get a profit and the ratepayers pay a rate. So you do all these other things too 
and somehow there's a means whereby a reasonable profit from those is given to the stock-
holders but also there's some benefit to the ratepayers. If there's a loss, the rate-
payers have to assume their share of that also. But you keep it all. Because what it 
sounds like, and I think the Chairman agrees, is that as you're developing things to meet 
the various needs that come out there, those keep getting spun off. So all you have left 
then is a little ol' homeowner to---buries the whole---that's the way it sounds. 
MR. GAULDING: There's one, at least from our perspective, compelling piece of data 
missing, and that is that we'll get sued if we do that unless somebody gives us anti-
trust immunity. Because it is true that as we enter competitive markets we have got to 
demonstrate that we are not cross-subsidizing and we're not behaving in an anti-competitive 
WilY. 
SENATOR RUSSELL; Is that from Mr. Greene, Judge Greene? 
MR. GAULDING: That 1 s from the Department of Justice and the Clayton Act, which we 
-68-
just went through 10 years on. 
I think we also have to think as we're thinking about the welfare of the local con-
sumer; we have to think about the fairness of business enterprise and in competitive 
markets. We have structured in a way that puts as many safeguards as we can find in place 
to prevent us from using whatever we have, under regulation in terms of market power, of 
using that in competitive markets. We can't do that or we'll get sued. 
SENATOR KEENE: You're saying that if profits from the unregulated activities are 
plowed back into the regulated entity that you're going to get sued under the Clayton Act? 
MR. GAULDING: I'm saying if we bundle everything together and we take all of this 
presence that we have in the marketplace gained under regulation in a supposed monopoly 
franchise, and we start using that to sell our PC's, or to sell our micro's, or to sell 
our services and PacTel Spectrum Services, or PBX's, if we do that, we will be guilty of 
leveraging the power of the monopoly into competitive markets. And all of our policies, 
structure, process, design, everything has been toward creating an ultimate amount of 
separation between our regulated business and the businesses that we're trying to start in 
competitive markets. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, it seems to me if that's what's against the law that that's 
exactly what you are doing. 
MR. GAULDING: That's exactly what we're not doing. 
SENATOR KEENE: You're not. 
MR. GAULDING: No. 
SENATOR KEENE: You're not taking ... 
MR. GAULDING: These are completely separate subsidiaries. Completely separate. 
Accountingwise, organizationally, no common management. 
SENATOR KEENE: And where do the resources come from to get into the unregulated 
activities? 
MR. GAULDING: How are they capitalized? Or what? 
SENATOR KEENE: Where do they come from? 
MR. GAULDING: People come from a mixture of places. 
SENATOR KEENE: No, no, no. The money. 
Vlli. GAULDING: The capital comes from common equity. 
SENATOR KEENE: Why kind of an answer is that? I mean, what's common equity? 
HR. GAULDING: It's shareholders' equity. Retained earnings. 
SENATOR KEENE: And where does that come from? 
MR. GAULDING: And new sources of equity. 
SENATOR KEENE: And where does that come from? Not ultimately from shareholders -- I 
mean from ratepayers? 
HR. GAULDING: We believe that the retained earnings belongs to the shareholders and 
new sources of common equity are new sources of common equity. 
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SENATOR KEENE: Where does it come from? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTF~L: Where does it come from? 
SENATOR KEENE: People who pay the bills but there's a profit in every .•• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTF~: No, no. I understand. 
SENATOR KEENE: It comes ultimately from the ratepayers and it comes as a product of 
the business process of the regulated activities. 
MR. GAULDING: It does indeed, and Senator, we have not yet earned the rate of return 
on common equity that's been authorized by the California PUC. So to---I would have to 
support Mr. Edward's statement of this morning that it's not clear that we have overearned 
anything. We haven't earned what we've been allowed to earn. 
SENATOR KEENE: I'm not alleging overearning. All that I'm saying is that whatever 
is invested in the unregulated activities originates in amounts that are paid by rate-
payers in the regulated activities. 
MR. GAULDING: Sure it does, but our form of incorporation is not as a state or local 
municipality. Our form of incorporation is as a privately-held corporation that operates 
under Public Utility Code. So the equity that is in our business is equity from private 
capital markets. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And that belongs to the shareholders. 
MR. GAULDING: That belongs to the shareholders. 
CHAI&~ ROSENTHAL: Let's move on because •.• We all have the same questions and you 
have the same answer and we're not somehow getting through to one another. 
May we hear now from California Telephone Association? Something that perhaps we 
haven't heard already. 
~ffi. BOB RINGMAN: Thank you, Senators. I'm Bob Ringman. I'm with the California 
Telephone Association. It's a trade association of the 22 exchange telephone companies 
that operate in the State of California. 
Today I'd like to, just for a few minutes, talk about some of the issues and problems 
of the 15 small rural telephone companies that operate in California. They serve approx-
imately 10% of the total number of telephone subscribers in California, yet they serve an 
area which is approximately 3 to 40 percent of the land mass of the state. Their density 
of customer per mile is just a fraction of those in the urban areas. 
These telephone companies are mostly family-owned. They were started many, many 
years ago and been retained in the family. 
Now, the rural nature of these smaller companies, because they are remote, produces 
diversification incentives quite different from those of the larger utilities, as General 
Telephone and Pacific. 
In these areas the tendency is that a need comes from their customers, and there's 
no one to fill that need. Therefore, because they are in the telephone business and it's 
related, they do provide this service. Examples are cable television systems, paging and 
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alarm services, direct mail advertising, mobile radio telephone service, sale, leasing 
and Inaintenance of customer provided service, telephone equipment, and most recently, 
underground construction work in local works as putting in small water and sewer connec-
tions and systems. 
In these areas, as I say, there may be one potential non-utility supplier, but the 
presence of two is almost remote, or rare. 
I'm going to jump ahead here because I think most of ..• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: May I ask a question? 
MR. RINGMAN: Yes sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Do these other services that you provide benefit or detract from 
benefits to your homeowner'? 
MR. RINGMAN: Yes. I'm going to continue right there, if I may, sir. I hope any-
way to convince you of this. The ratepayers do benefit from diversification. The primary 
benefits accruing to ratepayers are economies resulting from the sharing of personnel, 
particularly the area of common administration services, and the more efficient use of 
small branch offices and other physical assets, such as the work equipment, the trucks, 
the equipment of that nature. 
Other benefits accrue to the ratepayers due to the fact that they are the customers 
of a diversified business---businesses conducted by the smaller telephone companies which 
often provide services unavailable unless supplied by the affiliate of the local telephone 
company. It is hard to overlook the obvious benefits to a rural buyer in doing business 
with a neighbor, rather than having to depend on suppliers in a distant metropolitan 
area. 
We feel too that the California Public Utilities Commission regulates all exchange 
telephone companies, large and small, and with oversight the problems of cross-subsidiza-
t Lon between utilities and nonregulated affiliates will not occur. 
Separate and exacting accounting is mandatory and as even with the larger, the 
venture capital, these cases come from the owners, not the ratepayers. And they alone 
should be rewarded for the profit or sustain the loss in their unregulated venture. 
One important point to the smaller companies too is the fact that there is a very 
serious threat to the small telephone companies and that by bypass. You've heard that 
from most utilities today, but to the small companies they serve communities of 1,000 or 
2,000, and within that community there will be one large industry, a mill, a food proces-
sor, a feed lot, of that nature, and if that customer bypasses, and he will, and I assume 
that technology makes it possible that facility can result in a savings, but when he does 
bypass the local exchange, the network, that is a loss to that company of approximately 
20 to 25 percent of its annual revenue. It's that high. If that industry X's through 
bypassing, the same local network must be maintained for the remaining users, and that 
does result in higher rates to do that. 
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into new and other lines of related businesses will reduce the tele-
phone company cost of doing business, and the ratepayers truly will be the beneficiaries. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTP~: Thank you very much. Questions further? All right. Thank you, 
We'll next have our Concerns About Utility Diversification. The 
Public Staff of the Public Utilities Commission and Michael Shames, 
Executive Director of Utility Consumers Action Network. 
Let me ask you to be brief. Not to read statements, to give us ••. Oh, first of 
all, let me make a statement here regarding the Public Staff. I realize that you're not 
actually representing the Public Staff document, Hr. Arth, but are willing to answer 
questions about it. I've invited Bill Ahern, who's the director of the office, to be more 
specific about the document, knowing that it is but one document that the commissioners 
must consider in coming to grips with the diversification issue. But Mr. Ahern must be 
with Commissioner Vial today to deal with an issue that this committee dealt with yester-
day -- that's the Northwest Power. I do look forward to hearing from the Public Staff 
in the future, however, whenever their recommendations make as much news as the diversifi-
cation document has. And so I appreciate your pinch-hitting, being the one who at least 
is aware of the document and the position that the Public Staff took. So we may ask you 
some questions. 
But at this point, if you would make some comments about it, because we've referred 
to it several times in the last couple of days. 
MR. PETER ARTH: I would, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. My name is Pete Arth and my 
client for the day is Mr. Ahern who is very that he is not able to present the 
paper that he presented to his commissioners a couple of weeks ago. You've heard a lot 
today and what you've heard indicates to me that this won't be the last hearing on the 
, and I guess you will hear from Mr. Ahern on his views as this is digested and the 
dialetic begins between the Commission and the on this issue. 
I'm going to shamelessly steal a line from Mr. Shames, who is here on behalf of 
UCAN. It was used UCAN's attorney in SDG&E's diversification application. It so aptly 
reflects, I think, what's been going on in what you've heard so far. SDG&E sort of 
their desire to and to form a holding company as a window of oppor-
for the company. And the from UCAN said, having digested what was 
in the think I've got what this about. It is a window of opportunity, but 
as far as the ratepayer is concerned, it's made out of one-way glass." And that sort of 
is the overview of the concerns that the Public Staff division has as you look at what's 
going on. 
You heard this from Commissioner Calvo and from some of the already diversi-
fied utilities that there's new about 
about diversification. That's not true. You had 
companies and there's nothing new 
yesterday regarding changes in 
natural gas marketing. And what used to make sense in terms of PG&E owning the chain of 
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companies from Canadian gas supplies into California doesn't make as good sense now that 
there's open competition and cheap gas to be had and plentiful gas to be had. The same is 
true for Pacific Lighting and its supply affiliates and Southern California Gas Company. 
The change in supply of electricity. It used to be if Edison or SDG&E needed another 
kilowatt, or a kilowatt hour, they would produce it themselves. Now they can buy it from 
a completely separate, third-party producer, or they can buy it from a halfway separate, 
third-party producer of which they own some substantial proportion on affiliate or sub-
sidiary basis. 
Senator Rosenthal, you were asking earlier about the Spectrum Service. I think that 
wasn't the best example, but you were making the right point. If you take a large busi-
ness customer who now has the Centrex Service of the exchange utility, whether it's 
General of Pacific Telephone, that is a part of rate base. That is a part of the exchange 
company's switching mechanism, and the revenue that it generates is a part of the regu-
lated rate picture. 
It used to be that the seller of Centrex from the old Pacific Telephone was the only 
seller that would appear at the business customer's door. Now he's going to see another 
salesperson or perhaps two more from unregulated subsidiaries of Pacific Telesis. They 
may say why buy Centrex from Pacific Bell; we want to sell you your own PBX and you can 
now own the switching mechanism, no longer be part of this rate base Centrex, and you will 
have the same service but it will be a non-utility provided machine. Or you might hear 
from PacTel Communications System or PacTel Information Systems saying we're partnerships 
in a smart building, and this is a real estate partnership where we supply the telecom-
munication smarts and someone else supplies the real estate ownership and management and 
move into this and your telecommunication needs will be taken care of. But it won't be 
PacBell and their Centrex service anymore. It will be a service provided by one of these 
unregulated subsidiaries. 
And that's sort of the dynamic that's going on, and these companies, these startup 
subsidiaries, want to succeed. Without any pejorative bias to it they want to make money. 
And to the extent that there is that drive to succeed, there is this now conflict in what 
used to be a heavily regulated, pretty much single shot utility service provider. 
What Mr. Ahern's statement says in reaction to the changes that are going on, and I 
would say that in terms of the genie being out of the bottle it's probably about 20% that 
it's very minor, or at least in the startup phase for the energy utilities that are under 
Commission regulation, it's much heavier for Pacific Telesis simply because the federal 
policy and technology has moved so fast that the Commission is simply trying to catch up 
with what's been going on. But the biggest problem is the holding company. 
l sort of enjoyed the charts with the colors on them, and I would say that in terms 
of diversification itself, I would give that the yellow flag, but if it is under a holding 
company format, I would waive the red flag. 
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the Commission has to approve this because of its utility property and you transfer it 
out, Commission has to approve it. There has been a practice where the utility can simply 
say this is no longer utility property, and we had this transmission line site that just 
happened to be in the middle of what's going to be a new shopping center and all of a sud-
den we're going to buy purchase power, we don't need the transmission line, this is sur-
plus property. It's no longer in the rate base. They will take it out on an accounting 
basis from rate base, and then they are free to transfer it to a subsidiary, or a third 
party, without Commission approval. 
Whether it is utility property or not, again, what is the fair basis for a valuation? 
Is it the book cost, is it the fair market value? How do you recognize the fact that 
the ratepayer has picked up the acquisition costs and the carrying costs for that piece 
of property? 
And whether it's this sort of thing or back to the incident where SoCal Gas 
accepted the sour gas from one of their supply subsidiaries and were willing to pay for 
it, there really is a "catch me if you can" ethic to this because of the motives now that 
Lt's no longer strictly a utility business. The Commission does have some powers to do 
something, but it's the mixed motives in management that make this something that you have 
to find before you can do something about it. And that's one of the real problems in the 
holding company part of it, a big problem as far as the audit trail and the fair valua-
tion problem. 
Commission Calvo •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell has a question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It's my understanding that AT&T under divestiture rulings is given 
a purposefully disadvantaged position competitivewise so that other companies can catch 
up so to speak, and then at some time in the future that will be removed. Has there been 
any kind of a similar disadvantage imposed by government on Pacific Telesis or PacBell 
that you know of? 
MR. ARTH: The handicap for AT&T is mostly a pricing handicap, vis-a-vis Sprint and 
MCl and the other exchange carriers. For the Bell operating companies like Pacific Tele-
sis, it's more of a market handicap. You can't get into long distance-- that's one 
handicap -- and you were asking earlier about a percentage approach, which was a good 
.idea I think, and if I recall correctly, the Bell operating companies have a 10% ceiling 
on how far away from the home business they can get as they diversify and go look at dif-
ferent markets. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That wasn't exactly what I had in mind at the PacBell area. If 
they are operating, so to speak, with one hand tied behind their back, and trying to com-
pete, such as AT&T, maybeforvery good reasons, maybe not, it would seem that their 
activity would be more frenetic in trying to grab onto any and every profit and cut 
corners and so forth. What I'm trying to find out is at the PacBell level, are there 
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such inhibitions imposed upon them by government of some sort which just on the face of 
it makes them less competitive than somebody else starting in the business outside? 
MR. ARTH: The only burden they bear is they are still a utility to the extent that 
they have PacBell and Nevada Bell and that they have this franchise obligation to serve 
all of the utility customers. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It's a franchise apparantly that nobody else wants and everbody 
else .•. 
MR. ARTH: Well, there's parts of it that nobody wants, and that's the unprofitable 
residential basic telephone service. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Right, and then everybody else is competing for the profitable 
parts that are left to PacBell. And so it seems like they're fighting them off and trying 
to make them as profitable as possible for the ratepayers but also to become competitive 
in the rest of the world as independent entities. 
MR. ARTH: Yes. There is an inevitability to this, and I think there is reason behind 
SDG&E's wanting to diversify out of their traditional markets and PacBell doing the same 
thing. The question is the form and the one-way glass problem. The Public Staff division 
certainly wants the utility to stay competitive and financially strong. That much is in 
the ratepayers' interest. But to the extent that you have a holding company that is un-
regulated, subsidiaries that are unregulated, and all of the goodies flow out with only 
the potential for the risks and problems to flow back in, that's the deal that we think 
needs to be avoided. So let them do the things they need to do to stay competitive, but 
try to balance the equities in terms of the ratepayer. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I just wonder whether the nature of the public service goop, what-
ever you call them in the PUC, is so constituted that very seldom they could ever approve 
of a diversification simply because of the kinds of things we've been talking about. And 
therefore if that's true, and I don't know that it is, but if it is true just by the nature 
of things, to that extent the ultimate long-range result may be that PacBell will become 
less and less competitive and there'll be less and less to put in the rate base to help 
the ratepayers, and Senator Rosenthal's little consumer, homeowner, is going to catch it 
in the shorts. 
MR. ARTH: Well, I would hope we are a voice crying in the wind to the extent that 
that might occur. I think our sensitivity is strongest from the very brief experience 
that we've had and that is trying to audit the first of these substantially diversified 
major California utilities, and it is not encouraging. The preface to the report, the 
auditing report, says that because of access problems, the staff wasn't able to do a com-
plete auditing job. And it has hampered the rate case which is under severe processing 
time. But to carry that so far as to turn the policy on its ear and kill the golden 
utility goose, that wouldn't be an attempt, and I, again, would hope we would be ignored 
to the extent we prosthesized to that degree. 
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CI~lRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. May we hear from Mr. Michael Shames. 
MR. MICHAEL SHAMES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. Editing my remarks is going 
to be exceedingly difficult after listening to 6~ hours of proponents for diversification. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But editing is necessary. 
MR. SHAMES: I know, and I'm not even going to attempt to rebutt anything because I 
don't want to open up Pandora's box, which I'm not sure I can control. 
Let me just touch upon the five actions that I'd like the committee to explore during 
these, hopefully what we like the hearings are investigation. Numbers one and two involve 
a prohibition, or major restrictions upon holding company structures. Actually the first 
two actions are identical. I'm repeating them for effect. At this point, really what the 
holding company structure does, and it really hasn't been addressed that much up to this 
point, is that it encourages utilities to diversify, to expand more rapidly than they 
might otherwise in the other structure. And I think at this point in the discussions when 
there are so many variables which have not been addressed, so many variables which are 
still in the air and part of disagreement, that the PUC and this committee and the rate-
payers cannot afford to give up the right to control the pace and expansion of diversifi-
cation. That's the first thing I would touch upon. 
The next action involves a mandate of a separate procedure in which the public and 
the PUC staff can effectively audit and review the establishment of diversified subsid-
iaries. The audit and review simply cannot be done as part of a general rate case, and 
there should be a mandatory separate procedure for this. 
And I might also add that I think the expenditures, or the expenses for the addi-
tional regulatory costs for this hearing should be borne by the shareholders as a part of 
doing business, part of the expansion. 
SENATOR KEENE: What would be the purpose of the audit and review? 
MR. SHAMES: The audit---I think the PUC is going to have to audit and review any 
diversification proposal made by the utility, and it should be done---right now it's being 
done in general rate cases. It should be done in a separate procedure. 
SENATOR KEENE: Oh. I thought you said audit and review the subsidiaries. 
MR. SHAMES: Audit the subsidiary proposals, any diversification proposal, body, 
utility. I'm sorry. 
But I think it's important to add that the regulatory costs for this additional pro-
cedure should be borne by shareholders as part of doing business. Plus I'm sure I think 
you'd find that the utilities would not attempt to engage in dilatory tactics as they 
sometimes do in other proceedings. 
The next action I believe is an important one is an imposition of imputed royalties 
upon a subsidiary in order to compensate both the PUC and the ratepayers for the intangible 
benefits gained by that subsidiary. This is an idea that has been advanced in New York 
State by the public service commission there and then talked about by many noted experts 
-77-
here in California~ 
I think this issue of intangible cross-subsidization is a very important one. It's 
been talked about a lot frequently by most of the people here. The royalty proposal is 
the best one that I have heard in that it allows for the recapture of those benefits 
confered by ratepayers, of which we've been talking about today, as well as it funds the 
additional regulatory burdens that will be imposed upon the PUC. And as Mr. Arth has gone 
in detail about, those burdens are considerable. 
I think another action that this committee may want to consider is a statutory sanc-
tion for abuses of the diversification or freedoms by the utilities. Interveners, such as 
UCAN, which is centered in San Diego, plays a valuable role in monitoring the actions of 
the utilities. I mean, the Public Utilities Commission has acknowledged that it cannot 
effectively monitor everything, particularly San Diego as there is no PUC office in San 
Diego. 
I would look for legislative or administrative provisions to encourage interveners 
to explore for possible abuses by the utilities through appropriate administrative pro-
cedures. And where the interveners' charges are verified, I would ask that the compensa-
tion to the PUC and to the interveners for the time and energies expended should come from 
the ratepayers---from the shareholders. 
Those, I think, are the major actions that I'd like this committee to explore. And 
I would also appreciate the opportunity to submit written statements in forms of rebuttal 
subsequent to this hearing. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, I'd appreciate that. 
MR. SHAMES: Thank you. 
CliAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The committee would like to see rebuttal to whatever else you 
want to present to the committee as far as the record is concerned, and we will be study-
ing it for future activities. 
MR. SHAMES: Excellent. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Russell? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Would you say that---you make your investigation and then you find 
some malfeasance, or whatever •.. 
MR. SliAMES: Right. 
SENaiOR RUSSELL: ... that gets paid for, you get your expenditures back. Suppose 
they're slick as a whistle, clean as a whistle I guess it is, or a hound's tooth, and 
should you get your expenditures also? 
MR. SliAMES: No. No. I think if our charges are unverified or we can't prove them, 
I don't think that we should gain compensation --we being the interveners. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Even though it does take time and effort and money for you to 
investigate on a normal basis .the things---the audit such you would. 
MR. SHAMES: That would be something that at Christmas I would ask for but I don't 
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think it'd be really feasible politically to have us interveners making charges that can-
not be supported and then suggest, or expect some kind of compensation. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: No, no, no. You misunderstood. I picture that you, as an inter-
vener, have a function of normally looking over the books just to make sure everything's 
okay. 
MR. SH&~ES: Correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Whether you are making charges or not, you're just looking at the 
books. 
MR. SHAMES: Right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You look at the books and if you find, aha, and that's proved and 
you get your money back, but if you look over the books as a normal charge that you have, 
but you don't turn up anything under those circumstances, no charge is made, but you 
still expended money and effort, should you be paid for that in your opinion. 
MR. SHAMES: I would not expect compensation for that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Anything further? Thank you very much. 
MR. SHAMES: Yes, but not now. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand. The record will be kept open for a couple of 
weeks so that we can have additional information input or responses. 
We now will get to the final panel -- Competition with Utility Subsidiaries. David 
Norman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Business Land; Michael Morris, Director 
of Regulatory Affairs, California Cable Television Association; Bill Marcus, representa-
tive of Independent Energy Producers Association; and Kurt Maass, McCaw Cellular 
Communications. Okay. If you're prepared to begin, you may start. 
MR. KURT MAASS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Kurt Maass, and I'm the Manager 
of Business Affairs from McCaw Communications. McCaw is based up in Seattle and we offer 
a cable television, paging and mobile communications operations throughout the country. 
Specifically today I am representing McCaw of San Francisco which owns a significant 
portion of the non-wire line cellular franchise in the Bay area. In addition to our San 
Francisco holdings, we're also negotiating to gain interest in the Sacramento and the 
Fresno franchises. 
Our interests in this proceeding are very specific, and our concern has been quite 
aggressive over the last couple of months. We have recently entered into litigation with 
Pacific Telesis group charging them violation of federal anti-trust law as a result of 
their purchase of a portion of the non-wire line cellular franchise in San Francisco and 
San Jose. 
Cf~IRMAN ROSENTHAL: Is that microphone on? We have difficulty hearing you. 
MR. MAASS: All right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Say that last sentence again. 
-79-
MR. MAASS: Sure. We have recently filed litigation against Pacific Telesis for 
their purchase of a portion of the non-wire line cellular franchise in the San Jose and 
San Francisco markets. 
Now, as you probably know, in cellular there's two service providers in each designa-
ted market as determined by the FCC -- one related to the telephone company and one an 
independent supplier. The FCC determined that that was the best way to quickly and to 
most cost-effectively get service to the market, and those franchises were awarded several 
years ago. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I guess I missed what---somebody bought half of another company? 
Were they one of the two that was already there? 
MR. MAASS: The situation that we face is that Pacific Telesis has purchased a signif-
icant portion, not quite half but they're trying to increase it, of the non-wire line 
portion---the non-wire line franchise in the Bay area. General Telephone owns the wire 
line franchise. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I see. Is that prohibited by FCC? 
MR. MAASS: At the present time it's not. No. However, that's the basis of our 
suit, and I'll explain that --why we filed that suit, and that's really the essence of my 
comments today. 
What we have now in the Bay area is a situation where the same company owns the regu-
lar land base telephone operation. Throughout the state they also own and operate the wire 
line cellular franchises -- Los Angeles, I believe San Diego, for example -- and in San 
Francisco they are also now purchasing portions of the non-wire line cellular franchise. 
And so what we're facing here in California is a situation where the main ••. 
SENATOR KEENE: Could you tell us what the wire line, the non-wire line cellular 
system is? 
MR. MAASS: Okay. Again, the wire line cellular system is the franchise awarded by 
the FCC to the telephone company to serve cellular in a particular market area. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Like a radio phone? 
MR. MAASS: Cellular mobile radio, yes sir. I think Mr .••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: No wires. 
MR. MAASS: That's correct. Senator Rosenthal I believe is familiar with cellular 
intimately. And it's a mobile telephone technology. But the point I'm making is the 
situation we have in San Francisco is that our major supplier of interconnection services, 
which is Pacific Telesis, as well as our major competitor in different parts of the state, 
Pacific Telesis which owns the wire line is also our business partner in San Francisco, as 
they have purchased a portion of our business. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTP~L: Wait a minute. Help us understand. According to the way the 
system is supposed to work, the telephone company would provide the wire service in a 
community is one of the two that will do the cellular. Right? 
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HR. MAASS: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The other one doing cellular will be another enterprise, another 
business. 
MR. MAASS: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Now tell me what's happened. 
MR. MAASS: In San Francisco Pacific Telesis has purchased a major portion •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: They don't own---PacBell owns one system up there, is the 
recipient of one of those systems. 
MR. MAASS: Well, in San Francisco it's a little more complicated because General 
Telephone has the wire line franchise for cellular. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Oh, so General Telephone then has the cellular in San Francisco. 
MR. MAASS: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And you were the recipient of the second? 
MR. MAASS: A partnership-- that's correct -- was a recipient of the second license. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And now what has Telesis done? 
MR. MAASS: They have bought into the second franchise. Does that make sense? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: They bought into your company? 
MR. MAASS: In essence that's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And you don't like them as a partner? 
MR. MAASS: We think that it inhibits the development of the technology in general. 
That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Why did you sell? 
MR. ~UillSS: It's extremely complicated because the franchise was awarded to a part-
nership, a conglomeration of six partners. They bought out some of our partners. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
MR. MAASS: Okay? 
that I'm ... 
I see. 
So we didn't sell. Some of our partners sold. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You had no right of first ... 
The whole point 
MR. MAASS: Apparently in that particular transaction apparently not. But the point 
I'm trying to do is give you an example of what we're facing in trying to compete against 
some of the subsidiaries of the regulated entities in this state. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But Telesis now in that market, as your partner, doesn't that 
benefit you? 
MR. MAASS: We don't believe that it does, specifically for the reason ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Did it help you get the franchise? 
MR. MAASS: No sir, it did not. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Is it possible that by their joining with you they will begin 
to help you expand the thing so that everybody in that partnership makes more money? 
MR. MAASS: Our contention is that is not true. And the reason---one of the main 
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reasons is the fact that they are the supplier of our interconnection services, which is 
by far the bulk of our operating expense. 
So on the one hand, the supplier is our partner .•• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You think that's a conflict. 
MR. MAASS: We do, indeed. This is explained in probably a lot better detail in my 
written comments which I'll leave. In the interest of brevity, I tried to keep it short. 
That's the kinds of things that we're experiencing in the cellular business. In the 
best case for our situation, we don't think those kinds of things should be able to occur 
at all. In our comments to the CPUC, we stated that we believe that the ability of the 
utilities to diversify should be very, very restricted, to keep close to home, I believe 
is the term that was used. But given the fact that in certain cases now that doesn't seem 
to be realistic, at least as far as cellular goes, we would like to see some very, very 
strong restrictions on those kinds of activities., because we feel that it's having the 
same people playing on both sides of the scrimmage in essence. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Is there anything we can do about that? Isn't that an FCC 
prescribed ••. 
MR. MAASS: The FCC has really waffled on ruling on that particular item. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But is that their jurisdiction? In other words, if the FCC said 
there will be two-- they didn't say it couldn't be a partnership, they didn't say ••• 
MR. MAASS: You're correct there but the FCC has not shown a willingness to really 
effectively deal with that situation. We're involved in the litigation. We're also 
involved I believe in a CPUC proceeding as well. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do we have legal authority to get into that issue and say you're 
not doing right? You got to get out of this? 
MR. MAASS: We believe that that is something that is certainly possible, that the 
entire legality of the Legality of legal ramifications I don't think have been investigated 
as much as they need to be. We believe that the state can extend and reinforce the federal 
policy of trying to keep the separation between those kinds of businesses. And we think 
this is indicative of some of the things that probably some of the other people on the 
panel are experiencing. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Do you have anything further? 
MR. MAASS: You can read it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, thank you very much. Mr. Marcus? 
MR. BILL MARCUS: Hello, I'm Bill Marcus, and I'm a consulting economist and I'm 
representing the Independent Energy Producers Association this afternoon. 
I've been getting quite an education about the telecommunications industry sitting 
here listening to the presentations. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Were you here this morning? 
MR. MARCUS: No, I wasn't actually. Although I was at the PUC's hearings on 
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diversification. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I asked the question this morning of Southern California Edison, 
which he says is not so, and I was going to ask you the same question, but if you weren't 
here and didn't hear his response, it becomes a little difficult. Please go ahead. 
MR. MARCUS: I think we've been involved in watching the diversification issues very 
closely before the Commission. We were along with UCAN and the Public Staff division 
involved in San Diego's holding company case at the PUC. We've also monitored the 
activities of utilities in the qualifying facility industry nationwide and have drawn some 
experience in the prepared statement we've given you and in some of the prefiled testi-
mony that we'll attach to this record from other states. 
I think from our perspective the big problem results from utilities dealing with 
themselves. Utilities and affiliates have activities in the qualifying facility industry. 
I would emphasize -- I've been watching the papers San Diego Gas & Electric Company's 
20% subsidiary energy factors has been involved in projects of PG&E's service territory, 
they've been involved in projects in New Jersey. I wish them well on those projects. I 
just don't think that they ought to be dealing with SDG&E, and similarly that goes for 
the other utilities. 
I think that's our primary recommendation that we would come to you as legislators 
with. Electric utilities should be barred from selling---from buying power from affiliates 
in the cogeneration of the small power production industry. We believe you can act on this 
issue. There's an analogous statute in the State of Connecticut the utilities have not 
challenged as being illegal. They've tried to get it repealed but they've not challenged 
the legality of the action of the legislature in Connecticut. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: A question on that point. Don't we require by statute that the 
utilities buy the surplus power from cogenerators? 
MR. MARCUS: I think there is a statute-- the private energy producers ... The 
private energy producers statute in the State of California does say something to that 
effect. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, if a---is an affiliate a wholly owned affiliate? Is that 
what you're talking about? 
MR. MARCUS: When I use the term "affiliate", I'm using it fairly broadly to say 
anybody where the utility has an investment in it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So as I understand it, a lot of these cogeneration facilities are 
joint ventures with the utility. And what you're saying that if that---in that case, 
those would be precluded from selling energy to the company that is provided the joint 
venture capital? 
MR. MARCUS: I think that there are some joint ventures today. We would probably 
say grandfather the ones we've got, but we don't want to see anymore of them. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I Hee. 
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MR. MARCUS: I mean, I think the joint ventures that we have today -- I think SDG&E 
has several through this energy factor subsidiary, and Edison has a couple of large en-
hanced oil recovery projects they're dealing with -- but the queston is, you know, should 
these expand or should we stop dding this? 
The reason for our recommendation is that utilities are given a great deal of dis-
cretion in signing contracts with qualifying facilities, particularly if they are non-
standard in order to protect the ratepayers. We don't want to see them using this dis-
cretion given to them by the Public Utilities Commission ostensibly to benefit ratepayers 
to essentially benefit their subsidiaries and affiliates. Ratepayers do. not want to pay 
utilities' prices above those utility subsidiaries, prices above those offered to 
other qualifying facilities. We've seen this happen in other states, in particularly in 
Hawaii. We've seen utilities try to get away with it in the State of Maine and not suc-
ceed, and we don't want to see it here. 
We think that there also are a series of anti-competitive issues which arise in terms 
of the utility's ability to sign or not sign contracts which are not standard. We don't 
want to see the utility essentially refusing to negotiate something that might be reason-
able or claiming that the negotiation should be based on utility ownership. Again, we've 
seen a couple of cases in other states where utilities have attempted to gain equity 
participation as a condition of doing business with certain qualifying facilities in cer-
tain nonstandard ways. 
I think there's a third issue which relates to the question of access the informa-
tion. Essentially, a utility collects large volumes of information at the ratepayers' 
expense. Demand forecast, economic trends in the area, they know how much electricity and 
gas their customers are using -- they've got really valuable information that could be 
used in ways that would be anti-competitive if this information were allowed to be trans-
ferred to subsidiaries and affiliates. 
Furthermore, this information is very hard to value, so if we come back to Mr. Arth's 
problem of putting a fair market value on a transfer of information, what is the value of 
a customer survey on gas use? I can't go out and do one but the utility can with a, you 
know, through the utility, and that information could be used to market, say, cogenera-
tion systems. 
We think a transfer of employees between utilities and affiliates have serious 
problems, not only from the point of view of the ratepayers -- again, I think Mr. Arth 
made some very good points from the ratepayers' point of view -- but from our point of 
view, the people that I---he represents do not want to see the same persons sitting 
across the table negotiating for the ratepayers and then changing his hat and then nego-
tiating for the stockholders---or negotiating for the subsidiary. I think those types of 
things are the type of abuses that we would not want to see happen. 
Finally, I think that the holding company structure can provide an even greater 
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potential, because I think the holding company can lead to more and faster diversifica-
tion. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Potential for what? 
MR. MARCUS: The potential for anti-competitive activities, because it's bigger, 
more and faster. 
In the San Diego holding company case, there was a study -- San Diego Strategic 
Plan showed they could raise a maximum of $400 million for diversific2~;~n through A 
nonholding company structure. Their witnesses claimed they could make even less than---
raise even less than $400 million. And that study showed they could raise over a billion 
using the holding company structure. That difference means more diversification, faster 
diversification, and less control over that diversification. 
So to the extent that we're going in the direction of holding companies, I think all 
of the other controls that we are talking about become more important. 
And I would thank you. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Just one quick question. I was deducing from the conversation this 
morning that a holding company was the best way to go if we want to have a proper regu-
latory oversight so you could separate the utility from everything else. 
MR. MARCUS: I think there are two sides to the issue. It does allow a little 
clearer picture of separation. It also potentially makes it harder to get at the infor-
mation that the nonregulated entity has in terms of the PUC's control over information. 
And I think it also tends to lead to essentially a faster pace of diversification in the 
electric utility industry. Your telecommunications got a 10% limit on things, which 
apparently is causing problems according to my other panelists, but there is a 10% limit. 
In the electric utility industry there are limits caused by the requirement that you 
issue bonds only for utility purposes. Those limits essentially would be moved aside 
with the holding company so that you're essentially trading off, maybe having a little 
better picture of what's going on, or having, you know, the ability to put much more money 
into the diversified enterprise. So there's a tradeoff there. 
CHAIRKM~ ROSENT:1AL: Mr. Marcus, earlier today I asked a representative from Edison 
a question. He told us that their cogeneration subsidiaries did not, I repeat, he said 
they did not disadvantage competing third party producers. Can you tell us how you view 
influence of Edison subsidiaries on the market for independent energy producers? 
MR. MARCUS: I think that one has to take a very hard look at them, simply because 
they're fairly large with respect to the system. I know the Edison plants tend to be---l 
know one of them is 300 megawatts for example. So they are taking up a fairly large sec-
tor of the market. 
I think there are some questions that need to be raised and looked at closely in 
terms uf the pot>ition o[ certain employees. l mean, I've heard from talking to people who 
attended a particular conference that someone from Edison was introduced as representing 
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both Edison and a cogeneration subsidiary. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Perhaps if you have some information on---that I could 
then ask Mr. Edison about it, if you'll send that to the committee I'd appreciate it. 
MR. MARCUS: I think we're working on trying to get the information worked up. I 
think one of the things that's holding us up is getting the transcript back from the PUC's 
diversification hearing, but we will be happy to provide what we provide the PUC to this 
committee. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Mr. Morris. 
MR. MICHAEL MORRIS: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Oh, incidentally~ we are going to have to vacate this room at 
4:00 -- there's another group coming in. That's 10 minutes. 
MR. MORRIS: All right. I appreciate the opportunity for talking to you today. I'm 
Hichael Morris of the California Cable Television Association. 
I do want to give a short explanation of our situation now because it is no secret 
that in the past our relationship with the telephone companies has been a very bad one, 
and I would not want anyone on the committee to think that our position here is just 
another opportunity to take a low blow at the telephone industry. In fact, our relation-
ship now is at an all-time high and improving partly as a result of your good efforts, Mr. 
Rosenthal. 
SENATOR KEENE: What did you mean by another low blow? (Laughter.) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Under the auspices of the chairman, the Assembly committee and 
myself, we've brought the two together to at least begin to talk to one another, and 
there'll be another meeting coming up shortly. 
MR. MORRIS: We are hopeful that next year ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's our Geneva. 
MR. MORRIS: That's right. That the rancor that has characterized our relationship 
in Sacramento ih the past will be a thing of the past and we'll be able to move on to more 
positive type of a relationship. 
And as part of that, I think good relationship actually is separate from it. My 
members are doing business increasingly with the telephone companies in the exercise of 
independent business judgment. There are joint ventures which have been announced and 
it's a common occurrence in the trades. 
But our members, while looking for the best possible products and services at the 
lowest possible prices, while they've explored receiving some of those services and pro-
ducts from the telephone companies, remain concerned that the telephone companies still 
have a potential to cross-subsidize. And they do intend in their business schools to take 
advantage of those lowest possible prices. They have directed us to be active at the PUC 
and the State Legislature and the courts to make sure that the cross-subsidization is kept 
under control. 
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Our position is simple, and I think it's been clarified by what I've heard this 
afternoon. First of all, you have to start with the realization that competitive opera-
tions by definition yield no monopoly profits which can contribute to basic telephone 
rates and keeping home phone rates low. And I think that's a very important point to 
start with. 
Mr. Gaulding said before that diversification is not an answer to the local rate 
problem, and I believe that that is a very important point. And so whilP. diversificati~" 
may or may not continue in the best judgment of the PUC and the State Legislature, it 
should not be seen as a solution to the home ratepayers' problem. And realizing that, we 
think that there are a few steps that should be taken. 
Any diversification should be done through separate subsidiaries but even more 
separate---with more separation than there are now. The problem I think that was brought 
out in questions earlier this afternoon was that much of the capital being provided for 
t'hese new ventures comes from the shareholder equity as a result of ratepayer operations. 
We believe that there should be funding from separate stock that's sold to support 
these separate subsidiaries. When General Motors acquired Electronic Data Systems a year 
or so ago, they announced that one thing that they were doing to keep that company sepa-
rate and realize that it was a competitive business would be to set up a different---a 
separate class of stock, keep the incentives for competition there, and we believe that 
something like that would be a very important kind of an arrangement in the utility 
diversification area. 
Secondly, with regard to diversification and development of competitive lines of 
business that does happen within the regulated entity, we don't believe that the PUC is 
in a position to adequately police the cross-subsidy potential. And everytime you have 
people from the PUC to testify, they come up and they say, well, given enough funding and 
enough staff we could probably get a handle on it, and we don't believe that's possible 
given political constraints and funding constraints. 
One suggestion we have here is to change the state unfair competition laws, which 
currently do not apply to regulated rates of public utilities. And change those laws so 
tl1at competitive activities, which are carried on within the regulated entity, will be 
subject to the state unfair competition laws to provide a private remedy and private 
enforcement of cross-subsidization and pricing undercost irt those competitive businesses. 
Obviously, I had much more to say this afternoon. I'd be glad to answer questions 
if we have time. I have brought along ~ith me some comments which we filed in two 
separate PUC proceedings on the diversification issue and I'd like to hand those out 
afterwards to members of the committee and staff and make them a part of the official 
record. 
Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Mr. Norman? 
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MR. DAVID NORMAN: I'm David Norman, Chairman of Business Land. And maybe you can 
give me two minutes to just grab a couple of thoughts here. 
One is that we believe that specific unfair competitive advantages of unregulated 
subsidiaries of Pacific Telesis really happen because they are associated with Pacific 
Bell and that really the ratepayers are not getting the benefit back. And I think you 
brought up a number of those points and clearly understand that. 
And I believe that you've already covered a lot of the cross-subsidization issues. 
The other side of it is unfair competition, which is always of concern in this environ-
ment. 
And I think there's many statements, and I'm filing a brief with you, my outline of 
what I was going to talk about for 5 minutes or so, so that you have those comments. 
But I think the subsidiary that we deal directly with is PacTel Info Systems, and 
what we see happening out there is is that there's clear reference made to Pacific Bell, 
there's clear statements made, which we will give you copies of, where we have unlimited 
resources, we're losing money now, we're going to lose money for a long period of time --
these are comments in the San Francisco Examiner and other trade publications, and I'll 
give you copies of those. 
So clearly, money that now is being paid in dividends from Pacific Bell to Pacific 
Telesis is going back down into the subsidiaries to come into these businesses. And what 
we'd like to be assured of is that we are operating in a fair, competitive marketplace. 
We're starting to see indications that that's not true. You're familiar with if you 
sell something at one cost and you pay another cost, the difference is gross margin. We're 
seeing gross margins now being bit on products from PacTel Info Systems in the micro-
computer area of 14%. Nobody can run a business on 14% and be profitable. And yet 
there's no public disclosure of what's really happening with these funds because it's all 
in a consolidated, financial annual report and it's hidden there in the annual report with 
all these subsidiaries. So while the dividends are going up into a Nevada conglomerate 
called Pacific Telesis, there's no exposure of what's really happening. 
And I've just got a couple of recommendations that I'd like to---r think that you 
can address. And one.is that Pacific Telesis should be required to disclose in detail 
exactly how it uses these dividends. As you have already brought out, the dividends are 
coming from Pacific Bell a regulated monopoly. That's where these $1.6 billion of 
dividends have been paid in the last three years. And yet it goes into this holding com-
pany, and even though the boards of directors are exactly the same, except with one or 
two people, between Pacific Bell and Pacific Telesis -- so you've got similar boards of 
directors, you've got the control in the holding company, because it's the same chief 
financial people, the same legal people, the same public relations people that are 
managing all of these subsidiaries, and I think that you need public disclosure of that 
information. 
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I also believe that Pacific Bell should be required to file with the Public Utilities 
Commission a competitive impact report as they go into these new businesses. You know, are 
they going to be anti-competitive, are they really going to generate profits that will 
lower the rates of all of us in terms of the ratepayers? And they should be required to 
report on sources and uses of funds. And I think with more public disclosure of what's 
really happening, then the Public Utilities Commission is in a position that they can 
really, you know, look at what's happening and is it true that we need Q h;llion dollAr~ 
worth of rate increases this year, or is technology. And I ran the largest high technology 
market research company for 10 years and I'm familiar iri the world of high technology with 
prices coming down, not going up. 
And so I think that there are things that you can do that would ensure all of us a 
more public disclosure. 
Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Any further questions? Anybody feel compelled to 
make one last statement? 
I want to thank you for---I want to thank the Senators for staying all day with me. 
And the staff, of course, that's their responsibility so I won't thank them. But I will 
thank them for preparing all of you being here. 
Very good. Thank you very much. 
---ooOoo---
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
. ) 
Public Hearings on the ) 
Regulation of Utility ) 
Diversification in California ) 
____________________________ ) 
Comments of the California Cable Television Association 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The C a 1 i for n i a Cab 1 e . T e 1 e vis ion As soc i at ion ( 11 C C T A 11 ) is a 
trade association whose members serve approximately 95% of the 
cable television subscribers Ln the State of California. We also 
have some 250 Associate members, who are suppliers of products 
and services to the cable television industry. 
The CCTA has been an outspoken participant Ln regulatory and 
legislative inquiries relating to utility diversification into 
competitive businesses. We are so active out of necessity. As 
explained Ln detail Ln our comments ln orr 84-03-02, Order 
Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion into the 
Organizational Structure of the State's Telecommunications 
Companies for the Provision of Competitive and Other Services, 
the cable television industry has repeatedly and routinely been a 
victim of anticompetitive acts by the telephone industry as a 
result of that industry's efforts over the years to diversify 
into the cable business. (A copy of those comments is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 1.) 
As a victim of anticompetitive dive~sification attempts, the 
CCTA appreciates the thoughtful manner tn which the Commission is 
approaching the question of how, and indeed whether, to allow 
utilities to diversify into competitive ventures. Attached as 
Exhibit 2 are Comments and Reply Comments filed by CCTA in a 
related FCC proceeding (CC Docket No. 84-28), which presents our 
views on diversification in a.somewh•t more detailed manner than 
outlined below. 
II. BASIC PREMISES IN ESTABLISHING POLICIES ON UTILITY 
DIVERSIFICATION 
The Commission's Notice of July 15, 1985 ("Notice"), 
includes a discussion of various alternative strategies. Each 
strategy is premised on distinct theories regarding the effects 
of utility diversification. But those strategies and the 
theories upon which they are based merely result from the 
relative value of risks and benefits of utility diversification 
assumed in each case. We find it necessary, therefore, to first 
examtne the factors which lead to these risks and benefits. Upon 
examination, the conclusion is inescapabl~ that ratepayers (as 
well a~ competitors) are at great risk from utility 
diversification unless carried on through fully-separated 
subsidiaries. 
The Notice, in fact, discusses many of these f•ctors, such 
as economies of scope, the potential for cross subsidies and 
diversion of managerial attention. There are, however, even more 
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basic factors which must be discussed. 
outlined below. 
Several of these are 
A. Profits from a Competitive Business Can Not, By 
Definition, Provide a Contribution to Basic 
Telephone Rates. 
The impression which is given by the Notice is that, while 
there is always the risk of losses, there may conversely be large 
profits available from diversification into competitive 
businesses, and that these profits can be used to subsidize basic 
telephone rates. However, upon examination, it is clear that 
competitive ventures, no matter how successful, are incapable of 
subsidizing basic telephone rates. 
Just where do'"contributions" to basic serv1ce come from? 
Many maintain that, for example, long-haul toll rates are priced 
well above cost, and the resulting subsidy is applied to the cost 
of local service. But, that subsidy depends on the maintenance 
of a telephone company monopoly in long-haul, intraLATA toll. 
Subsidies come from monopoly profits. Indeed~ the phone 
companies argue that the introduction of intraLATA competition 
would drive long-haul toll prices to cost, eliminating subsidies 
to basic service. 
In a competitive setting, prices tend to be equal to costs. 
Costs do include a "normal" profit, which varies in magnitude to 
reflect the level of risk of the competitive venture. But, as it 
reflects the level of risk to. investors, that normal profit must 
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go to the shareholder. Otherwise, unless rewarded for their risk 
taking, investors will be unwilling to invest in a competitive 
business. There simply are ~o monopoly profits from a 
competitive venture to contribute to basic telephone rates. 
B. It is Highly Doubtf~l That There Are Economies of 
Scale or Scope to Be Rad In a Company the Si~e of 
Pacific Bell. 
The Notice appears to assume that ventures which 
horizontally integrate a utility's operation lead to economies of 
scope. The CCTA has seen no evidence that horizontal integration 
by Pacific Bell will lead to economies of scope. Even if 
economies of scope could be shown, there is a natu~al 
relationship between ecdnomies of scale and scope. Thus, 
Pacific, with eight billion dollars per year in sales, may well 
be in a region of diminishing returns to scale, which could well 
outweigh any scope economies present. Utilities should be 
required to prove such economies will result -- they should not 
be presumed. 
The Notice cites telephone company expansion into the cable 
television business as an example of economies of scope. That 
premise is highly doubtful. While the cable television and 
telephone b~sinesses both involve transmission, the similarity 
ends there. The two businesses are completely different in both 
technical structure (switched v. point-to-multipoint and 4Khz 
capacity v. 450 Mhz cap4city and up) and marketing approach. 
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There is no reason to assume, for example, that the considerable 
marketing expertise at Pacific Bell, geared to the provision of 
monopoly services,. wo~ld be transferable to marketing a 
competitive luxury, such as cable television. As discussed 
below, the mere ability of new utility ventures to shar~ 
existing utility employees and facilities should not be taken as 
proof of economies of scale, or, indeed, as in any way benefiting 
the ratepayer. To the contrary, the greater the amount of 
sharing, the greater the cross subsidy risk. 
B. The Sharing of Idle Factors of Production is Not 
a Valid Justification for Diversification into 
Competitive Businesses. 
Often the fact that a utility may have idle factors of 
production, such as labor or equipment, is used to justify a 
horizontal ~xpansion into competitive ventures. Expansion under 
those circumstances should not be viewed as automatically leading 
to scope economies, or benefiting the ratepayer. 
Ratepayers will not be served, for example, by a horizontal 
expansion into the cable television business. Since a telephone 
utility's staffing levels ought to be prudent and necessary, its 
existing technical and administrative staff should not have spare 
time with which to plan, construct and operate a cable system. 
If the telephone utility is overstaffed, the remedy to protect 
the telephone ratepayer is to disallow the expense, not to 
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encourage that the utility enter competitive businesses so its 
staff will be able to keep busy. 
Local telephone service is a utility service in part becuase 
it is a necessity. Telephone companies have staffing levels 
which are needed to restore service promptly in emergencies. It 
would not be in the interests of the telephone ratepayer to have 
employees of the local telephone company, hired to handle peak 
demands, diverted to cable television matters in the event of a 
severe storm or other emergency. Similarly, cable television 
subscribers would suffer if those operating the cable system were 
to owe their primary allegiance to maintenance of the telephone 
system so that in the event of a severe storm, telephone service 
was 100% restored before any repairs to the cable system were 
made. 
Diversificati~n into the competitive provision of billing 
services is another example mentioned in the Notice. While a 
utility's computers may well have off-peak idle capacity, it 
should not be presumed that use of the idle capacity by 
diversification into the provision ~f competitive billing 
services would lead to economies of scope or benefit the 
ratepayer. Utilizing that idle capacity for a new billing 
service would merely maximize the potential for cross subsidy 
through shared use of office space, maintenance staff, 
programmers and managers. If the utility does indeed own excess 
com~uter capacity that can be used to provide competitive 
services, the arrangement with the least potential for cross 
subsidy should be required by the Commission. In such 
circumstances, leasing the utility's excess computer capacity to 
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a third party would bring marginal revenue, but m1n1m1ze the 
potential for abuse~ The utility could even lease the .excess 
capacity to its own fully-separated subsidiaries, assuming 
safeguards existed to assure a fair price was paid. 
I I I. ANSWERS TO THE COMMISSION'S QUESTIONS 
A. Horizontal Transfer of Assets/Employees. 
The transfer of assets from a regulated utility to 
non-utility operations presents a major opportunity for cross 
subsidy. Thus, such activity should be held to a minimum. If 
such transfers must take place, prices should approximate market 
prices. A utility wanting to transfer physical assets should, 
where possible, put those assets out to bid and transfer them to 
the highest bidder. Where such an auction arrangement is not 
possible, a non-utility operation purchasing utility assets 
should never pay less than cost plus the utility rate of return. 
Shared use of employees should never be allowed, as the 
costs of regulatory oversight of such arrangements would be too 
high, and accurate oversight impossible. When employees are 
transferred to subsidiaries, the non-utility operation should pay 
the utility an amount equal t6 a normal fee which a headhunter or 
personnal agency would charge for locating a person of like 
skills. That would prevent emplo~ees from being hired and 
trained at ratepayer expense and then transferred to non-utility 
operations. 
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B. Transfers in Instances of Vertical Integration. 
Again, these transactions should be minimized. Transfers 
should be by competitive bid. However, cost plus a utility rate 
of return should be a floor for prices in the case of transfers 
from the utility to the non-utility. 
In any transactions involving a utility's competitive 
venture, state laws regarding unfair business practices ought to 
apply. Cross subsidies through below-cost pricing would then be 
a violation of state law. The potential for stiff penalties 
would be a strong-deterrent against improper behavior. State 
laws should be amended to give ratepayers a cause of action under 
the unfair competition statutes in the case of 
cross-subsidization. 
C. Anticompetitive Favoritism. 
Anticompetitive favoritism must be minimized by the use of 
arms-length, fully-separated subsidiaries for non-utility 
operations. The subsidiaries should have separate facilities, 
separate management and separate financing, including separate 
stock. 
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D. Allocation of Profits and Losses. 
With the use of fully-separated subsidiaries, the 
subsidiaries' stockholders should be at risk for all losses, and 
benefit fully from profits. If, however, a utility puts its 
ratepayers at risk by diversifying into competitive activities, 
all profits should go to the ratepayers. All losses, though, 
should be charged to the shareholders. This scheme would serve 
as a strong incentive to form separate subsidiaries, and prevent 
the losing businesses from being kept part of unified operations, 
while the winners are spun off. 
E. Alternate Regulatory Strategies. 
1. Stick to the Monopoly. 
While strong caution should be exercised before allowing 
diversification into competitive areas, this strategy may go 
farther than necessary. Fully-separated subsidiaries, separately 
financed with separate stock, plus the applicability of antitrust 
laws to transfers between the utility and subsidiaries will tn 
most instances provide adequate ratepayer protection. 
2. Stay Close to Home. 
This strategy would put the ratepayer at significant risk. 
Even related businesses may well be intensely competitive, and 
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joint operations 1n such circumstances raise the strongest 
incentive and ability to eros~ subsidize. As discussed above, 
diversification into competitive areas within the regulated 
utility yields no possibility of contribution to basic utility 
rates as no monopoly profits are possible. 
3. Moderate Diversification. 
The problem with this strategy is the approval of 
diversification into related businesses without the use of 
fully-separated subsidiaries. There ought to be a very strong 
burden on a utility to prove benefits from such arrangements, not 
satisfied by the mere claim of economies of scale. 
Utilities should not be able to escape scrutiny under the 
state's unfair competition laws by offering competitive services 
at regulated r~tes through its utility operations. Nor should 
ratepayer~ 'be at risk for expansion into competitive ventures. 
4. Utility Discretion ~- CPUC Oversight. 
This strategy would result in virtually no oversight of 
utility diversification, even though history is replete with 
abuses. Competitors ought not be forced to participate in 
general rate cases in order to attempt to gain protection from 
unfair competition. 
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IV, CONCLUSION 
In order to ~rotect utility ratepayers and the market system 
for competitive goods and services, all proposals by utilities to 
diversify into competitive areas should be carefully evaluated by 
the Commission. Especially close scrutiny is appropriate where, 
as with telephone industry attempts to enter the cable television 
business, there is a demonstrated history of a~use. 
Fully-separated subsidiaries and application of state unfair 
competition laws are the best protection against potential harm. 
Dated: September 20, 1985 
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CALIFORNIA CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION 
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P.O. Box 11080 
4341 Piedmont Avenue 
Oakland, CA 94611 
(415) 428-2225 
by Is/MICHAEL A. .\lORRIS 
Michael A. Morris, Esq. 
Attorney for 
California Cable Television Association 
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EXHIBIT "1" 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
ORDER INSTITUTING INVESTIGATION on 
the Commistion's Own Motion into 
the organi:ational structuLe of the 
state's telecommunications companies 
for the provision of competitive 
and other aervices. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________________________________ ) 
RECEIVEr.: 
.~ .. -\ ,' 0 ~ 
orr 84 ... 03-02 
Comments of the California Cable Television Association 
The California Cable Television Association ("CCTA") is a 
trade association representing approximately 400 cable television 
systems in California. The .CCTA views the issues being addressed 
by the California Public Utilities Commission ("Commission") in 
this Investigation as critical. A careful resolution of these 
issues is necessary to prevent anticompetitive telephone company 
behavior, both for the protection of California's ratepayers, and 
so that competitive businesses will be able to continue to exist 
and bring products and services to the public at reasonable 
prices. 
The cable television industry in California ("cable") 
provide~ broadband interstate transmission services to both 
residential and institutional subscribers pursuant to local 
franchises granted under §53066 of the California Government Code. 
The services which cable provides, or will be able to provide in 
the coming years as technology advances and consumer demands 
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become more sophisticated, include both entertainment and 
non~entertainment services •. Th~ non~entertainment services 
include such residential services as videotex, security services 
and high-speed delivery of computer software, plus such 
institutional services as video confere~cina, high-speed data 
transmission, traffic signal control, energy load management and 
aaeter reading. 
The cable industry, unlike the telephone industry, serves a 
dual role. In addition to its role as the provider of broadband 
transmission c~pacity, the cable industry acts as an electronic 
editor, selecting material to be offered to subscribers, 
packaaing and marketing that material. 
In order to_ appreciate the necessity of instituting strong 
measures to prohibit anticompetitive telephone company behavior 
toward the cable industry,. it is helpful to understand that the 
historical relationship between the two industries is marked by 
repeated abuse of the telephone industry's monopoly power. The 
telephone companies will say that we shouldn't remind the 
Commission of their industry's past behavior, because that was 
pre-divestiture and things have now changed. We disagree. 
In 196), an AT&T study stated: 
We must own that "pipe"-- not just own it more 
importantly -- control it.l 
1 Plaintiff's First Statement of Contentions and Proof at 203, 
United States v. AT&T, Civil Action No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 
1978) [hereinafter referred to as "First Statement"} 
2 
Pacific's attitude, as reflected in its recent statements, 
has not changed. Pacific has told both the Commission2 and 
the California Legislature chat it must be the sole provider of 
transmission services within its service area, and that cable 
television companies should lease the capacity rather than 
construct their own facilities.l As a first step in 
implementing its intent to be the sole provider of local 
tra~smission services, Pacific has proposed to construct a cable 
television system in Palo Alto and surrounding communitiea and 
lease a portion of the capacity back to the City of Palo Alto 
("City"). 
The use of such a "leaseback" scheme to preclude competition 
from an independent cable operator is not a new idea. The first 
BOC to offer such service was New York Telephone in 1959. By 
1964, eighteen of the 23 _BOCs had filed tariffs for the 
service. 4 However, the BOCs had made insignificant inroads 
into the cable business by 1964, because their rates were too 
high and their tariffs often restricted the variety of services 
which could be provided by leasees.5 
2 
.!!..!• !...:..&...!.• etter from Margaret delL Brown to E. Nicholas Selby 
l (May 26, 1983). (statement from Pacific Telephone's Legal 
Department on Pacific's Palo Alto Plans.) 
3 Local Telecommunications Services: Telephone and Cable 
Television Informational Hearing before California Assembly 
Committe• an Utilities and Commerce (F•bruary, 1984) (statement 
of Al Boschulte, Pacific Bell Company) [hereinafter "Boschulte 
testimony"]. 
4 First St4tement at 213. 
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In order to bolster the success of the BOCa' leasebacks, 
AT&T atepped in in 1965 and slaahed rates, allowing the BOC share 
of new cable conatruction to rise from zero in 1964 to 28.4% in 
1967.6 The FCC asaerted jurisdiction over the telco'• cable 
televiaion offerings in 1966,7 and by 1968 it wa• determined 
that the BOCa' rate• for leaseback cable system• would have to 
be raiaed 76.6% to cover costs.8 Subaequently, AT&T ceased 
offerina the service.9 
In addition to cross-subsidizing its rate• for cable 
television leasebacks, some Bell Companies acted in an 
anticompetitive manner by refusing pole attachments to 
independent cable operatort.10 Where pole attachments were 
offered, strict restrictions on the services which the 
independent cable operator could offer were imposed and pole 
rates we~• raised. AT&T discouraged all exceptions to the 
restrictions: 
Any enlarging of the privileges granted under the pole 
contract tends to make the service more valuable. 
This, in turn, will tend to encourage still more people 
to get into the business and the companies have enough 
to do to cope with the ~xisting situation.ll 
Concerned about these abuses, the FCC found it necessary to 
6 ~ id. at 214. 
7 See Common Carrier Tariffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.c.c. 2d 257 
(1966) 
8 Fi~st Statement at 214-215. 
9 id • 
......... 
10 id. at 219. 
1 1 id. at 208, 209 (quoting AT&T documents.) 
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prohibit telephone companies from providing cable service within 
their telephone services areas, and ordered that leaseback 
systems could be offered only upon a showing that ~ole attachment 
rights were available at reasonable rates and without undue 
restrictions.l2 State and federal legislation was also 
enacted to assure access to poles and conduits at reasonable 
rates.l3 
This is not meant to be an exhaustive review of history of 
anticompetitive treatment of the cable industry by the telephone 
industry.l4 Rather, we have included this historical 
perspective to encourage the Commission to be particularly aware 
of the impact of its actions resulting from this proceeding on 
the ability of t~e telcos to continue their twenty-year crusade 
to impede the growth of the cable television industry, and to 
impress upon the Commission the need for careful scrutiny of 
renewed telco interest in participating in the cable business. 
We set out below our responses to the questions listed in 
Appendix B to the Commission's Order. 
CROSS SUBSIDIES 
A. WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD PERMIT ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR BY 
A TELEPHONE COMPANY'S SUBSIDIARY OR AFFILIATE BECAUSE OF ITS 
12 ~Section 214 Certificates, 21 F.c.c. 2d 307 (1970) 
l3 ~. ~· Public Utilities Code §767.5; Act of February 21, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat.)). 
14 We.have referred only to actions by the Bell Companies, but 
m&ny tndependents have acted in a similar fashion. 
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RELATIONSHIP TO TH! REGULATED LOCAL COMPANY? CAN REGULATION 
.AMELIORATE POTENTIALLY ANTI-COMPETITIVE CIRCUMSTANCES? HOW? 
There are three circ~mstances which give rise to 
anti-competitive behavior when local telephone companies take 
part in both natural monopoly and competitive activities: 
1) the ability to cross subsidite through the 
misallocation of common costs: 
2) the ability to discriminate against competitors in 
the provision of access to utility facilities; and 
3) the ability to leverage unique marketing advantages 
gained as a result of the lo~al exchange telephone 
monopoly. 
l) Misallocation of Common Costs 
The first way in which telephone companies beha~e 
anticompetitively is when costs which should be assigned to their 
competitive activities are instead assigned to costs of regulated 
activities, and picked up by their monopoly ratepayers. This 
misallocation may occ~r with regard to ~osts of facilities or 
other assets, personnel or services, and is most easily 
accomplished where the competitive activities are 
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. . l d 15 telecommunlcatlons-re ate • In such cases, there is a 
greater degree of sharing of· facilities and. equipment, so that 
correct cost allocations are difficult to determine, and improper 
allocations hard to detect.l6 
The provision of both monopoly and competitive services by 
one company not only affords the ability to cross-subsidize, but 
the incentive to do so, because the competitive activity can show 
a profit without having to cover its true costs, while monopoly 
profits can continue to be extracted from the rate base.l7 
In fact, one telephone company refers not to the possibility to 
cross-subsidize competitive ventures with monopoly ventures, but 
to the "propensity" of telephone companies to do so.l8 
It is important to understand that there are a variety of 
regulated telephone activities which are, in fact, competitive, 
and that the cross-subsidy problem exists even in such 
LS See Reply of the United States to Responses to the Department 
Prop;;als Regarding Section VIII (C) Waivers, U.S.A. v. Western 
Electric Co., Civ. No. 82-0192 pp. 63-64 (D.D.C. February 21, 
1984). [herinafter "DOJ Reply"]. cf., Reply of Pacific Bell and 
Nevada Bell to Memorandum of United-states Concerning Line of 
Business Restrictions, U.S.A. v. Western Electric Co., Civil 
Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1984), p.4 (citing the 
District Court's decision, 552 F.Supp. at 190), ("any need for 
the imposition of restrictions would be greatest in 
telecommunications business which serve the same end-product 
market as the former SOC's local exchange business and which 
might provide a realistic opportunity for unproper 
cross-subsidization.") 
16 See 552 F.Supp. at 189 n. 238. 
17 DOJ Reply at 42. 
18 Comments of Centel Corporation In Support of Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 84-28, p.7 n.5 (March 1, 
1984). 
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circumstancea.l9 For example, point-to-point 
telecommunications services exhibit no natural monopoly 
characteristics,20 and are provided by a myriad of suppliers 
of satellite, microwave and cable services.21 Because of the 
growing number of such suppliers, and the technologies used, 
pricing is very competitive. 
The local telephone companies provide private-line services 
on a regulated basis which are, to varying degrees, substitutable 
for p4int-to-point service~ offered by others on a competitive 
basis. The rational way for a telephone company to act in such a 
situation would be to subsidize its competitive private line 
services with monopoly revenues. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Pacific has stated that it will lose over seven 
hundred million dollars in 1984 on its private line 
services.22 Because of ~hat seven hundred million dollar 
subsidy, Pacific's monopoly ratepayers suffer through higher 
telephone rates, competitive service suppliers are harmed, and 
19 DOJ Reply at 18 n.1. 
20 !!..!.• !..:...i..:.• Teatimony of DaleN. Hatfield, Exh. 51, p.ll, Order 
Instituting Investigation to determine whether competition should 
be allowed in the provision of telecommunications transmission 
services within the state, OII 83-06-01 (June 29, 1983); id. TR 
14: 1782, l 13-26 (Testimony of Nina W. Cornell). -
21 According to D.E. Guinn, Chairman of Pacific Telephone, there 
are 568 satellite earth stations and over 4,200 licensed 
nonutility private microwave channels in California. Testimony 
of D.E. Guinn, Investigation on the Commission's own motion into 
the effects of competition upon local and toll exchange service, 
including t~e issues of intra and inter-LATA competition, access 
charges, bypasa, and methods of regulating competitive marketa, 
OII 83-02-01 (February 24, 1983). 
2 2 .!.!!.:.• Exh. 13, p.3 (Testimony jf John E. Gueldner) 
the competitive market is adversely impacted to the detriment of 
the public. 
Pacific Telephone's23 proposal to build a cable 
television system for the City of Palo Alto is another example of 
circumstances under which cross-subsidy is likely to occur. 
Pacific proposes to build a 112-channel cable system, and lease 
80 of those channel/ to the City. This type of arrangement is 
therefore referred to as a "leaseback" system. The provision of 
capacity over such a system is called "channel service," and is 
a regulated interstate service for which a federal tariff must be 
filed.24 
Pacific's proposal is an example of the type of activity 
which affords the highest likelihood of cross-subsidy. The 
incentive to cross-subsidize is high because the provision of 
leaseback systems represents entry into competitive markets. The 
offering of such a system competes with both independent cable 
operators who construct their own systems, and with companies who 
construct and sell facilities to independent cable operators on a 
turnkey basi 
The opportunity to cross-subsidize such leaseback systems is 
blatant, as easebacks are telecommunications-related and share 
many of the same subscribers as the telephone company local loop. 
2 3 Pacific Telephone Wideband Telecommunications System Proposal, 
!e~ponse :o the City of Palo Alto Request for Proposals to 
Provide Cable Televisin Service to the Designated Service Area. 
The proposal was submitted under the name Pacific Telephone prior 
to 1/1/84. Since the employees workin1 on the project are 
employed by Pacific Bell, we assume this is now a venture of 
P a c i f i c: Be 1 l. The b i d i s r e f e r red to he rea f t e r a s "P a c i f i c ' s • " 
4 F.c.c. 2d 257, supra. 
A lea•e-baek venture will share common personnel for planning, 
conatruetion, inttallation apd maintenance with the local 
exchanae telephone activities. 
The need to cross-subsidize is also apparent. The NYNEX 
line-of-business manager was recently quoted as saying NYNEX has 
"no current plans" for leaseback systems, because they are "not 
economically viable."25 
The specifics of Pacific's proposal expose even more 
opportunities for cross-subsidy than the general ease described 
above. Pacific proposes to lease only 80 of the 112 channels it 
will build to the city. The remaining 32 will be retained for 
Pacific's own use, raising the problem of allocating costs 
between the various channels on the same cable. In addition, 
Pacific proposes to co-locate the cable television hub sites with 
Pacific's central switching offices.26 Pacific's proposal is 
an example of a competitive v~nture designed to open every 
conceivable avenue of cross-subsidy. 
CCTA believes that Pacific's ratepayers have already been 
subsidizing its proposed cable venture in Palo Alto by bearing 
all costs incurred to date associated with development of the 
propoaal and with its advocacy: Pacific argues that such costs 
ought to accrue to the ratepaye~s, as the cable television system 
is simply a transmission system, and transmission is Pacific 
25 209 Cable TV Franchising 3, (Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., 
April 6, 1984). 
26 Propotal at 8. 
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Bell's bus nesa.27 However, if the Commission is serious 
about protecting the telephone ratepayer from subsidizing 
competitive ventures, it must make a distinction between the 
natural monopoly transmission activities and the competitive 
transmission activities in which common carriers engage. 
Pacific's Palo Alto proposal clearly represents a 
competitive transmission activity, both because several other 
operators have submitted competitive bids to build and operate 
the system and many more contractors will bid to construct the 
system once a franchise is granted, and because the services to 
be furnished over the system -- both the entertainment and the 
non-entertainment services -- are now available from many 
suppliers on a competitive basis, and will be available from many 
more sources as time goes on. 
At a min mum, safeguards must be enacted to protect the 
public from the cross-subsidy problem. Such projects should be 
required by the Commission to be offered through fully-separated 
subsidiaries with separate financing, and utilizing the services 
of separate employees. In addition, transactions between the 
separated ~nt ties should be minimized to reduce the likelihood 
and abilit to cross-subsidize through inter-subsidiary 
transactions. 8 
In the c se of cable television leaseback facilities, 
tructural re trictions are the only viable means by which the 
7 ~ Bouschulte testimony. 
2B Memorandum of the United States Concerning Removal of Line of 
Business Restrictions Pursuant to Section VIII (C) and Response 
to Motions of Bell Atlantic and Bell South, U.S. v. AT&T, p.l2. 
l 1 
commi11ion will be able to protect tha public, as channel service 
tariff• muat be filed with the ~CC, not the C~mmission.29 
AI part of its Palo Alto plans, Pacific also proposes to 
build an institutional network, over which the city and other 
bueinesses and inetitutions will be served. The Commission 
should carefully review its regulatory treatment of that 
inetitutional network. It too will provide service1, euch as 
video conferencing and high-speed date tranemission, which are 
inteneely competitive. Thus, Pacific's incentive will be to 
croes-subaidize in order to lower rate1 below those of 
c ompe tit o r'e. 
Pacific describes the institutional network as follows: 
[T]he proposed insitutional network provides the 
capabilities for service that are not significantly 
different from several hundred previous proposals for 
special contracts and services that have been approved 
by the CPUc.30 
Precisely because the institutional network provides 
services analogous to "special services," its operation 
requires special regulatory attention. The FCC has recently 
agreed, announcing its belief that such special construction 
and special services ought to be recategorized from common 
carrier to non-common carrier services in order to 
" ••• reduce croee-subsidies, promote just and reasonable 
rates for common carrier services and limit 
29 4 r.c.c. 2d 2S7, supra. 
30 Propoeal at 8. 
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discrimination.")! In analyzing the problem of 
cross-subsidies to these services, the FCC stated: 
Typically, special construction provides lines that are 
traditionaLly tailored, constructed and priced in 
response to a customer's request where existing lines 
or ordinary tariffed facilities would not satisfy the 
request. These lines are priced on an individual cost 
basis, but some or all of their costs may be covered by 
the rates for other services •••• 
Special service arrangements are individually tailored 
and priced in response to a customer's request. Some 
of the costs of providing special service arran!ements 
may be covered by the rates for other services. 2 
To remedy the problem, the FCC proposes in part to: 
-- Keep the costs of special activities on books of 
account separate from those used to calculate the 
revenue requirement of generally-available, 
indiscriminately-supplied, common carrier service 
offering~, perhaps with some structural separation; 
-- Require carriers to interconnect on reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory terms with suppliers of special 
activities •••• J3 
2) Discriminatory Access 
The second type of anticompetitive circumstances which arise 
when telephone companies provide both competitive and monopoly 
services stem from the failure to offer competitors 
nondiscriminatory access to the local exchange. It is this 
problem which forms the basis for prohibiting the BOCs from 
31 ~odificiation of Common Carrier Treatment of Special 
Co s ruction of Lines and Special Service Arrangements Proposed 
(CC Docket No. 84-369) 17943 FCC News 1, (April 12, 1984). 
32 
3 p .12. 
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providina interezchange service, and which led to the breakup of 
AT&T.34 
AI di1cueeed above, the development of the cable television 
induetry has hietorically been hindered by anticompetitive 
behavior of the telephone industry in their provision of access 
to poles and conduits. The CCTA is concerned that, •• telephone 
companies enter into competition with cable, discriminatory 
ace••• to facilities other than poles will result. 
Pacific's Palo Alto proposal it1elf point• out the 
advantages of easy access to Pacific's monopoly facilities. One 
reason the Subscriber Network's hubs will be located at Pacific'• 
central switching offices is explained as follows: 
[T}he Subscriber Network will also interface at those 
hubs with regional and national sources of programming. 
Major regional Pacific Telephone telecommunications 
circuits transit these hub locations ..•• 
(T]he City of Palo Alto, Stanford University, and the 
Palo Alto-Menlo Park industrial leaders of high 
technology in the United States will have access to 
regional and national telecommunications networks for 
quality video conferencins or data transmissions."~ 
Several conclusions are implied by this quote. First, the 
ability to accees the telecommunications network on a 
nondiscriminatory basis may very well develop into a roadblock to 
fair competition between the cable industry and the telephone 
indue try. Second, integrated operation of telephone and cable 
services will open the possibility for subsidies from monopoly 
telephone ratepayer• to "industrial leaders of high technology in 
34 ~. ~· 552 F.Supp. at 188. 
3S Propo1al at 9 (emphaeie addedl 4 
the United States," who presumably should be able to pay their 
full share of telecommunications costs. Finally, it is evident 
that Pacific's interest in the ca~le business is not to provide 
traditional monopoly switched-voice telephone service, but to 
offer new and competitive services such as video conferencing and 
high-speed data services, which are capable of being provided by 
a multitude of competitprs, but not by Pacific over its voice 
network. Pacific's plans do nothing to enhance residential 
telephone service; rather, they imperil residential telephone 
service by ra sing the likelihood that residential rates will 
rise to subsidize a competitive venture. 
We note finally with regard to unfair competition through 
discriminatory a~cess that, although Pacific proposes that its 
Subscriber Network will have two-way capability, Pacific will 
apparently only make one-way-capacity available to the City, 
reserving all two-way services for its~lf.36 Thus, by system 
design, Pacific could circumvent established federal policies 
favoring competition in broadband services, as well as similar 
policies of this Commission which may emerge from OII 83-06-01. 
(Such competitive policies have been recommended by both the 
36 Walter s. aer, Telephone and Cable Companies: Rivals or 
Partners ia Video Dittributian (March, 1984) pp.21-22. (''Perhaps 
the most impa tant distinction between Pacific's proposal and 
other telca construction/leaseback arrangements is the carrier's 
ongoing control of system bandwidth. In other proposals, the 
telcos hava 1 ased the full capacity of the system to a cable 
operator. Pacific has no such idea in mind •••• Pacific ••• will 
retain contra over capacity beyond these 80 channels, 
specifical y ncluding the institutional network and any 
interactive services offered on the subecriber netvork •••• Pacific 
thus would keep its monopoly control over two-vay services to 
u1i •• and esidential customers." Emphasis added.) 
1 s 
Communications and Policy Staffs.) There will still be several 
competina wire-based systems delivering voice, data and video in 
Palo Alto -- evidence that no natural monopoly exists 
Pacific's intent is simply to control them all.37 
3) Leveraging of Monopoly Power 
The final circumstances which allow anticompetitive behavior 
occur when telephone companies are permitted to leveraae the 
unique marketina advantaaes which they possess as a result of 
their monopoly position in order to impede competition in other 
markets. For example, whenever anyone moves into Pacific's 
service area, they must call Pacific to order service. If 
Pacific is allowed to use this initial service contact to market 
CPE, competition in the CPE market, which has proven beneficial 
in bringing new, low-cost equipment on the market, will be 
stifled. Similarly, if Pacific were allowed to use its monopoly 
resources to market cable services in areas where it is providing 
cable facilities, the viability of diversity in information 
delivery, so essential for first amendment goals, would be 
curtailed. 
The above discussion outlines the ways in which 
anticompetitive behavior by the telephone industry can occur as a 
result of involvement in both monopoly and competitive markets. 
Because of the strong likelihood of anticompetitive behavior, the 
Commission should consider carefully whether telephone company 
involvement in a competitive market will have any beneficial 
37 At the same time, Pacific's proposal reserves sufficient 
downstream capacity to offer competitive program services, should 
reaulatory policy change to allow that. ~at 22. 
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competitive eff~ct, and should weigh any such beneficial effect 
against tbe risk of harm to ehe ratepayer and competition.38 
If, after weighing the benefits and risks, the Commission 
decides to allow telco entry into competitive markets, strict 
structural safeguards should be enacted. At a minimum, these 
safeguards should consist of complete structural separation, 
separate financing, a prohibition on sharing employees, 
restrictions on the transfer of employees from monopoly to 
competitive subsidiaries and restrictions on transactions between 
subsidiaries. 
B. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD SUBSIDIES (INCLUDING FUNDS, 
INFORMATION AND SERVICES) TO SUBSIDIARIES OR AFFILIATES B! 
PERMISSABLE? 
Whenever there is a subsidy of any kind from a regulated 
monopoly to a competitive venture, there is harm done both to the 
monopoly ratepayer and to competition. Therefore, such 
cross-subsidies should be entirely prohibited. 
INTEGRATION WITH REGULATED OPERATIONS 
A. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY, ARE NON-UTILITY SERVICES SO 
RELATED TO UTILITY OPERATIONS AND SERVICES THAT THEY SHOULD BE 
FULLY OR PARTLY INTEGRATED WITH THE REGULATED COMPANY? 
38 ~. 552 F.Supp. at 191 (Court retains prohibition on 
manufacture of CP! by BOCa because CP! industry is already 
competitive and risk of anticompetitive telco behavior is 
i . ) 
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In aeneral, we do not believe there are any reason• why 
non-utility •erviee• should be intearated with the reaulated 
company'• activitie•· Non-utility 1ervice• are by definition 
both non-neceslitie• and not naturally monopoli•tic. Intearation 
would ea•e the way for cro••-•ub•idiel, re•ultina in harm to the 
monopoly ratepayer and to competition. 
8. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY, SHOULD SUBSIDIARY OR 
AFFILIATED REVENUES BE USED TO SUPPORT THE LOCAL REGULATED 
UTILITY? 
AI discu1sed above, there are sianificant risks to the 
public interest when telephone companies participate in 
competitive activities. There is also little benefit to the 
public from telco entry into markets that are already competitive. 
Pacific hal justified its plan• to enter into competitive 
businesses, as proposed ~n Palo Alto, on the grounds that those 
ventures will be extremely profitable and keep residential 
telephone rates low.39 We are doubtful that such ventures 
will be highly profitable, but where they are, high profit• are a 
result of high ri1k. It will be impossible, in a practical 
sen1e, to in1ulate the ratepayer fully from that risk, and 
prevent cross subsidiaries through transfers of expertise and 
information. Therefore, the Commission should consider requiring 
telephone companie• to transfer a percentage of their gro•s 
income from competitive activitie• to their revenue requirement 
for residential service. Such a requir~ment ~ould be in keeping 
with Pacific's announced intent. Before a Committee of the 
39 Bo•chulte testimony. 
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california Legislature, not only did Pacific not reject this 
idea, but referred to it as "tempting."40 
c. HOW SHOULD REGULATION ADDRESS SUBSIDIARY OR AFFILIATE 
SERVICES WHICH MAY BE COMPETITIVE WITH THOS! OF TH! REGULATED 
COMPANY? 
This question is important in that it recognize& local 
telephone companies offer services, such as point-to-point data 
transmission, which are not natural monopolies and which are 
subject to competition.4l Participation in these competitive 
markets by other parties has wrongly come to be labeled "bypass." 
It should simply be called "competition." 
Telephone companies should be allowed to enter competitive 
markets only when t~eir participation will enhance competition. 
Then, there should be strict structural separation, as outlined 
above. 
COMMISSION AUTHORITY 
A. IS COMMISSION AUTHORITY CURRENTLY BROAD ENOUGH TO PROTECT THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST? 
The Commission has broad authority to regulate telephone 
corporations in the public interest. That authority requires 
that the Commission act to prohibit monopoly telephone ratepayers 
from subsidizing competitive ventures. If there is any questions 
about the Commission's ability to oversee the unregulated telco 
40 Id. 
41 Pacific, for example, plans to compete with itself by entering 
the DTS business, as well as the c~ble business. 
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affiliate• iD order to protect the aoaopoly ratepayer, the 
coaai11ion 1bould 1eet 1uch authority froa the Leai•lature. 
1. HAVE RECENT FEDERAL ACTIONS RESTRICTED COMMISSION AUTHORITY? 
The Coaai1aion hal the authority to iapo1e any re1triction1 
on telephone eatry into coapetitive bu1ine11e1 it feel• are 
aece11ary ia order to protect the ratepayer, iacludina 
re1trictioa1 oa eatry into bu1iae11e1 iavolviaa traneai11ioa, a• 
i1 the caee with Pacific'• Palo Alto propoeal. The FCC hal 
eta ted: 
Where the Commission has aot required separation, 
reaulatory tool• 1uch a• accouatina requireaentl !!!_ 
structural 1eparatioa are available to the atate1 ia 
meetiaa their leaitimate reaulatory iatere1t1 in 
ia1uriaa that aa intrastate carrier'• participation in 
uareaulated activities is aot at the expeaae of the 
comaunicatioa• ratepayer.42 
c. SHOULD THE COMMISSION INITIATE LEGISLATION ON THIS MATTER? 
IF SO, WHAT SHOULD I! THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION? 
It is the respon1ibility of the Commission to tate all stepl 
necessary to preveat anticoapetitive behavior of telephone 
companies throuah cro•s-subsidiaatioa or other means which harm 
the telephone ratepayer. 
The Coaaissioa hal the authority and the duty to 10 act. 
However, the talk of over1eein1 California's reaulated telephone 
compaaie1 aad their affiliates to protect the monopoly ratepayer 
may overburden the Commission's reaource1. If the Coaai11ioa 
4 2 Further lecon1ideration, Second Computer Inquiry, 88 FCC 2d 
512, 542 (1981) (Eapha•i• added). cf. !liaination of Telephone 
Coapany-Cable Cro11-0waer1hip lulel77.for Rural Areae, 88 FCC 2d 
564, 577 ("It i1 not our intention to preeapt the riahtl of the 
atate1 to adopt ero••-owaerlhip prohibition• a1 they 1ee fit.") 
believes e1islative action is req~ired to protect the ratepayer 
by way of judicial as well as administrative remedy, it sho~ld 
certainly sug1eat to the Le1ialature that it take •~ch action, 
and propose appropriate lesialation. 
CONCLUSION 
The CCTA urges the Commiasion to balance the riak of hara to 
the monopoly ratepayer with the benefit& to competition which may 
reault from any telco entry into competitive lines of buaineaa, 
whether the competitive business will be resulated or 
unresulated, before authorizi~l such entry. In cases wbere the 
balance favors entry; strict structural safesuards of the type 
discussed above should be imposed. 
Dated: May 1, 1984 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALIFORNIA CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION 
William M. Winter 
Mi c h a e 1 A. Morris 
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EXHIBIT "2" 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
In the Hatter of ) 
) 
Blanket Section 214 Authorization ) 
for Provision by a Telephone ) 
Common Carrier of Lines for its ) CC Docket No. 84-28 
Cable Television and other ) 
Non-Common Carrier Services ) 
Outside its Telephone Service ) 
Area ) 
Comments of the 
California Cable Television Association 
1. The California Cable Television Association (CCTA) is a 
trade association representing over 300 cable television systems 
in California. We generally favor legislative and administrative 
actions which reduce the burden of regulation and promote the 
ability of industry to better serve the public. Nevertheless, 
while we support in principle the Commission's effort to 
eliminate unnecessary regulatory procedures by granting blanket 
Section 214 authorization for telephone common carriers wishing 
to provide cable television and other non-common carrier services 
outside their telephone service areas, we believe that stringent 
structural protections need to be adopted, to insure that the 
public will not be harmed, before the Commission takes this 
step.1 Otherwise, we have grave concerns regarding the 
!Moreover, such blanket authorization would not be appropriate 
under any conditions with respect to applications to construct 
facilities within a telephone company's service area, where the 
close individual scrutiny afforded by Section 214 is required. 
1 
growing threat to the telephone ratepayer, the cable televiaion 
induatry and cable subscriber• aa a reault of croaa-aubaidies and 
other unfair pra~tices which may arise along with the heightened 
interest shown by local telephone companies in entry into cable 
television. 
2. The CCTA bas historically been at the forefront of FCC 
proceedings which have led to the adoption of atructural and 
procedural aafeauarda to protect the public from being injured by 
telephone company foraya into the cable televiaion buaineaa,2 
and by their misuae of monopoly power over poles and 
conduita.l 
3. Now, once again we find our attention and reaources are 
turned toward thoae same problems of anticompetitive telephone 
company behavior. While moat of the problema which have aurfaced 
at this time are related to telephone company proposals and plana 
to provide cable television facilities within their own aervice 
2~, ~· Applicability of Section 214 of the Communications 
Act with Reaard to Tariffs for Channel Service for Use by 
Community Antenna Television Systems, 13 F.C.C.2d 448, (1968) 
aff'd aub nom. General Telephone Co. of California v. FCC, 413 
F.2d 390 (D.c. Cir~, cert. denied, 396 u.s. 888 (1969); 
Application• of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates 
for Channel Facilities Furniahed to Affiliated Community Antenna 
Syatema, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970) (Final Report and Order in Docket 
18509), aff'd aub nom. General Telephone Co. of the Southweat v. 
United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). 
3~, California Water and Telephone Co., 42 F.C.C.2d 410 (1973) 
(concluding inveatiaation opened in .!.!.:.• S F.C.C.2d 229 (1966)). 
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areas,4 and thereby prevent competition for the transmission 
of inform•tion, we are no less concerned with the potential for 
mischief which is present when telephone companies provide cable 
television service outside of their service areas. 
4. Although the Commission discounts the pos~ibility of 
cross-subsidization from the telephone ratepayer to non-common 
carrier services outside of their telephone service area because 
of its requirement that separate books of account be kept,S 
the CCTA believes strong incentives to cross-subsidize still 
exist anytime a regulated utility providing monopoly services 
strivas to enter competitive businesses. The Department of 
Justice has expressed similar concerns with entry by the 
divested BOCs into competitive ventures outside their traditional 
exchange telecommunications business in a recent memorandum on 
the subject filed with the u.s. District Court for the District 
' of Columbia in connection with the Modified Final Judgement to 
the AT&T Consent Decree.6 Separate books of account are 
simply inadequate to protect the public interest. 
4!.!.!, ~· Complaint of RVS Cableviaion Corporation (FCC File 
No. !-84-9, Dec. 1.5, 1983). See also, "Pacific Tel Seeks CA 
Cable Franchise," HuHiclunnelie;;-(Oct. 17, 1983, p.l). 
5NPRH at t7 
6Memorandum of the United States Concerning Removal of Line of 
Business Restrictions Pursuant to Section VIII (C) and Response 
to Motions of Bell Atlantic and BellSouth, U.S.A. v. Western 
Electric Co., Civ. No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1984). 
3 
5. Additional structural safeguards against cross-subsidy 
should be adopted before blanket authorization to construct 
facilities is granted. At a minimum, the Commission should 
require non-common carrier services outside a telephone company's 
service area to be offered through a separate subsidiary. The 
Commission has deemed such protection necessary for the provision 
by AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies of customer premises 
equipment and enhanced services,7 and for wireline carrier 
provision of cellular service.& Given the concern of 
Congress with the c~ntinued availability of universal telephone 
service, the ratepayer deserves a similar degree of protection 
when .telephone companies choose to participate in speculative and 
competitive ventures such as cable television or the provision of 
non-common carrier private line services. 
6. The CCTA urges the Commission to adopt appropriate 
structural safeguards to prevent cross-subsidies from captive 
7second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, Reconsideration, 84 
F.C.C.2d SO (1980), Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 
(1981), aff'd., Computer & Communications Industry Association v. 
FCC, 693 F.2d 1983 (D~C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 s. Ct. 2109 
(1983); Policy and Rules Concerning the F~rni~hing of Customer 
Premises Equipment, Enhanced Services and Cellular Communications 
Service by the Bell Operating Companies, CC Docket No. 83-115, 55 
R.R.2d 49 (Dec. 30, 1983). 
8cellular Communication• Systema, 86 F.C.C.2d 4569 (1981), 
Reconsideration, 89 F.C.C.2d 58, Further Reconsideration, 90 
F.c.c. 571 (1982). 
4 
monopoly telephone ratepayers to new competitive ventures before 
granting the blanket 214 authorization proposed. 
Of Counae 1: 
Frank W. Lloyd, Esq. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALIFORNIA CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION 
Spencer R. Kaitz, President 
William M. Winter, 
Vice President/General Counsel 
Michael A. Morris, Assistant General Counsel 
By~ 
Mi c h a e 1 A. Mo r r 1 • , ! s q • 
P.O. Box 11080 
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Ma r c h 1 , 1 9 8 4 
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. 
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Before the 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
Washington, D.C. 20554 
In the Matter of ) ) 
Blanket Section 214 Authorization ) 
for Provision by a Telephone ) 
co~mon Carrier of Lines for Its ) CC Docket No. 84-28 
Cable Television and Other ) 
Non-Common Carrier Services ) 
Outside its Telephone Service ) 
Area ) 
REPLY CCMMENTS OF THE 
CALIFORNIA CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION 
The California Cable Television Association (CCTA) hereby 
replies to the comments submitted in the above-captioned 
proceeding. The CCTA's position, as reflected in our initial 
comments, is that blanket Section 214 authorization should not be 
granted to telephone companies applying to construct non-common 
carrier facilities outside of their telephone service areas, 
without first implementing adequate structural safeguards to 
reduce the likelihood of cross-subsidization from monopoly 
telephone ratepayers to competitive business ventures. The 
comments of the other parties support our concern over the cross-
subsidization threat, and reinforce our belief that, in the 
absence of structural protections, the individual scrutiny 
afforded by the Section 214 process is essential. 
The FCC and the commenting telephone companies cite 
inordinate cost and delay from the existing scheme. We are 
sympathetic to the view that procedural rules should be avoided, 
if they are not necessary. But the comments of those other than 
the telephone companies demonstrate that some type of safeguard 
is necessary. Therefore, we offer a compromise solution which 
gives the telephone companies the choice to structure their 
ventures in a way that protects the public interest, and thereby 
obtain procedural deregulation • 
• 
I. A Compromise Solution: Blanket Section 214 Authorization 
Should Be Granted Only to Those Telephone Companies That 
Will Operate Non-Common Carrier Facilities Outside Their 
Telephone Service Areas Through Separate Subsidiaries 
The CCTA proposes a reasonable compromise -- that blanket 
Section 214 authorization be granted to those telephone companies 
that would operate their non-common carrier businesses outside 
their telephone service areas through separate subsidiaries, and 
with separated financing.!/ Individual scrutiny of Section 214 
applications should be retained for all others. 
The Commission has the power to examine the plans of Sec-
tion 214 applicants to determine cross-subsidy problems at the 
time the 214 application is considered.JV It also has the 
ability to make such determinations, since carriers must file 
"proposed tariff charges and regulations" with their 214 
dpplications, 47 C.P.R. Sec. 63.0l(o), advise the Commission of 
"added revenues and costs and the basis therefor" in connection 
lf Prohibition of joint capital formation, in addition to a 
separate subsidiary requirement, is essential. See discussion 
infra, at 7. 
1/ See, ~~ General Telephone Electronics, 70 F.C.C.2d 2249 
(191Jfr SateLlite Business Systems, 62 F.C.C.2d 997, recon. 
denied, 64 F.C.C.2d 872 (1979); aff'd. United States v. FCC, 
52 F. 2d 7 2 (D.c. c ir. 1980) • 
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with the proposed facilities, 47 C.F.R. Sec. 63.0l(m), and 
include a "statement of the accounting proposed to be performed 
in connect ion with the project," 47 C. F. R. Sec. 63.01 (p). 
Although this examination is not always undertaken by the FCC, it 
has been performed when particular concern about cross-subsidy 
• 
was present.ll such an inquiry ought to be made with any 
applicants that propose to provide non-common carrier services 
outside their telephone service area without protecting their 
telephone ratepayers by establishing a separate subsidiary. 
The scheme we propose would give telephone companies the 
flexibility to decide whether to avail themselves of streamlined 
procedures by establishing structural separation. But it would 
not impose a separation requirement. Rather, it would allow 
those who believe that, because of their particular 
circumstances, structural separation is not in the pUblic 
interest,' to make their case for unified operations during the 
214 process. 
The Commission should also make it clear that the states are 
free to impose separate subsidiary and other structural require-
ments on intrastate common carriers proposing to construct non-
common carrier facilities. The states have an interest in 
keeping non-common carrier costs out of the intrastate rate base 
in order to protect the intrastate ratepayer, and may feel their 
ability to do so is constrained, absent such an affirmation by 
~~ ~· Satellite Business Systems, supra. 
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the Commission of its policy to allow states flexibility in this 
area to meet local concerns.~ 
II. The Cross-Subsidy Threat Is Real Both Inside and Outside 
a Telephone Company's Service Area 
• The position of the commenting telephone companie.i/ is very 
simple and straightforward, as exemplified by the United States 
Telephone Association: "(W]here a telephone company proposes to 
build a cable system outside of its service area • cross-
subsidies cannot exist • • • since there will be no sharing of 
common carrier and non-common carrier facilities."!/ In taking 
such a position, the telephone companies reveal not only their 
contempt for genuine competition, but an insensitivity to the 
interests of the_ir ratepayers. 
"Cross-subsidy" refers to the shifting of costs within the 
same company away from a competitive business to a business with 
a return on investment assured through rate-base regulation. The 
location of the two business ventures has no relevance to the 
1/ See Further Reconsideration, Second Computer Inquiry, 
88 F:<!:"C. 2d 512, 542 (1981) ("Where this Commission has not 
required separation, regulatory tools such as accounting 
requirements and structural separation are available to the 
states in meeting their legitimate regulatory interests in 
insuring that an intrastate carrier's participation in 
unregulated activities is not at the expense of the 
colllmunications ratepayer." (Emphasis added.) Cf. Elimination of 
Telephone Company-Cable Cross-Ownership Rules :-. . for Rural 
Areas, 88 F.C.C.2d 564, 577 ("It is not our intention to preempt 
the rights of the states to adopt cross-ownership prohibitions as 
they see fit.") 
2/ With the exception of Centel, whose comments will be 
discussed below. 
USTA Comments at 3. 
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existence of this phenomenon. The comments of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA), Centel Corporation {Centel) and the Staff 
of the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) amply 
demonstrate that the cross-subsidy threat is real, whether or not 
• 
the venture is outside a telephone company's service area. 
The DOJ states that, even outside of a telephone company's 
service area, "the problem of cross-subsidy may persist. Thus, 
an exchange carrier may win franchises away from potentially more 
efficient suppliers, while gaining unjustifiably high rates for 
its telephone service . .. JJ 
Although the DOJ endorses the Commission's proposal to grant 
blanket authorization, its position is based not on the belief 
that the potential for mischief does not exist, but rather on an 
assumption that the Commission may have more cost-effective means 
of policing the problem.:§/ However, the DOJ cites only "other 
review procedures" -- wlii ch are left unspecified -- that will 
identify cross-subsidies.2/ 
We do not agree that there are "other review procedures" 
which can effectively control what Centel calls the "propensity 
for local telephone companies to misallocate cable television 
21 DOJ Comments, p. 6 n.l2. 
~ "If the Commission has other sources of information available 
to it~at it can use to carry out its regulatory 
responsibilities ..• the regulatory transaction costs of 
implementing new services can be safely and substantially reduced 
by the Commission's proposal." ·...!!!· pp. 6-7. (Emphasis added). 
2/ ~· p. 7. But see our discussion below. 
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Final Judgment to the AT&T Consent Decree (OOJ Memorandum),l!/ 
the DOJ amplified its concerns regarding entry of the Bell 
Operating Companies (BOCa) into competitive lines of business, 
such as the cable television business. 
The OOJ Memorandum points out not only the traditional 
threat of direct cross-subsidization through misallocation of 
costs,ll/ but also the danger of indirect cross-subsidization by 
joint capital formation. The DOJ Memorandum notes: 
To the extent funds for a competitive venture 
were raised jointly with the relatively 
"riskless" regulated service • • • the coat of 
capital to the regulated BOC would be 
raised • • • • The SOC's ratepayers would 
therefore be subsidizing the activities of the 
competitive venture by assuming, through 
higher interest rates, part of t~,/risk of the 
competitive enterprise's future. 
An added prohibition by the FCC against joint capital formation 
in telephone company cable ventures will make a separate 
subsidiary requirement more effective in preventing the risk of 
entering into speculative competitive ventures from being shifted 
to monopoly ratepayers. 
In addition to direct and indirect cross-subsidization from 
misallocation of costs and joint capital formation, the DOJ 
Memorandum also points to the danger that telephone company 
personnel will divert their attention from running the regulated 
l!/ Memorandum of the United States Concerning Removal of Line 
of Business Restrictions Pursuant to Section VIII (C) and 
Response to Motions of Bell Atlantic and BellSouth, U.S.A. v. 
Western Electric Co., Civ. No. 82-0192 (O.D.C. Feb. 21, 1984). 
1.9..· p. 11. 
1.9..·, p. 9. 
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III. Structural Protections Can Deter Cross-Subsidization 
Without Harming Either Cable or Telephone Service 
• 
cross-subsidization will thus be encouraged by the grant of 
blanket Section 214 authorization, if no structural safeguards 
are imposed, to the detriment of the telephone ratepayer, the 
cable television industry and the cable subscriber. The DOJ 
Memorandum, 17/ the NTIA Comments, 181 and those of Centel cite 
structural separation as a proper solution to this cross-subsidy 
threat. 
Because Centel both owns large independent telephone 
subsidiaries, and, through a separate subsidiary, serves 
approximately 23p,ooo cable television subscribers, its comments 
~ Since a telephone utility's staffing levels ought to be 
prudent and necessary, its existing technical and administrative 
staff should not have spare time with which to plan, construct 
and operate a cable system. If the telephone utility is 
overstaffed, the remedy to protect the telephone ratepayer is to 
disallow the expense, not to encourage that the utility enter 
competitive businesses so its staff will be able to keep busy. 
Local telephone service is a utility service in part because 
it is a necessity. Telephone companies have staffing levels 
which are needed to restore service promptly in emergencies. It 
would not be in the interests of the telephone ratepayer to have 
employees of the local telephone .company, hired to handle peak 
demands, diverted to cable television matters in the event of a 
severe storm or other emergency. Similarly, cable television 
subscribers would suffer if those operating the cable system were 
to owe their primary allegiance to maintenance of the telephone 
system and in the event of a severe storm telephone service was 
100% restored before any repairs to the cable system took place. 
J:2/ ..2.!!. DOJ Memorandum, pp. 11-14. 
NTIA Comments, p. 2. 
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are particularly on point. Centel argues that cross-subsidy 
probleu "can be dealt with more effectively through a 
requirement that telephone companies maintain separate accounts 
for their cable operations, or perhaps through a requirement that 
cable operations be conducted through a subsidiary of the 
teieehone company ... 19/ 
Centel's own separation shows that such a requirement is 
workable. Its cable operations "are the responsibility of 
officers who are different from the officers responsible for the 
operations of its telephone services." 20/ Centel in fact gains 
benefits from this structure. Through separation, Centel is aQle 
to ensure that its cable operations "are not burdened with 
unnecessary regulation. "W 
IV. Conclusion 
Centel's Comments, as well as those of every other party to 
this proceeding other than the telephone companies, indicate the 
reasonableness of CCTA's view that blanket Section 214 autho-
rization should not be granted absent structural protections. 
Those parties whose comments have pointed out the dangers of 
cross-subsidy, but have felt the Section 214 process inadequate 
to deal with them, should embrace CCTA's compromise solution. 
'CCTA has also pointed out that, where separate subsidiaries are 
19/ Centel Comments, p. 8 (emphasis added). 
w ..!.!!·· p. 3. 
Id., p. 8, n.6. 
-
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not selected, the Section 214 process does supply data to the FCC 
and other interested parties that can be used to determine the 
public interest grounds for approval or disapproval of the 
application, including·the potential for cross-subsidy. 
This is a form of "optional deregulation" or "earned 
• 
deregulation" that gives the affected telephone company the 
ability to make a business judgment as to how it wishes to 
conduct its non-common carrier activities outside its service 
area. A careful balancing of the public interest on both sides 
of this question requires no less. 
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